A glimpse of a future naval special operations mission

Thanks to the jesters at the futurist court’s table over at io9, we note a most interesting concept in circulation for new urban development project – at sea. The environment will be a tailored cross between luxury resort, cruise ship, and a small city. Throw in a casino and conventional center, and you have an interesting playground for what the designers presumably hope will be the rich and famous.

Should such a vessel ever be constructed, however, one can imagine its prominence as a target for maritime terrorism and piracy. And while authoring that threat assessment would be quite interesting, we are not sure we would want to be in the company directors’ shoes when briefing those results to an insurer such as Lloyds of London.

More interestingly yet, this inevitable threat raises the distinct possibility that a future naval special operations mission would be required to respond to a potential incident aboard. With anywhere between 20,000 to 50,000 souls on board, and what will likely be an internal architecture quite different from other maritime vessels, such a mission would no doubt be taxing in the extreme for even the most capable unit. Even the barge-like hull structure and high rise type construction envisioned by the ship’s builders would impose its own complications on such an operation.

While the concept itself looks slick enough, it is far from certain whether it would ever be ready for primetime. However, the idea does provide interesting fodder for intelligence professionals seeking to explore future scenarios for unconventional warfare and counterterrorism. And one cannot beat that back to the 80’s feel of the whole endeavor, even if one should include the more modern elements of Somali pirates and radical Islamist terrorist actors in the scenario itself. After all, it has been some time since considering the response to a vessel hijacking incident has been new enough to occasion comment.

For those future operators which may one day be tasked with this kind of mission, at least there is some solace to know that it will likely occur in a pleasant climate. After all, the rich do not generally favour less hospitable weather – which makes this a far cry from the typical oil rig takedown.

RAND views analytic tradecraft

The new RAND study “Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis” has been out for more than a few days now, but deserves an in depth look by those that may have merely given it a passing glance. It was brought to our attention by the Analyst’s Corner, which has become increasingly consistently interesting (although we knew it would be, given the earlier writings of its author.)

What is interesting is that the report is very much a snapshot of a transition period – one might even be temped to say one that was taken at the height of the revolution in intelligence affairs. We agree with our virtual colleague Michael Tanji in his statement that “The dominant pattern in the U.S. intelligence agencies has been not stasis but almost constant revision, even to the point of disruption.” It is for this reason we have tended to look upon the cottage industry of intelligence reform with great suspicion, as too often of late we have had more than our fill of academics and other outsiders writing in with inspiration from what those in forward deployed locations often call the good idea fairy.

However, RAND’s study brings to the debate a number of important concepts, that while not new, certainly need to be circulated more widely. In part, this is due to the commendable methodology chosen for the study, in conducting formalized interviews across the community, targeted against not merely the ever changing organization charts (which as RAND itself noted “names have been a moving target”, given reorganization), but against the National Intelligence Priorities Framework and the Analytic Resource Catalog.

Among these critical concepts are the emphasis that analytic tradecraft is about the management of tradeoffs. There are few other human endeavors where this is not true, but for too long the community has focused on the ideal state, rather than maximizing the best possible outcome from the existing states. The ideal picture approach is very much an academic conceit, and assumes a mythical power to create organizational change simply by redrawing organograms or renaming offices under some centralized directive from on high. The real community simply does not respond to such abstracts in the clean and dispassionate fashion that many reformists would wish for. These tradeoffs are also one of the reason initiatives which begin organically within the working level line analysis shops are the most successful, as they allow those with the greatest stake in the outcome to balance their tradeoffs to the best possible effect.

The RAND study addresses interesting aspects of the increasingly dominant focus on current intelligence at the expense of longer term deep analysis. It also touches upon the issues of compensation and human resources that we have so often mentioned in these pages. We are quite pleased to see an increasing recognition of the importance of targeting analysis as a distinct discipline within the field – and given the delay between the interviews and the release of the public paper – one that we feel has been increasingly internalized within the community.

Collaboration and data sharing issues are discussed, but fall far lower in the spectrum than discussions of intelligence quality and value – quite in line with our own experiences.

The need to strengthen analytic training and education throughout the community is likewise emphasized, with the idea of a standard curriculum model again surfacing. We are aware of at least one quite promising effort in that regard, that goes far beyond what is typical academic fare; and hope to see further aspects of the model developed for mid-level and journeyman class analysis audiences in future iterations.

All in all, the RAND study is an excellent contribution to the literature which we are grateful now sees the light of day. There is much food for thought, which we will no doubt revisit again in due course. We did initially give pause upon a day’s reflection, fearing our agreement with the paper stemmed too much from a potential echo chamber effect of seeing similar views reflected back at us. However, these are things that are rarely formally captured in discussions of reform or the future of intelligence (at least, those written by outsiders). It is important to get them onto the table in a more formal setting – for as much as we believe in the value of the blog, it is a different vehicle for inquiry and scholarship than that of a more rigorous study approach.

Imaginary constellations meet visionary capabilities

We rarely comment on ongoing matters in the intelligence world due to the natural restrictions which accompany a professional’s responsibilities. However, the very public intercept of USA193 does touch upon an issue that we have previously discussed in these pages – the disconnect between what assets those planning for the future intelligence community thought they would have, and those that exist in an IC in which we have gone to war with what we actually have.

The shot itself has been extensively discussed by others, including In From the Cold, Arms Control Wonk, Ares, Danger Room, and many of the more mainstream blogs. We will not rehash these public details.

However in this particular instance, we find the contrast between the notional pieces on the chess board (and the detritus they left behind when the model came tumbling down) quite striking against the very effective real world capabilities offered by one of the most condemned warfighting concepts of recent history - hit to kill. These differences are also at the heart of the classic tensions between intelligence and operators. But it also demonstrates the value of innovative vision – and the need for persistent effort towards what may seem an unachievable goal. The operation also shows the adaptability of those capabilities towards missions that may never before have been conceived – particularly when the tools to execute them were first on the drafting boards.

