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09 October 2006

And in a flash....

And in a flash, failure is revealed. This particular incident, beyond its strategic and military implications, will be grist for the mills of the political science types for years to come. There is certainly enough blame to go around, and definitely serious questions regarding national will (or perhaps more accurately, the policy and strategic communications processes by which national will is mustered.)

More importantly, from the perspective of this blog's interests, is the post-mortem of the analytical tradecraft and key judgments which helped inform the policy and action void on this issue. If ever there was a case for opportunity analysis....

This process of review will not be appropriate for matters in the closed realm for a long time to come. However, there is a wealth of open source analysis in the various policy journals, non-proliferation publications, and other countless volumes of academia's interests and the Beltway's salons to begin with; and unquestionably these materials have also informed the broader debate on the NK issue.

And given the circumstances, it is not uncalled for that we should see a public breaking of swords, particularly among those analysts and policy wonks which still support the fiction of the 1994 Agreed Framework and other equally worthless treaties made with parties who openly display every intention of violating terms and offering only deception rather than transparency. Unfortunately, no such accounting will ever occur; and very likely the same authors will be granted opportunity to garner accolades as they pursue ever more elegant theories regarding future conflicts and policy challenges, with no need to account for the bruising inconvenience of hard facts and realities.

Let this be then a warning to other analysts; less they would follow the same easy route of damnation when facing future questions.