Insight problems, red cell mindsets and alternative analysis

We have long held mixed opinions regarding the computer security guru Bruce Schneier. While he often says interesting and provocative things, and has a distinct flair for memorably naming common phenomena (including introducing nomenclature such as security theatre, which even senior Transportation Security Administration officials have adopted in their own verbiage). At the same time, his off the cuff commentary frequently reaches far beyond his area of expertise into things of which he clearly has limited knowledge, but which he asserts with the same confidence – with less than useful results. It is a classic problem of the expert’s paradox, one frequently seen in those SME’s that spend a great deal of time in the media’s limelight.

Despite this caveat, we do commend to our readers a recent piece in which Schneier has brought to our attention an interesting course in computer security. The course attempts to inculcate the “attacker’s mindset” into new students, teaching them to view problems from the adversary’s perspective in what intelligence professionals will recognize as a classic red cell fashion. He notes that this kind of thinking is quite alien to most engineers. We concur, and to this category we would also add lawyers, most economists and political scientists, as well as others of like inclination which have been educated within the formal strictures of similar academic disciplines that do not value alternative models outside of their own recognized boundaries.

We are happy to see such matters being discussed in the otherwise normally disconnected halls of the academy. We feel it crystallizes an approach to addressing one of the core problems of the intelligence profession – that of teaching analysts about insight problems, and in particular the kind of insight problems that require experiential epiphanies to begin to understand. Much of the lack of creativity and loss of imagination in the intelligence field can be attributed to attempts to bound non-deterministic problems too tightly within the confines of a given methodological approach. While structured analytical techniques are vital to exploring the fleeting quicksilver of insight, those who try to squeeze too hard will find that quicksilver escapes their grasp. You cannot teach insight – you must inspire it, and teach the methods which can reliably generate such inspiration.

We view this as a vitally important and almost entirely neglected aspect of current intelligence education and training. Given that alternative analysis has been enshrined as a requirement to meet community standards, and that formal red cell efforts continue to proliferate throughout many agencies and organizations, cultivating the kind of analysts which can perform well in those environments is vital. And unfortunately, most current instruction falls woefully short of that which is needed to accomplish such a task.

Considering immunity

While there are those that believe the world of polite conversation and “good faith” in arms control and disarmament can trump the hard realities of proliferation, we see a world in which the technologies required to assemble and deploy a credible threat are increasingly within the reach of the most mundane of non-state actors. While we are rarely given to dwell exclusively on issues of threat, as threat is not always in fact the most interesting aspect of a particular problem account (despite what many outsiders may believe), there are a few areas in which our nightmares are never far from fruition in the hands of the wrong actors.

This is especially true in the areas of emerging biological threats. While we are very much aware of a particular academic effort that examined the matter recently, we found its results disappointing, to say the least, largely because its work focused far too much on an assessment of the present vice a truly predictive and forward looking estimate – one that would help to bound the future space of uncertainties, and would identify the drivers and forces moving on the horizon.

Nonetheless, we continue to see the faint indicators of these forces from time to time. These are best captured not in some formulaic collection of wiki pages dedicated to a highly geographic scope – as if disease somehow respected national borders. Rather, one looks for the trend lines, and those areas in which black swans may emerge without warning as sudden shocks to the unprepared perspective. And while there are those that will insist that a black swan event is inherently unpredictable by nature, we are reminded of Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s original formulation of the turkey’s day. The black swan event of meeting the butcher is only a shock to the turkey after a thousand days of being fed and cared for by other humans; it is an entirely normal course of a day’s work for the butcher. Likewise, for those who shift their perspective to the edges where the future is not evenly distributed, there may one find the first seeds of those events sown.

The difficulty of course lies in winnowing the signals of true predictive value from the noise of the overwhelming range of possibilities and potentials. This is fundamentally an insight problem. And the difficulties faced in approaching these problems are the epitome of the danger of treating mysteries as if they were puzzles suited for deterministic approaches and linear solutions that can be tied up neatly in sections and a nice cover page.

We happened to glance today at just such a faint indicator in which the merest hint of future insight might be reflected. It comes to us by way of the scientific community – always fertile ground for an intelligence professional to mine when examining fundamental issues of the physical and the living (as opposed to our more usual domain of the virtual and the dead). We find the development of simple replica immune systems for rapid testing of vaccines quite interesting in its own right, with the prospect of accelerated (and more accurate) clinical trials as the first clear benefit.