The debates of the past few decades across all of the systems involved, and last night’s operation itself, also brings to mind the Bill Whittle’s now seminal essay on Tribes. The defense space community gave the public an unprecedented glimpse of world of the Gray at the high frontier. The press briefing (found here) is as specific a discussion as ever has occurred regarding a once entirely classified area. One has to remember that only a few short years ago, even the name of the National Reconnaissance Office was not publicly acknowledged – let alone the kind of systems of systems approach evident in this operation. But the briefing also displays strong analytic tradecraft, and an excellent use of estimative language to communicate intelligence and operational information in a transparent manner. It was indeed an impressive display, and is well worth studying for those that are in the business of facing tough talks.

Altogether, this was a unique mission, and those involved will be able to look back on the operation with pride. They have most deservedly earned the drinks being poured last night and this morning. Space control has a new face. Let us hope that this will also be the symbol that inspires future generations of capabilities on the intelligence side of the house, and the desire to avoid any other holes in the imagined sky.

On analytic environments

It has been a while since we have revisited this subject. We are still strong believers in the adage that if one stares long enough into the cubicle, then the abyss stares back. However, long gone are the halcyon days of an IC influenced by the dot com era, seeking to implement revolutionary new space designs for a more creative atmosphere. Now, we face constant compression, and the ad hoc creation of new kinds of environments in the far flung realms of our forward deployed edge, as well as the unique spaces of the watch and fusion centers that now proliferate throughout the community.

But it is occasionally worth reflecting on what might be, if one were to challenge the dominant archetype of the current analytic environment. New spaces are being built all the time, and the further one goes from the Beltway, the more potential one finds for innovation – especially in the face of decentralization pressures.

We are not looking for something so radical as to be out of place even in modern corporate culture. Certainly nothing like the brooding industrial era estates one finds out in the wilds of “other” Virginia that might be readily re-purposed to the cause, but would remind one of a nearly HP Lovecraft atmosphere better fitted to the home of the fictional Laundry (or perhaps more appropriately, its American Black Chamber counterpart.)

Rather, we look to the best in class commercial entrepreneurs whose primary business is that of the mind. We have written many times before about the approaches taken by Google, and think enough has been said for that comparison. We would this time around seek to highlight the new spaces created for Microsoft’s Research division, also as iconic an institution of thought as any in modern America. We are fortunate that the roving blogger Robert Scoble has profiled this unique environment in a recent photo series.

We think there are lessons in these designs which can be distilled for the new IC. We are certain that given the option, many of the best and brightest would vote with their feet in favour of such environments - should they ever become available in an enlightened organization.

Interfacing with the future

We have long had a fascination with the emerging edge of new interface technologies, if only because we frequently encounter the need to work with these Babbage engine contraptions under a variety of circumstances far outside those envisioned by the original designers. While we are quite aware that the space is quite littered with the remnants of failed attempts at new concepts and the broken dreams of the paleo-future, we nonetheless hold out hope for certain new technologies from time to time – a triumph of optimism over experience.

One technology – the interactive multi-touch style of whiteboard / display – has in particular caught our attention. It is a curious artifact, insofar as it was most famously profiled (in stunningly attractive set dressing) in the science fiction film Minority Report. In an unusual reversal, however, it was the jesters that invited the futurists to the table. Peter Schwartz, of the Global Business Network (and the Art of the Long View), was among those commissioned to enhance a number of the forecasted technological and social changes that provided a good number of “eyeball kicks” in the movie.

We are pleased to note that the ever innovative folks at Carnegie Mellon University are struggling to make this sort of technology a reality. Even more interestingly, they are doing so using low cost commoditized components repurposed from popular entertainment systems. The street does indeed find its own uses for things, in the famous formulation of another jester.

Whether such a technology will actually prove to be of value for the intelligence professional remains to be seen once working implementations are available for testing. We can however already think of certain scenarios – including in VTCs, watch operations centers, and situational awareness applications – where such an interface would be of great value for collaborative discussion and production. Coupled with the right big board type display, and driven by one of the better fusion portals, we could certainly see this garnering the same kind of rave reviews that first greeted the trials of the Knowledge Wall.

SIGINT in the exaflood environment

There has been a lot of talk recently regarding the implications of the rising rate of data exchange for policy issues such as network neutrality and broadband penetration. The term exaflood - coined by one particularly lobbying group - is apt enough, even if one doesn’t necessarily agree with their proposed solution approaches.

There has been however little discussion of the implications of this expansion for the intelligence community – at least in public and academic circles. The current debate is too much caught up in the things of lawyers and politicians, wrangling continuously over legislation drafted when networks were switched by telephone system hardware and connectivity not much different from the transoceanic telegraph systems of a century previously. Those are questions of whether or not the US should even be engaged in such activities, and are far too closely reminiscent of the short-sighted political decisions which resulted in the closure of the Black Chamber – with the potential for equally devastating consequences.

Traditional SIGINT techniques – even within the relatively new realm of digital network intelligence – are the products of an earlier era, in which the target set and its emanations were distinct enough from its environment to be amenable to capture and analysis using a certain degree of discrimination. The kinds of intelligence that will be required against the adversaries of tomorrow will be increasingly less able to rely on the traditional tradecraft which is undergirded by such assumptions.

We do agree with the statement, frequently attributed to former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis & Production Mark Lowenthal, to the effect that “there is no such thing as information overload, only poor analytical strategies.” However, the exaflood will challenge both collection and analytical strategies such as never before. Against this backdrop, we look to the continuing infrastructure, language, and human resources challenges faced by those in this section of the community, and greatly wonder if our future community will be adequate to the task.

