Another for the wall of dead terrorists

Once upon a time at a particular institution, new analysts were assigned to a simulation course which involved a model joint terrorism task force. Over the course of time, they built up quite a collection of handheld imagery of various prominent targets, many of which came out of historical case studies. This collection was for a time assembled into an infamous “wall”, in which the sole factor for inclusion was that the target has been serviced and resolved.

Via MESH –Middle East Strategy at Harvard – we learn that the infamous Lebanese Hezbollah leadership figure Imad Mughniyah is dead in a classic Beirut style car bomb. His brother was previously killed in the same fashion.

This one has been a long time coming. We are sure that many of those former junior analysts – now having progressed for quite a number of years in the field, and with many a now forgotten face having been posted to that wall since – may be quietly ordering a round as a toast to a small measure of victory. It does not matter, in that moment, whether this was merely red on red violence, or if some unknown covert action element of the international great game achieved the decisive checkmate. It only matters that the faces now change, and the benefits of Mughniyah’s long operational experience has been denied to the terrorist adversary.

In good Buenos Aires fashion, we think our drinks for celebration shall be the Bellini – perhaps accompanied by a fine bife de lomo.

Reverberations of Yamamoto

The fine folks over at the Volokh Conspiracy have provided the intelligence studies field with yet another interesting angle for consideration when discussing decision-making in the SIGINT environment.

The case study of the interception and shoot down of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s transport flight, based on successful cryptanalysis of Japanese coded communications traffic, has long been one of the most clear cut examples of the difficult calculus which must be weighed between using a unique intelligence source to immediate operational benefit, and risking the long term consequences of losing that source based on the higher order effects of the enemy’s possible reactions.

Generations of students have grappled with this case, but rarely is it mentioned that a serving Supreme Court Justice is among those who were decorated for their role in the operation. Nor, until now, has it been disclosed that the Justice has chosen a rather unique perspective from which to view the deed – seeing it as a questionable action, and evaluating future state sanctioned killings (such as judicial execution) through the prism of that experience.

Now, of all the ethical questions to be raised in the intelligence field, we rarely consider the morality of warfare itself. Just war theory and generations of thinkers before us have rendered this well trod ground. An intelligence officer is no less of a moral actor in supporting through analysis or action the ethical conduct of military action, in accordance with the civilized norms of warfare and customary international law. It is very much true that the intelligence professional is, through the chain of events he sets in motion, in a way responsible for the deaths of those who are killed on the kinetic end of the military deed. Yet these casualties are measured against the potential loss of friendly forces, and the potential effects of defeat in the conflict. In a just war, those casualties are almost always deemed necessary to prevent further, greater harm to those the intelligence professional is charged to protect. And if justified, the Western way of war dictates that the operational and tactical means by which the mission is carried out should imperil one’s own side to the least degree possible, and introduce effects as soon as is practical. Intelligence enables this – and targeted killing, especially through interception and engagement of fighter aircraft far from any civilian area, accomplishes this with the least possible harm to uninvolved bystanders.

This is not an abstract question of historical interest. Every day in the Long War, intelligence professionals seek to find and identify enemies which in their own way are no less cleverly dangerous than Yamamoto. In many cases, the dangers in attempting to apprehend those enemies on the battlefield – or even to attempt to engage them directly through infantry action in what is typically dense urban terrain, is to risk the death of friendly forces, the failure of the mission, or potential unintended collateral damage and civilian causalities. If the potential intelligence value to be gained by the capture of the individual does not outweigh the risk of the operation, and the operation does not imperil the intelligence sources and methods which allowed for the identification and location for the target, targeted killing through engagement standoff weapons may be the most ethical and moral choice. The Western way of war is to expend materiel, not our people, to obtain victory. While some have disingenuously attempted to declare such actions “state terrorism”, they are part and parcel of the legal and ethical framework by which the Western World has waged warfare for generations.

The introduction of Justice Steven’s comments in the ethical debate over targeted killing is most troubling. There are good men who grappled with damnably hard decisions regarding such matters daily, and who frankly display far better arguments - on both sides of the issue – backed by more solid reasoning and analytical judgment. Perhaps those engaged in the fight may choose to put forth a paper regarding such discussions. The
well regarded International Symposium for Military Ethics / Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics would seem to be the perfect venue for addressing such issues. And of course, this is excellent fodder for the intelligence studies academic classroom, for both the ethics of intelligence and SIGINT operations courses.

See also Ace of Spades for further uncensored commentary, and the excellent fictional treatment of the engagement (from Cryptonomicon) reproduced today at Volokh.

Emotion versus intellect in war

As Robert E. Lee (not William Tecumsah Sherman) said, “It is well that war is so terrible -- lest we should grow too fond of it.” However, the recent trend towards obscuring the hard realities of the battlespace has been creeping in far too often to where it should be recognized for what it is. The Long War is tiring – it drains individuals as it confronts them with horror upon horror. The question of how one hardens to it, and what kind of person they are when they come away from it, is for each individual to answer on their own.

But out of the same war that formed Sherman’s views has been one of the key thrusts of the American way of war – spend things, not people, whenever possible. It is better to expend treasure than blood – although no amount of treasure will ever make war bloodless.

Thus it is with amazement and disgust that we view the recent Washington Post article cited by Belmont Club. The anthropomorphism of military tools is an old tradition – from at least the days of the first sailing vessels onward, and it is only natural that men come to emotionally value those objects which have been their companions for long, difficult times under extreme stress, and which have saved their and their comrades lives. However, the use of materiel in combat often leaves those items roughly handled – and if in doing so, saves additional US and allied lives, then so be it.

We thus strongly disagree with the favorable interpretation of this anecdote held our esteemed virtual colleague Wretchard. These are the emotional indulgences we cannot afford, as they grow out of the continued (and regrettably naturally human) desire to avoid confronting the harsh realities of war. Writ large, these are the same dynamics which the adversary attempts to exploit through sapping the will to continue at the coal face. It is this same impulse to “make it stop” through disengagement, appeasement and retreat, in the futile hopes that the enemy will likewise no longer wish to pursue conflict. And it is equally as wrongheaded – testing of new tools should be done as destructively as necessary, and then more again. After all, it is precisely that kind of unexpected performance above and beyond anticipated design parameters that led to the phenomenal longevity of the Mars rovers, in but one example of a civilian unmanned ground vehicle applications.

And as for us, we will save our emotion for the human casualties of this war - US, allied, and the true non-combatants cruelly used by an enemy which hides among them and kills to cynically manipulate emotion unrestrained by intellect. And when we can at last declare, in spirit if not on calendar, our V-L day, we will once again allow the indulgence of these and other emotions for things of lesser distinction than the paragons of the sacrifices, the courage, and the astounding achievements of the fighting force.

UPDATE: Correction, with thanks to our Civil War history contigent, who pointed out our error of attribution in the opening quote. One can perhaps blame this on our learning the history of the Northern Agression from a politically correct perspective, that would also have presumed to have taken all of the good lines after - but it is entirely our fault, and we are grateful to our attentive readers to keep us accurate (and honest.)