But our darker minds also take hold of the concept, and ponder the dual use implications that such a technique might offer in the hands of an adversary seeking to accelerate testing of modified biological agents designed to defeat immune resistance - whether human or otherwise. The footprint of such a facility would not be large, and would pose a very different kind of challenge to the intelligence community of tomorrow than the classic concept of an offensive bioweapons program. Threats abound in most futures that are easily envisioned.

At the same time, the technology presents the potential hope of opportunities not yet conceived. Just the other day before the University of Maryland findings began circulating, we found ourselves listening to an interesting discussion of the value that captive wildlife populations might bring to large scale bio-surveillance programs, both for sentinel warning as well as novel agent detection. The potential for cultivating accelerated immune responses as test models by which we might know the signs of outbreaks through wildlife (or domestic animal) populations is quite intriguing, especially given the other utility brought by captive populations in the urban settings of major zoos.

We ponder this as case study not solely in pursuit of any account in its own right – as that is more properly the domain for the line analyst, but rather as a teaching example. The case illustrates well the difference between intelligence done off a checklist which presumes a puzzle to be assembled from some mythic collection of dots, vice the kinds of implicit linkages that can only be found through creative exploration driven by fruitful obsession. Whether that which has been sketched here has any true value is a matter for the more disciplined application of analytic tradecraft. However, if one is not preparing analysts to begin to find reflections in the endless stir of these echoes that they may seek to later crystallize through more formal methodology, all that they will have to work with will be checklists and formulaic incantations - which alone will not keep the dark at bay.

Applications in commercial overhead imagery for stability and support operations

We continue to be impressed with the uses for commercial overhead imagery which the private sector now increasingly relies upon in an astounding array of situations. While none of these applications are new from the perspective of an intelligence community which has been employing national technical means to similar ends for decades, their independent re-discovery in the outside world, and operationalization in support of crisis situations, remains fascinating from the perspective of intelligence studies scholarship.

The most recent example comes from the conflict in Chad - which provides an excellent and evolving unclassified teaching case to explore the issues involved in small wars and destabilizing countries, particularly for the unique kinds of intelligence support required in noncombatant evacuation operations and other stability and support missions. UNOSAT has recently released a series of products derived from commercial satellite data which attempt to estimate the scale of urban evacuation of the capital of N´Djamena.

In the long ago forgotten history of commercial satellite imagery in the 1990’s, many early papers were written describing the potential impact that the availability of these then futuristic capabilities would have on the international community’s attempts to assess these kind of crisis events – which were frankly the dominant mission of the day. While many crises have come and gone since then, we have seen only a few efforts truly utilize open source imagery analysis during such events to produce truly effective intelligence support. This is a fundamentally different order of thing than how most NGOs and press organizations have attempted to use imagery, and the team which generated it is to be commended for their work. It should also be held up as a model to be emulated in future crisis situations by both the NGO and the PMC sectors; and as such studied by future generations of analysts that may find themselves employed as intelligence professionals in those sectors.

h/t War and Health

Novel underground facilities revisited

We had previously covered the kind of unusual civil construction which makes for good unclassified teaching examples in consideration of the intelligence challenges posed by hard and deeply buried targets. Thus we thought it appropriate to also note the excellent example surfaced by the fine gentlemen over at Coming Anarchy, which appropriately notes the difference between the uses to which sophisticated underground construction techniques are put in an oil rich democracy versus its kleptocratic and autocratic counterparts in other places also graced with the geologic accident of such resources.

More importantly, the site also demonstrates the difference between construction at a true civil site – extensively documented, widely discussed, and exceptionally transparent – vice that of the kinds of subterfuge that can be observed at other suspected dual use or known bad actor facilities.

While we are not fond of the political purposes to which the seed vault itself has now been put – the issues of exceptionally long term climate change being the least of our worries in futures scenarios; we cannot argue with the idea of a genetic Ark as insurance against a future Black Swan event. However, our thinking on the matter trends much more towards concerns regarding the other high consequence / low probability events that may occur with far less warning, such as pandemic multi-crop agricultural disease.

We also note that this particular underground facility does indeed perhaps now truly merit our earlier erroneous application of an acronym drawn from the same convention as that of the Dining FACility (DFAC). Bon Appetite.