This is an intelligence challenge that goes far beyond the classic view of conversations that is implied with the COMINT model. Critical value will be found in the relationship and intentionality of information within the digital deluge as much as the actual items itself. One need only look to the importance of identifying individuals in video and photo, such as VOA Iran scandal or the as yet unresolved counterintelligence questions surrounding the relatives of Nada Prouty, for a glimpse of the future impact of such changes on the way the community does business.

Short of some unexpected development in artificial intelligence which will allow for a weakly-godlike appreciation of this overwhelming mass of largely undifferentiated packets, new approaches will be desperately needed. One can only get so far with human-centered processing strategies (at least without introducing a much large pool of vetted practitioners in a Mechanical Turk like system.) And we will still face the essential limitations of time – the time needed to immerse, incubation, and cultivate a longer term appreciation of the narrow windows into complex issues SIGINT will provide, even in the new environment.

It is our contention that the native competency of intelligence in the cyber environment has yet to be recognized. The nature of cyber intelligence in its mature form will have shifted so far from its roots in the SIGINT and even OSINT disciplines that it may well be unrecognizable to the practitioners of today (no matter how complex the Large Scale Internet Exploitation System or how many dark web projects are built for OSINT purposes).

We do not yet know what the new discipline will look like, nor how it will ultimately be shaped. But we are very interested to observe its evolution, and are privileged to be present at its creation.

Riding the coffin

We have been taken to task recently by several of our close friends on the sharper side of the profession for focusing too much as of late on the analytical and privatized segments of the field. While we are the first to note that it is far harder to write in the public forum regarding the darker aspects of the intelligence professional’s world, we have indeed been less focused on those rare opportunities which might serve to inspire discussion and debate regarding the history and future of the operational house.

Thus we are pleased to note, via Aviation Week’s Ares blog, the following glimpse of the future of covert insertion techniques that would no doubt make even an OSS or SOE veteran wince. It enters the public sphere tucked away in a longer discussion of future warfighting concepts.

“The spookily labeled Coffin In The Sky (CITS) concept was a result of Northrop Grumman's engineers talking to SOF operators. The bomber would carry up to 12 modified Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) weapons, each fitted with a pressurized life-support container for one person. After launch, the missiles would fly deep into hostile territory, pop the containers open and release the operators for a HAHO (high altitude, high opening) parachute descent.”

Any piece of equipment named the “coffin” does not exactly inspire confidence, and reminds us of the old expression from the first days of discussing the probabilities of success of early orbital recovery systems – “NASA odds”.

What amazes us is not that the oddity of the concept, but rather the fact that is now a rational part of military futures exercises. This was once the stuff of pure science fiction – and as always, the jester’s at the table forecast it more accurately than the think tanks. The concept joins a rapidly growing list of successful predictions by author Bruce Sterling – who foresaw something very closely akin to the technique, including the consequences of a failed landing, in his short story Taklamakan. (Among his many other insights were the use of armed UAV’s for selective assassination and the rise of Islamic insurgency as a defining problem in Africa – envisioned in the 1980s’, no less.)

We have in our time done a lot of dangerous - and some might even say, foolish - things on the way into, and out of, some very bad places in the world. While we are not eager to repeat them unless absolutely required in pursuit of the mission, this new concept sounds at least as safe as riding in a taxi in some parts of the disconnected Gap, and certainly about as comfortable as the Fulton skyhook….

Lessons of the strike

We have never been much a fan of unions in this modern era of incredible individual opportunity and rapid innovation – qualities seemingly quite at odds with the behavior of most forms of organized labor. We do however freely admit that unions have their place in a competitive market economy so long as individuals are free to choose to organize (or not) as their preference dictates, free from pressure or intimidation. For a variety of reasons, however, we have never had much call to consider organized labor within the context of the intelligence community (though the actions overseas unions were indeed a prominent feature of political analysis during the Cold War.)

Thus, the ongoing Hollywood writer’s strike is quite unfamiliar territory to contemplate. We have long known that the studios which drive that town are essentially specialized forms of financial vehicles designed to leverage investment against the high initial costs of media production and distribution against a potential return measured in popularity (and attending profits). In the course of our musings on the death of other forms of traditional media – particularly those of the fishwrapper variety - we have enjoyed the analysis of various contemporary commentators and pundits who sought to describe the impact of the digital revolution on these entities’ future. However, in the past they had seemed sufficiently disconnected from the concerns of the community’s own revolution in intelligence affairs that we could discern no potential lessons learned – with the possible exception of the fiasco that digital rights management (DRM) implementations have become, and the attending incentives for new cryptanalysis and covert communications technologies that emerged for defeating such DRM and related copyright enforcement systems.

However, the serial entrepreneur (and philanthropist) Marc Andreessen offers up a new piece regarding the strike that has spurred us to reconsider that opinion. His take on the situation is a classic example of opportunity analysis - and one well worth reading not merely for its insight into the potential of a Silicon Valley business model for the next generation media business.

While we differ with those who characterize the profession of intelligence as a specialized form of journalism or (albeit wonkish) media, we cannot argue with many of the very real parallels between intelligence community production processes and consumer outcomes issues to those experienced in the “Industry”. Among the similarities we will concede are the eternal quest for consumer attention, the need for a perceived return on investment of that time for the consumer, and the increasing demands of a more mobile consumer base more closely attuned to 24/7 information streams, and the increasing availability of numerous alternative sources of substituting products. We also see the same kinds of monolithic industrial age structures – adapted for the demands of an earlier age, and often adrift in the current environment.

