Glimpses into agent psychology

We have long held the opinion that the British writers of the intelligence novel have offered the best examplars to be found of the psychological experiences of agents recruited for espionage. (That is, the classic intelligence definition of the term, and not the disastrous usurpation of the designation for the law enforcement community). Among the unique insights have been the often striking similarities between the subjects and those officers responsible for handling them, something particularly more visible in certain accounts and historical case studies than others.

We speak of course of Len Deighton, whose works remain classics, and of John le Carre, whose early pieces well captured the tenor of his time (despite the increasing gap between his later fiction and the realities they allegedly represent). A more recent entrant is Charles Cumming, whose depiction of the post-Cold War British intelligence establishment from the perspective of a partially witting asset is striking in its tone, not least of which is the result of the author’s semi-biographical approach. (This has been true of most of the better intelligence fiction writers).

It takes a certain personality to write fiction of this sort. Some insights are only the result of lived experiences. We are unsurprised, then, to hear recently of Le Carre’s early intent to defect to the Soviet Union. One can easily see the life-long hints of such intentions throughout much of his work, and most notably in the characters which in fiction carried out that which the man himself never did. It also provides an underlying cause to explain the often excessive intricacies found in the novels’ plot lines, which a number of years ago caused a former Russian intelligence officer to remark in despair regarding the negative impact that such fictionalization had upon younger professionals in his service attempting their own approaches along such models, without regard for the inevitable imposition of Mr. Murphy’s Russian equivalent in the real world. After all, after spending so long considering what one does not act upon, it is only expected that the resulting planning takes a tangled and impractical shape.

For students of intelligence as an activity and a profession, it is a subject perhaps best handled through fictional characterization. In this form, certain features may be exaggerated for the purposes of the narrative – and over time, a composite constructed to reveal the whole. Consider this sort of fiction perhaps the intelligence community’s version of the morality play.

We do wonder where the next century shall find the literature to play the same role. In this, we are reminded of the most insightful essay by Charles Stross, The Golden Age of Spying, in which he quite neatly characterized the unique cultural pressures which brought such works to the published market. We do not see a modernized parallel anywhere on the horizon, and we think the profession poorer for it.

Commercializing the honey trap

Japan has long been one of the world’s leaders in the privatization of intelligence functions. Hand in hand with this privatization comes the blurring of the distinctions which define intelligence as a profession itself, and that which are incorporated across a range of interdisciplinary areas. In the 1980’s, the rest of the world most famously became aware of the commercialization of these activities in the realm of scientific and technical intelligence obtained through a variety of joint venture structures and other business alliances. The trend has continued, albeit in new areas and different forms.

Japan is also noted for the relentless consumerization of ideas and concepts into marketable goods and services. Their retail sector evolves at a blistering rate, making the Tokyo schoolgirl the most sought after youth demographic to test new fashion trends and other memetic products.

Thus we are unsurprised to note the intersection of these two trends, profiled in a recent UK article regarding professional sexual entrapment services. The cases are interesting in that they demonstrate both classic human intelligence approaches across a variety of cases, but also in that they represent an apparently profitable market segment. In the United States, private investigators have long known that spurned spouses – and their lawyers – are an easy source of income. Such has been the stuff of a certain genre of crime novel for decades. However, the Japanese incarnation is more subtle, in that the primary focus is on influence operations designed to alter the target’s behavior and perceptions – typically to overcome cultural factors in what is still largely a conservative and tradition oriented society.

It seems to us there is a growing body of lessons learned that might be culled from the cases handled by such services. No doubt none of these lessons are new, nor terribly unique, as the lusts of men and women change little over the years. However, the experiences of these professionals (and equally importantly, the handlers which conduct the equivalent of targeting analysis and other operations management functions) do represent a unique aggregation of unclassified examples which could be used to augment academic studies of what is otherwise the most clandestine of intelligence activities.

No doubt for a young researcher such studies might also be uniquely rewarding. One should hope however that the debriefer is otherwise unattached prior to embarking upon the project.

Understanding the village

The following piece from Marginal Revolution catches our attention as yet another example of the growing utility of interdisciplinary approaches to those aspects of the intelligence that have not been traditionally served by the national and technical collection apparatus.

The tool is strikingly simple – a piece of software designed to ease data collection and processing burdens for studying epidemics in developing nations. The package will run on common mobile phone platforms, typically ubiquitous in such environments – or otherwise exceptionally cheap to obtain and circulate. Strategic communication branding, anyone?

The potential applications however go far beyond epidemiology – or even other aspects of medical intelligence. We can immediately see a use for such a tool in a number of information operations, civil affairs, and cultural intelligence settings – not to mention any of the political intelligence activities that require survey information. Less obvious mechanisms for overt human derived reporting also suggest themselves, given a degree of preparation and planning.

There are distinct limitations to what might be accomplished using this approach, but with those limitations in mind it is quite possible to develop new and innovative collection programs leveraging this capability against the kinds of questions it may suitably answer. This is precisely the kind of experimentation – and extensible designs – that ought to be coming out of the intelligence studies academia, in support of forward deployed intelligence professionals.

Case studies with enduring legacy

There is much to be thankful this holiday season, and it is natural at such a time to reflect back on the conflicts past, and those lost in the course of these conflicts. It is also a time to reflect upon history within the intelligence community, as our first – and for nearly 60 years, our most severe – intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor falls within these months.