RAND views analytic tradecraft

The new RAND study “Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis” has been out for more than a few days now, but deserves an in depth look by those that may have merely given it a passing glance. It was brought to our attention by the Analyst’s Corner, which has become increasingly consistently interesting (although we knew it would be, given the earlier writings of its author.)

What is interesting is that the report is very much a snapshot of a transition period – one might even be temped to say one that was taken at the height of the revolution in intelligence affairs. We agree with our virtual colleague Michael Tanji in his statement that “The dominant pattern in the U.S. intelligence agencies has been not stasis but almost constant revision, even to the point of disruption.” It is for this reason we have tended to look upon the cottage industry of intelligence reform with great suspicion, as too often of late we have had more than our fill of academics and other outsiders writing in with inspiration from what those in forward deployed locations often call the good idea fairy.

However, RAND’s study brings to the debate a number of important concepts, that while not new, certainly need to be circulated more widely. In part, this is due to the commendable methodology chosen for the study, in conducting formalized interviews across the community, targeted against not merely the ever changing organization charts (which as RAND itself noted “names have been a moving target”, given reorganization), but against the National Intelligence Priorities Framework and the Analytic Resource Catalog.

Among these critical concepts are the emphasis that analytic tradecraft is about the management of tradeoffs. There are few other human endeavors where this is not true, but for too long the community has focused on the ideal state, rather than maximizing the best possible outcome from the existing states. The ideal picture approach is very much an academic conceit, and assumes a mythical power to create organizational change simply by redrawing organograms or renaming offices under some centralized directive from on high. The real community simply does not respond to such abstracts in the clean and dispassionate fashion that many reformists would wish for. These tradeoffs are also one of the reason initiatives which begin organically within the working level line analysis shops are the most successful, as they allow those with the greatest stake in the outcome to balance their tradeoffs to the best possible effect.

The RAND study addresses interesting aspects of the increasingly dominant focus on current intelligence at the expense of longer term deep analysis. It also touches upon the issues of compensation and human resources that we have so often mentioned in these pages. We are quite pleased to see an increasing recognition of the importance of targeting analysis as a distinct discipline within the field – and given the delay between the interviews and the release of the public paper – one that we feel has been increasingly internalized within the community.

Collaboration and data sharing issues are discussed, but fall far lower in the spectrum than discussions of intelligence quality and value – quite in line with our own experiences.

The need to strengthen analytic training and education throughout the community is likewise emphasized, with the idea of a standard curriculum model again surfacing. We are aware of at least one quite promising effort in that regard, that goes far beyond what is typical academic fare; and hope to see further aspects of the model developed for mid-level and journeyman class analysis audiences in future iterations.

All in all, the RAND study is an excellent contribution to the literature which we are grateful now sees the light of day. There is much food for thought, which we will no doubt revisit again in due course. We did initially give pause upon a day’s reflection, fearing our agreement with the paper stemmed too much from a potential echo chamber effect of seeing similar views reflected back at us. However, these are things that are rarely formally captured in discussions of reform or the future of intelligence (at least, those written by outsiders). It is important to get them onto the table in a more formal setting – for as much as we believe in the value of the blog, it is a different vehicle for inquiry and scholarship than that of a more rigorous study approach.

The dark history of those wearing orange (and tweed)

We are lucky to count among our correspondents an officer and a gentleman who has sought to enlighten us as to a little known aspect of the history of the Office of Strategic Services –the involvement of the United States Coast Guard in maritime clandestine operations through WWII. Guardian Spies is the result of these efforts – and an excellent resource well worth the reader’s time.

Given the importance of port operations to the early OSS, this should not be surprising. After all, one look at the map of WWII era stations throughout Europe and Asia should have been enough to validate the requirement for the kind of experiences that the Coasties could bring to the dark side. Yet this is an area which has been consistently overlooked - in a fashion regrettably typical of the shabby treatment usually afforded the "other" service, and we are glad now to see the effort to surface it. This is truly a best of class endeavor to rescue an otherwise lost history, through a combination of primary source documentary work as well as an oral interview series. It is a model by which other, also lesser known aspects of military support to intelligence structures might also be explored. We very much look forward to further developments out of the program.

The OSS has been very much on our minds as of late. We have recently also had occasion to pick back up the excellent treatise Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services by Barry Katz, which recounts the unique circumstances of those present at the creation of R&A. The line of influence of many of the decisions taken under the political and operational environment in which that office first came into being has rarely been more clear, and as such the volume is a must read for those contemplating transformation within the community. Many of the same tensions faced today – under the exceptional circumstances of wartime expansion and pressures – were very much the stuff that mere academics of earlier service had to contend, and without even the benefit of being afforded an overarching professional framework to unify the various threads of their activities.