Thus Andreessen’s piece strikes a unique sort of chord as we contemplate the vast legions of line analysts and field collectors who toil under cumbersome layers of management bureaucracy – both within government and their contractor counterparts. Increasingly, the barriers to entry for those attempting to produce high quality finished intelligence based on unique information sources not commonly available are falling ever faster. In many cases, only the inertia of the incumbents and the market-distorting effects of a cumbersome clearance process are arguably the only reasons why alternative products based on open source information and other, non-governmental intelligence efforts do not surface to defeat entrenched but uncompetitive offerings. But the incentives for the development of alternative models are clearly also present. And in key emerging issue areas, such as the cyber domain, there is the earliest indicators that such alternative may yet develop – perhaps paving the way for other efforts targeting other key accounts.

There is also a line that we note particularly well in the context of our earlier examination of the numbers of intelligence students graduating from the academic programs that will likely never hold a clearance, but will still seek employment utilizing their professional skillset and education. “after all, if you really can't work for the Man, why not start your own company, if you can”? We have no doubt that many of those not in the favored 28% will also take note – and we would not be willing to bet against their chances of success.

On the 500…

It’s not quite the epic of Spartan battles – nor even the parody which declares, “Tonight we dine in Virginia.” But the DNI’s newly released 500 day plan has something akin to martial feel to it – albeit buried somewhere in the glossy public relations image management slick. One can sense the fights to come over its execution, quietly brewing somewhere in the administrative offices.

We understand the need for strategic planning, particularly to move large bureaucracies in new directions. This is especially apparent when there are multiple such bureaucracies involved – all of which who have previous shown hostility of varying degrees towards the commander’s intent on transformation.

Yet we cannot help but note Zenpundit’s accurate calling out of the Soviet flavor to the exercise. The core and enabling initiatives most surely do have a certain ideological element to them – the kind of deeply abstract ideal one expects to see scrawled in meter high characters on some Chinese banner outside the People’s Party Congress. And some offer little more than slogan – such as the continued insistence on a kind of diversity most likely to be interpreted by skin color or gender metrics rather than the measures which are truly needed, such as language capabilities, personal travel and regional experiences, unique skills and backgrounds, or other forms of real thought diversity.

Most critically, though much of the philosophy within the document tracks with what we here at Kent’s Imperative have long emphasized, we remain somewhat skeptical of the implementation of true steps towards the revolution in intelligence affairs. Too often we have seen major programs begun with high hopes, only to see the usual bureaucratic inertia and poisons corrupt the efforts into a pale imitation of what could have been.

But in fact, those efforts which we have seen to be successful were the ones built around a shared vision and dream. These are the concepts and ideas which were successfully branded – often in a manner that provoked multiple competing interpretations (and therefore growth and innovation.) They were the programs which drove imitation and expansion in new contexts and new environments – often by those who may not have even seen the originals, but rather merely re-created them whole from the cloth of rumour. Such efforts were themselves often more useful and innovative than the programs they sought to copy, even though they too often suffered from the poor cousins’ syndrome, with a sort of cargo cult sadness about them. But as a wise man once said, you have to want a frontier.

Thus we sincerely hope that the 500 day plan will drive more professionals within the community towards the kinds of shared vision that can propel forward transformation. From its sterile and glossy pages there are the hints of far more radical ideas and deeper changes spoken of in the dissident literature, and in the back halls and vaults. The first intimations of real change are on the wind…. but will this be merely another wisp of smoke from distant shores?

The sun rises on Japanese intelligence

Further to the study of comparative intelligence traditions, we note the recent increased discussion of the role and activities of the intelligence profession in Japan.

The country’s WWII legacy has long made discussion of such matters extremely controversial within the context of the domestic political scene. Recent publications have however shed new light on otherwise neglected aspects of the country’s own intelligence community.

The National Bureau of Asian Research has recently reviewed two Japanese language books on the subject. The first, Nihon No Intelligence Kikan, was written by the former Chief of the Cabinet Secretariat Information Research Bureau – a position which seems very roughly analogous to a US counterpart of the NIC or even the old Office of National Estimates. The book describes the organization of the agency, its activities, and the role of OSINT in Japanese intelligence.

The second volume, Strategy on Intelligence Activity by the State, was authored as a dialogue between a former intelligence officer in the Japanese Foreign Ministry and a former intelligence officer from the South Korean Navy.

For those wishing to peruse more official sources as background before diving into such works, there is also a short briefing paper available from the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies, which provides a concise overview of the country’s intelligence structure.

We are pleased to see the internationalization of intelligence studies amongst our allies, and hope to see additional similar works in the near future (as well as English language printings…)


(With our humble thanks to the reader who kindly brought this to our attention).

Intel 3.14159265

A lot has been said recently about the application of Web 2.0 technologies to the intelligence community. The debate has also attracted new bloggers to the field – some academic / student, some more professional.

But this debate occurs at a time when many are seeking to identify the next generation of technologies beyond the current crop of lightweight / social / rich experience / web as platform entrants that have defined the generation. Some commentators have even gone so far as to declare the Web 2.0 meme dead – ironically at around the same time as the intelligence community has just begun to manage to wrap its collective head around the possibilities of the technology, with things like Intelink blogs, Intellipedia, and now the new A-Space.

We remain uncertain what the next new wave of technologies might bring to the community. However, certain tantalizing possibilities do present themselves. The Web 2.0 revolution is fundamentally a change to the way information is shared and internalized by those tasked with production – in short, the way analysis is done. (And contrary to the self-aggrandizing claims of certain university types, real distributed collaborative analytical work is being done in the environment of the community’s wikis and blogs, not merely just descriptive summation.) New analytic tradecraft is developing, enabled by these new technologies, in ways that it is frankly impossible to fully predict. We have only begun to observe the first outlines, hinting at what might eventually be the native competence of these environments.

Given that Intel 2.0 is all about exchange and analysis, the next iteration of revolutionary transformation will likely change forever the dynamics of intelligence collection. The systems and processes which dominate collection as a problem set remain firmly mired in industrial age models, part of the long legacy of the cultures which gave them birth. The new generation entering these fields will bring with them changes which cannot be forestalled for long.