Recently, new allegations have surfaced regarding what some consider to be another greater intelligence failure – the Allied ignorance of the machinations of death that were the Holocaust. This has long been an area of immense historical controversy, and present a number of opportunity to examine intelligence / policy relationships, the effects of cognitive bias, the questions of imagination (in thinking about the unthinkable), and (due to the importance of ULTRA decrypts in the overall reporting stream) decision-making in the SIGINT environment.

In short, the new claims put forth in the Hebrew language book Pazner: The Man Who Knew, are centered around supposed HUMINT reporting containing explicit discussion of the construction of camps intended for extermination operations in German occupied Eastern European areas. The reporting, alleged to originate in July 1942 from an unidentified German officer source with what was claimed to be good access, was passed through a Swiss intermediary to a Jewish Agency official. This reporting was subsequently provided to Allied intelligence, and may have even made its way to the highest echelons of the British government.

If true, it is an interesting addition to the historical case study of the Holocaust warning problem. One raw report does not warning make – particularly third-hand HUMINT from unevaluated sub-sources. However, a HUMINT source would have been encumbered by only a fraction of the difficulties of dissemination that the information provided by the ULTRA channel would have imposed. It is possible that such reporting could indeed have been the best “public case” material that could be used to support strategic communications and information operations pressure against the Nazi regime. Indeed, the source is alleged to have even proposed such a use of the information himself, recommending daily BBC broadcasts warning against the commission of war crimes. A later very similar reporting stream, which surfaced through the Riegner telegram, did become the basis of the US acknowledgement of the genocide in November 1942. Public diplomacy at the time had impact on the Nazi pogrom - and given modern experience in Bosnia, Darfur, and elsewhere - it is indeed questionable how effective even widespread public knowledge would have been in halting evil intent.

The handling of this information joins the already extant list of intelligence controversies from other collection disciplines – from the ULTRA COMINT to strategic air IMINT. The ultimate questions that are invoked, however, are ones of policy and operations – not merely intelligence. And these all continue to be well worth study – particularly in the face of the continued threat of genocide throughout the world.

Death to spies

Let there be no mistake – issues of operations security and counterintelligence are very serious, and very real. We do not usually comment on such matters, but the recent case against the Chi Mak network illustrates well the severity of the threat the intelligence community faces from hostile services and serves as an excellent teaching case for those that may not yet realize the full extent of the efforts directed against US interests.

It is significant to note that the case apparently involves a family-based network based around a twenty year active operation (the culmination of over forty years of preparation and access attempts.)

It is also significant that the convicted agent apparently passed materials which included otherwise publicly available open source information – even if it could be considered gray literature due to its usually limited circulation due to the narrow range of its audience. We would wager that this would not be the first time in history that an agent attempted to pad out his take with less valuable (and less difficult to acquire) materials. We note this with wry amusement, despite the fact that the broad based nature of many hostile collection efforts often include requirements for commercial and academic information (as outlined in a number of the annual public reports published by the National Counterintelligence Executive). Perhaps, in the PRC service's case, also not the first time in history an office has padded its requirements list in order to show successful metrics.

Nonetheless, their successes depend upon the treachery of those in trusted positions. That betrayal is not just institutional – it is a personal affront to everyone that ever served alongside the convicted agent and were deceived. Regrettably, this is becoming a far too common occurrence given the long list of cases which are presented before the courts in recent years.

While the strategic value of a convicted and imprisoned spy may be in the later potential for an agent exchange (especially given family connections in the hostile country), we still feel that the appropriate sanction remains the same as dealt out through history to spies, saboteurs, guerillas, and the other lawless brigands operating outside of the laws of armed conflict.

Paging Mark Bowden

There’s no doubt an entire book to be written regarding the saga of missing former FBI Special Agent Robert Levinson, who vanished from Kish Island, Iran – and who has become the center of a fascinating nexus of political entanglements, illicit markets, totalitarian state power ministries (who, not coincidentally, also are designated as terrorist sponsors), and corporate security / brand protection concerns.

Stratfor has an excellent summary of open source information on the case to date. (Warning - Link is to their transient free weekly sample page, otherwise the article will have to be found in their paid archives.)

While we are not given to indulging in conspiracy theories, this is certainly one incident in which the back story is likely to be even more interesting than what is already known. It is not for us to write, however, but there is definitely room for an aggressive journalist / researcher with a flair for the sweep of history and insight into the personalities of individuals. We look forward to reading that publication someday - and hopefully also to be able to use the example in a case study method session.

The community in purple

It seems that the inevitable back and forth debate over military versus other government HUMINT will continue to play out in the press for some time to come. If nothing else, this is good fodder for policy and think tank types; and academic papers of the should have – could have – would have variety for another few years.

A well written counterpoint to the entire debate itself has come from the inimitable Mark Bowden.

Your authors agree that it is long past the time to rehash these turf fights masquerading as “genuine community re-structuring” (TM). It is a waste of time and valuable intellectual bandwidth that would be better turned to the real problems of the community. The community needs more purple – jointness - and although the DNI has not yet gotten it there, the idea of an integrated, cross service HUMINT mission as proposed by some well versed commentators is an interesting destination from the current bifurcated structures.

h/t to Haft of the Spear – who, while perhaps late out of the gate on this issue, commands recent writings and consistency far and beyond our own humble and busy selves. His efforts are well worth reading, and as we ourselves struggle to put pixels to screen, we find them frankly inspiring in their own right. The gentleman does truly fine work in the service of the literature of intelligence.