Exactly what the nature of these changes might be is another question entirely, however. The community has not fully grasped the implications of iteration 2.0, and peering forward to what will come after is less an exercise in forecasting as it is in fortune-telling. In this, however, we unapologetically look to the jesters at the futurists court’s table – the speculative fiction authors, who may fearlessly explore these new spaces unbound by the constraints of the mundane.

It is from one such writer we recently observed the fascinating potential for emergence at the intersection of several technologies and social changes. Charles Stross is no stranger to writing about intelligence in fiction – quite enjoyably crossed with elements of the fantastic in an elaborate Cold War allegory (which he has also sought to explain in an essay on "The Golden Age of Spying", well worth reading even for those professionals which otherwise eschew the genre). His latest novel, Halting State, touches again upon the work, this time presenting a series of intriguing suggestions regarding future trajectories of the field. Among his concepts (one of which led to the title of this post) are that alternative reality games might be adapted to training a pool of unwitting subjects for future intelligence and related support tasks, that an age of nearly ubiquitous networks will lead to new emphasis on classic HUMINT operations, and potential radical changes in field operations will be enabled by the introduction and common adoption of augmented reality vision displays. He further highlights the nature of the potential future adversary – the “blacknet” of highly networked transaction driven hostile connectivity which enables a market of illicit goods and services (including those things of economic value in persistent virtual worlds) exchanged on behalf of criminal and other adversarial interests.

Like all good speculative storytelling, it is based on elements of the future which are already here, but not evenly distributed (in the words of Gibson). A fascinating menu of potential, to say the least, the implications of which are well worth exploring in a more formal manner within the community. Again, if ever there were a role for the intel studies academia…

Electronic attack and advanced denial and deception in new contexts

The technical boffins over at O’Reilly Radar have highlighted an interesting potential scenario, first put forth by Aviation Week, to explain the apparent failure of the Syrian air defense network during last month’s air strikes by Israel.

This is not the first time that public reporting has emerged discussing the potential applications of sophisticated EW techniques in suppressing adversary air defense networks. One can recall similar speculative stories coming out in the initial days of major combat operations of OIF in 2003.

What makes this interesting is the boffins’ discussion of engineering new public networks to defeat these kinds of attacks in the context of other, civil applications. One can easily understand the desire to do so in order to protect the integrity of wide-scale surveillance networks such as London’s ring of steel. There are less obvious applications in assuring the reliability of monitoring systems which do not rely on even such unambiguous elements as video feeds – perhaps large scale environmental monitoring programs? Given the research dollars flowing towards theories of climate change, one can easily see the potential motivations for manipulation of sensors and associated data streams at the source, in order to avoid the appearance of bias in later analysis.

These approaches will rapidly scale beyond their original military context as widely implemented sensors systems come into more common civil use. One can easily picture such efforts directed against GPS based highway toll and use monitoring systems, for example, or against other RFID or cellular population density measurements. (Persistent virtual worlds have already proven the potential benefits to retail and other establishments from manipulating such “popularity” measurements based on presence related data. The real world would be no different.)

The Wizard’s War is always with us. It just grows more interesting over time.

Novel UFACs

The evolving sophistication of commercial construction techniques is increasingly popularizing elaborate underground structures for a variety of entirely novel applications. The latest of these – urban luxury homes in development restricted areas - are profiled by various British print media outlets.

London’s newest urban underground reminds us a great deal of author William Gibson’s fictional “stealth houses” – structures designed to conceal high value properties entirely within apparently abandoned industrial areas, providing security through obscurity.

However, these are very real examples of the growing complexity of urban geographies – and the increasing challenge to planners, operators, and intelligence professionals which will encounter these spaces in the cities of the tomorrow. Such future underground facilities will make the Hezbollah fortifications in urban Beirut encountered during the Harb al Tammuz in 2006 look insignificant in comparison.

While costly, these architectures do not require a great deal more sophistication than any other typical commercial construction project, especially any building that already requires building sub-basements for drainage, power, or HVAC systems. Of course, it is even easier to arrange for these features when fitted to new building sites.

Frankly, we are quite surprised we have not seen these yet in the high value property markets in Manhattan, San Francisco’s Bay area, or in particular the greater Washington DC metro area – there are plenty of row homes in Georgetown, Arlington or Alexandria that one would suspect might benefit from such modifications (though we suppose there is always the question of the water table to worry about in some of those areas). But give it time…

Of course, familiarization tours for new analysts to these types of underground facilities will be far more pleasant than the trips taken by their counterparts. We would certainly far rather enjoy a glass of wine next to a private pool than tramp through the damp tunnels of some Cold War era concrete structure.

UPDATE: Thanks to one of our readers who wrote in to recommend changing the choice of acronym from UFAC (underground facility) to HDBT (hard and deeply buried target). The specific meaning of the original wording within the IC apparently now creates some confusion based on its typical application to the analytic center responsible for study of these targets. (Our use was based on a more generalized, and perhaps older, naming convention - in the same manner that derived naming for chow halls and other structures. We shall have to update our style guide.) Text above corrected in accordance with that convention, with our humblest apologies to the fine folks over at the center, and sincere gratitude to those who raised the matter.

Intelligence for the sixth generation warfighter

We seem to having found ourselves, by virtue of the most excellent work being done over at 5GW Theory Timeline and elsewhere, enmeshed more deeply in the continuing debate over the ongoing revolution(s) in military affairs. We enjoy the intellectual exercise of considering the implications of changing technologies, social structures, political arrangements, and economic factors on war in the next generations. After all, the matters of intelligence are often deeply intertwined with war, and we strong believe that the transformation of intelligence - away from an industrial age bureaucracy dedicated to counting things to an agile, knowledge worker driven enterprise focused on understanding and forecasting the subtle dynamics of complex systems – will require engagement to the very boundaries of current n generation theory.

That being said, we do think that there is distinct limit to the current foreseeability of future GW. The radical changes that will be introduced in even the near future – let alone on the distant horizon – will challenge even the best of minds. In this, we would crib Nassim Nicholas’ Taleb’s analogy that in order to predict current events in Mesopotamia from the perspective of the Neanderthal, one has to understand the invention of the wheel first, and every subsequent technological and social change after – an impossible task, given that if one has the knowledge to predict an innovation one usually has the concept required to build it sooner rather than later.

This limitation is essentially defined by the Singularity – the event horizon beyond which we cannot predict future technological or social changes, due to the inherently radical nature of the intermediate changes – and the accelerating effects of those shifts - that will bring society to that point.

Purpleslog and Shloky note that this becomes a useful upper boundary for the unknown n in the generations of warfare. 6th generation warfare is therefore post-singularity warfare, and essentially and entirely unpredictable from the perspective where we now stand.

It thus follows as a corollary that intelligence in 6GW would be similarly as difficult to predict. This gives those of us engaged in the continuing study of (and participation in) the revolution in intelligence affairs a useful upper boundary for our speculations.

This boundary also helps place perhaps the most enigmatic and promising element in the debates regarding the future of intelligence: the potential for intelligence collection and processing to be radically altered by developments in quantum science. These are developments that will occur both in the immediate future and deep out-years timeline, and offer the potential to create new sensors and entire new intelligence disciplines. Quantum intelligence, or QINT, might thus take its place in the pantheon among the earlier forms of technologically derived intelligence such as IMINT, SIGINT and MASINT. And based on what we believe regarding the future Singularity, QINT will be a late stage 4GW and full course 5GW discipline. It may also be the discipline that is most important in carrying forward into the event horizon of 6GW and beyond.

But those post-Singularity futures lie far beyond our humble perspective, and we content ourselves with having seen described this upper boundary – and find our sense of the discussion renewed to focus on those elements within the reach of where we currently stand.

A glimpse of Porter’s Five Forces at work in the commercial imagery industry

Not so long (chronologically) but an eternity (in terms of privatization concepts) ago, the first generation of high resolution commercial space based imagery systems for intelligence came into existence. These architectures – and their operators – spent far longer than they ever should have needed to in fighting for their rightful place at the intelligence table. The very idea of private sector capabilities usurping the government monopoly on overhead systems was so unthinkable for many within the community that had the Long War not gone hot and every second of imaging capacity been desperately needed, we might never have seen the development of the industry – let alone the remarkable directions that it has trended towards in the hands of the Google / Keyhole team.

At the dawn of its earliest, hard fought, and tentative acceptance, another new technology was emerging. Unlike the expensive and arcane world of satellites, the UAV offered an immediate, accessible, and understandable tool to the community. More importantly, it was a technology they could directly control throughout its full life-cycle – and that is critical to a certain kind of procurement and operations mindset.

Needless to say, the UAV has been a Very Good Thing for the GEOINT community – and at the same time, opened new frontiers in the mix between collection, analysis and warfighting. But these systems largely remain dedicated to looking at the battlespace through a soda straw. It is for that reason that many of the proponents of imagery intelligence continue to dismiss the idea that UAV’s will ever compete with the better resourced national technical means – or even their commercial imaging counterparts – in providing theatre-level and strategic IMINT.

The true dynamics of competition are very rarely understood within the halls of government, and too often likewise among the contractors which are ever so sensitively attuned to non-rational markets dominated by government dictum that they can no longer recognize the forces at work in the open market. (There is a reason why the Long War’s most popular acquisition programs have occurred through proponency from the ground up – often by individuals and small units voting with their feet, and government cards.)

Thus we note with interest the first indicators that the received wisdom regarding the relative competitive positioning of UAVs versus other more traditional overhead systems may soon be subject to radical change – brought on by pressures along a different axis of Porter’s Five Forces model.

The home-built UAV market is emerging in fascinating ways from a simple, if obscure, hobby, into much more sophisticated technical and conceptual approaches. Chris Anderson (of Long Tail fame) is doing much to advance it through his own efforts, including integration of imagery collected through these personal UAV systems into a coherent processing framework – in this case, the ubiquitous Google Earth.

In a way, it is fitting to see that private hobbyist efforts may yet open new vistas for imagery intelligence – just as they did in the earliest days of “photographic intelligence” by balloon, bird, and kite.

We certainly think there are a few lessons being taught to the community here. In our mind’s eye, we see these lectures being given by the Mechanical Turk, with texts provided by Yochai Benkler, in a classroom not too dissimilar from what one might find in Second Life.

The literature of intelligence and the changing face of academic literature

One of the critical drivers of our Imperative has long been the need for a (better) intelligence literature. We have been sorely disappointed by too many years of attempts to rehash the old tired refrains of the debates that were outdated and overtaken by events long before the world changed and the Long War was joined in earnest. And for all the growth in the number of academic institutions and privatized intelligence shops, we have seen precious little in the way of innovation in the literature. (In part, this is excusable given the innovation which is occurring at the sharp end – and the lack of time and energy to write about them available to those practitioners which are fully engaged in the fight. But this is unforgivable in the academy and in the rear echelons… and note we do not define those solely on geographic terms.)

The stagnation of the field’s intellectual exchange and discourse is in no small part due to the lack of evolution in the major institutions of the literature to keep pace with the times. While some very good papers get written and published, they are few and far between in the major journals traditionally associated with the field. There have been even fewer new publications introduced into the field, despite a scattering of research across a dozen interdisciplinary outlets which clearly indicates a need for a larger publishing base – especially outside of the classified world. (And as much as we love Studies and Tradecraft Review, these august tomes offer very few opportunities to tap into the insights which might be offered by outside contributors. But then again, that was not their original mission, and it would be unfair to criticize a well honed tool such as a scalpel for failing to perform as a hammer…). The major presses in the academic world are too bound up in issues of copyrights and the slow, slow publication processes of yesteryear to effectively transform the literature.

We thus take great interest in the changes which are currently sweeping the academic literature in other fields. Among such changes have been the moves towards open access publishing, as well as the increasing proliferation of non-traditional alternatives for distribution and reputation-based evaluation.

We thus note an interesting concept of “fantasy” journals which was floated in economic circles (along with ideas for other incentives to encourage the growth of that field’s literature.) It is a most interesting idea, which could be rapidly implemented for the intelligence literature, and seems to offer good benefits towards encouraging readership of key papers among the less connected, busier, or newer members of the community which have not traditionally seen the consumption of this literature, let alone the participation in it, as a career priority.

This also brings us also to the idea of a virtual journal, which we have seen floated from time to time. We find it incredibly significant that among the most influential military publications of the day is the entirely virtual Small Wars Journal, which itself must grapple with many of the same tensions of operational security, publication review, and attribution issues that many have claimed would doom such an open publication effort. Yet SWJ successfully offers an appropriate forum for what are among the best writings by the leading thinkers in the counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and stability / support operations domain. There is little reason to believe that a virtual journal for the intelligence literature would fare worse.

We anticipate the development of such an effort in the very near future. Prospective contributors are welcome to contact us for further details in advance of the initial call for papers.

Watching the source of first resort

There has recently been a tremendous amount of movement in the open source intelligence space. The sea change in the information environment, whose earliest glimmer became apparent over a decade ago, has now created tides which now batter the intelligence community in an undeniable fashion.

To our eyes, however, much of the current discussion surrounding open source intelligence is like a drowning man flailing for a life raft. Too many individuals are looking for magic – the idea that information will simply appear, for free, out of the technological changes which have shifted the nature of what it means to do intelligence as an activity. Worse yet, we see a number of organizations frantically scrambling to find a way to re-establish their role as a gatekeeper, and to ensure their centrality in the future intelligence environment.

We thus are uncertain of what to make of the new CSIS report discussing a “Trusted Information Network” for open source intelligence production. We are unabashed proponents of OSINT - having both cut our teeth in its earliest (modern) community iterations, and having long attempted to understand its evolution in the wider context of the privatization of intelligence.

We are also keenly cognizant of the growing importance of public/private partnerships which enable the intelligence community to tap into unique pockets of expertise, particularly for transnational issues and homeland security accounts. The government has for a long time now seen its monopoly on certain subject knowledge eroded to the point that it is barely even able to compete in certain fields. Others were never previously considered a domain in which the intelligence community should maintain competence – until the unanticipated emergence of higher order effects of critical national security import.

We think however the key to getting OSINT right is not the creation of another network of gatekeepers and filters, but rather the deliberate cultivation of catalysts whose interaction with the wider environment will produce strange attractors around which unique new collects and innovative analytic insights will naturally accrete. It is that organic development that we believe will be most critical to developing the kind of OSINT capabilities that can survive in the heavily engaged information environments of the information operations / strategic communications / public diplomacy battlespace. OSINT must contend daily with the problem that as a discipline, it is essentially drinking from a poisoned well.

Turning that tainted water – replete with the corpses of hostile ideologies, the detritus of senescent and irrelevant ideas long past their time, and the constant buzz of noise and falsehood – into a fountain from which analysts and decision-makers may drink will never be an easy task. It will require new forms of tradecraft, and new concepts of organization and activity that will greatly push the boundaries of the wheel and redefine ideas of what the intelligence community will itself be in this new environment.

Numbers game

With the increasing proliferation of intelligence studies programs within academia, and the ever growing size of classes within existing intelligence academies, we have begun to ponder in discussion the question of what do with these volumes of new graduates. After all, most academic programs have pursued growth in the inevitable pattern of most fiefdoms (for good or for ill), in order to be able to afford instructors, buildings, and all the interesting toys of the trade. But to what end?

To be sure, there is a significant need for additional intelligence professionals, and the creation of a good analysts and operators is the work of years, perhaps even decades. Those entering as freshman undergraduates will not be in the workforce until four or five years hence, and even then will most likely assume entry level positions. (Although more than a few stellar individuals may emerge to build entire new programs, as we have seen in the past, having worked for years during their time in school.) A decade hence, the majority will most likely be just coming into their own as senior analysts and junior managers.

But as we contemplate this pipeline from the perspective of the community, we seriously question whether the existing clearance system will be able to handle this volume of new, entry level recruits – particularly when they are geographically concentrated in a handful of areas. While the hiring sprees of the post 9/11 period were impressive, the creaking system shows no sign of reform. Given that less than a third of that population will be eligible for clearances in the first place (assuming no change to existing standards), we are looking at a glut of graduates entering the workforce that will not be assuming traditional roles within major agencies.

Of course, new positions within homeland security, at lower clearance standards, have been opening up – particularly in the state and local arena. Likewise, there are a number of non-cleared, intelligence related positions in marketing / business development and other proposal work, technical writing, open source intelligence and media analysis that have been emerging among the contractor shops. The private military companies are another outstanding question mark, for their eventual growth and shape is extremely difficult to predict at the moment.

The corporate world takes its percentage, with the ranks of competitive and business intelligence growing year by year (although constantly in the fight for budget, resources, and management attention in most shops – or in the consultants continual dance.) So too the new roles within corporate security and related critical infrastructure protection, closely tied to homeland security responsibilities but often even more global in perspective. There are even a few consulting roles in that space, for non-combatant and medical evacuation operations, travel intelligence, and political risk analysis.

As we contemplate the shining young faces of this years’ cohort, we greatly wonder if the programs that are taking new students’ money - and given the current costs of higher education, quite a lot of it indeed - are investing enough in the actions required to ensure placement in the field later on. In part, this is a matter of relationship building, most critically with the agencies and contracting shops that can expedite clearances for new hires, across a diverse enough set of offices and locations to be able to absorb the ranks of the freshly graduated. But it will also entail the cultivation of entirely different sorts of employers in the private sector, to take those whose past, or even current inclinations (rather than derogatory records), would have them seek work elsewhere within the field.

We also wonder if these programs will be able to incorporate the development of the kinds of skills these students will need to survive in the private sector (as we have seen more than occasional trouble among those that went directly into the contracting route, let alone a world in which classic tradecraft is adapted to entirely new ends).

In many ways, despite the ongoing demographic revolution within the intelligence community, it is a profession which has forgotten how to incorporate its apprentices. As a craft-based vocation, in which guilds are enshrined and mythos most sacred, it is critically important to bring the new initiates into the fold through a deliberate and considered pathway. This is not to say such efforts can ever be perfect, but all too often we see ad hoc hires, body shop dynamics, and the terrible calculus of immediate billets over-riding the longer term cultivation of the essential next generation.

Let us hope that the new academic programs - and their more established but rapidly growing counterparts - take close heed, and pursue now the long term investment in their programs that will be required to support growing populations of graduates and alumni moving forward.

Undiscovered countries

It is telling, we think, that one of the premier authors of speculative fiction has chosen to abandon the search for futures in favour of works chasing, in various ways, the mysteries of the intelligence world. It is perhaps the defining element of our time, the ways in which the hitherto invisible world continues to intersect the common planes of existence – usually with dramatic and difficult consequences.

William Gibson conceived of cyberspace simply by looking at one of the first Apple advertising posters, and wrote of the virtual world on an old typewriter. His most recent work, Spook Country, is not so much a matter of de novo creation but rather the innovative weaving of threads of stories which touch upon the very root of the world in which we work. In a way, should he continue to explore these themes in his work, and eschew the easy answers of existing monologues in favour of his own unique voice, he might just become the voice of a new generation of intelligence literature in fiction – in much the same way that early Le Carré became quietly internalized in the narratives of an earlier generation. (In fact, a former SVR officer we once knew had an entire monologue regarding the works of David Cornwell, but that’s another story…)

We have never cared much for spy novels, nor other elements of such popular fiction. (Our interest in science fiction as the jester at the futurists’ table is a different matter…) But there is something in the better iterations of these works which has long served as a kind of metastructure and mythology for the shared endeavor – something one is full free to never take seriously as a real professional, but is acknowledged as a sort of gateway to attract and captivate young minds on the way to their own understanding of the real profession. For years, the literature of intelligence fiction even provided case studies for use when real cases were not available, allowing the very carefully selected expression of maxims and lessons within an unclassified context. Now, the collected volume of recent history is on the side of those who teach intelligence, with quite a bit of authentic declassified material to support a wide range of instructional cases. And for a long time, the literature of intelligence fiction has trended more and more towards the spectacular, and entirely entertainment focused – perhaps good yarns, but nothing that could be an assigned reading section. We think the profession is long overdue for a change – and very much needs the kind of fiction that can articulate the underpinnings of the intelligence instrument of national power.


We do not yet think Gibson gets there quite yet, but he is well on his way should he desire to pursue such a path. We think what small success he has had in setting forth fictional keystones of the intelligence profession’s ongoing narrative is entirely coincidental and unintentional, but there is great promise in what he might accomplish. After all, it is in the unanticipated interaction of things that the most interesting stories of the Long War are emerging, and he has a knack for capturing the essence of such intersections well. Whether in the systema inherited from the failing days of the DGI, reinterpreted through the lens of an entirely new kind of service, to the expression of rumours of a new kind of surrogate proxy in the far waters of Asia – the author has a distinct knack for envisioning higher order effects.

And it is this kind of speculative imagination that needs to be nurtured, not as the reality of the profession’s days, but in the campfire tales of evening and the dreams of its long if unquiet nights. For far stranger things will emerge to challenge the next generation of intelligence professionals, and it is in the quality of their imagination that they will first stand or fail when facing these new challenges. It is difficult to cultivate the sparks of vision, and far harder to sustain. them If a few pieces of fiction can help along the way, we would be glad to see it.

Considering again the very smallest of stuff

We have previously mentioned the key Proteus Insight of Small Stuff. It remains one of the more visionary aspects of that groundbreaking study, and the one in which we have observed quite a bit of movement within the intelligence community. It is difficult to understand new accounts in the community, such as pandemic monitoring and other emerging disease related medical intelligence, alongside the increasing importance of other targets, such as network warfare, absent an overarching strategic framework of concerns.

Smalltech is not only the stuff of futures studies, but rather also serious scientific examination. We note a fascinating piece from the National Academies Press - Nanotechnology for the Intelligence Community. This study concludes in part:

The IC should develop a strategy for exploiting smalltech areas of special promise mentioned in this report...
Search for quasi-commercial technologies.
Develop a methodology for producing non-commercial technologies for use by the IC.
Develop a mechanism for monitoring and supporting enabling technologies for smalltech breakthroughs.
Build up long-term, in-house technical expertise in areas related to smalltech; in the near term, seek expert advice regarding investments in areas of high technical risk or uncertainty.

For those young analysts seeking to find the accounts which will define their careers, one could do much worse than a focus on the Small Stuff. (In our humble opinion, this is likely to be far more useful and actionable an intelligence endeavor than the politicized reaches of climate Wx… particularly when “scientific consensus” continues to avoid peer review.)

UPDATE: Via Instapundit this afternoon comes the following presentation on "Nanotechnology and the Future of Warfare", from the "Center for Responsible Nanotechnology. Interesting presentation and fortuitous timing...