We think that this body of history can provide a rich set of case studies for those that now seek the further professionalization of their own tradecraft – in both operational and analytic contexts. We are inclined to believe that the general overviews with which most students are now presented – the history everyone knows – has served as an intellectual obstacle to a deeper understanding of the very real, and very relevant, aspects of these events which still translate directly across the decades to the concerns of today. It is our fortune that this state of affairs is now changing.

An alternative film for intelligence analysis exercises

We have been surprised at the level of discussion sparked by our previous consideration of the classic 12 Angry Men and other films, for teaching the fundamentals of intelligence analysis and writing to entry level candidates. Apparently, the technique is more widespread and popular among instructors than we knew. Frankly, we have found that it is something possible only in professional in service sessions, where there is usually enough contact time to permit such hands-on practical work. Typical academic environments rarely afford sufficient engagement to lose the several hours involved, and we have found that most students assigned to view the same film on their own will tend to present remarkably similar work product (although the assignment tends to be very popular with students, particularly prior to weekends and in coed classes.)

We have thus given the matter some consideration, seeking a better replacement for the now classic Joint Military Intelligence Training Center exercise which utilized the film The Hunt for Red October (briefly mentioned in our earlier post on the topic.) That film was an excellent choice for the time, insofar as the limitations of Hollywood typically permit – and was even used as a teaching aid at the submarine school in Groton for a time after its release (though albeit moreso for its counterexamples). Its utility was no doubt derived from the unique historical basis for Clancy’s original book – a composite of several real world cases of great strategic importance during the Cold War.

The purpose of the film exercise was to provide the analyst student with a chance to practically apply basic tradecraft dealing with ambiguity, and to create a collaborative analytical product using simplified unclassified material. Each student would be assigned to a smaller group, which would then be tasked with a specific intelligence component to focus on. The students would then seek to answer a key question regarding the factors which influenced the defection of the fictional Russian submarine captain in light of these larger strategic issues within the Cold War. The film material itself was treated as authoritative narrative – requiring a degree of suspension of disbelief, but not terribly so if the students were unfamiliar with actual undersea warfare. This typically led to some excellent discussions and more than a few unique analytic outcomes.

Replicating this exercise in a more modern context has proven to be no easy task. There simply have not been films which encapsulate the unique factors which made the Red October exercise such a good choice. But as much as we liked the case, its value is limited for students who will be engaged in the Long War for some time to come.

We considered – and rejected – quite a few other options. The 1996 film The Peacemaker was one possibility, but for most students the Balkans conflict is as remote as its World War I antecedents, and WMD terrorism and homeland security issues are now viewed through a far different lens in the post 9/11 world. The 2005 film The Great Raid could offer potential, but was a more limited tactical scenario in a far less ambiguous information environment, from which actual historical materials would be far better suited as a source of instruction. We briefly contemplated the film Spy Games, but it is far more suited for a history of intelligence class than an analysis course. Syriana too came under consideration, particularly given the involvement of a former case officer in its scripting, but the explicit politicalization of the film also ruled it out. The drug film Traffic was rejected for similar reasons. Most of the other contemporary drama or action films can be dismissed out of hand, being little more than flights of fancy – something that removed films such as Swordfish, the le Carre works, and all of the Bond pieces from our list.

This left us with few options. Thankfully, our dilemma appears to be solved – for the time being – by the 2007 release of The Kingdom. It is unsurprising the film’s early releases were trialed in the greater Washington DC metro area, and that a high number of community professionals were among those early audiences. While the work suffers from the usual Hollywood inaccuracies and the insufferable modern politicization, it does present a narrowly scoped case which is itself a composite mélange of historical incidents of ongoing relevance. While we hate to be seen promoting the Bureau – particularly through the fantasist version of that organization presented in the film – if one ignores those aspects, there is value in the sense of realism otherwise conveyed across the piece through a good application of the director’s art.

Again, the key to turning the film into a good analytic exercise – rather than just a several hour long break from lecture – is to encourage deeper discussion of the underlying factors that led to, and would result from, the incidents depicted. The students should be able to pull out a number of specific points that can be summarized and expanded with additional open source research into unique finished analytic papers. The film offers a variety of these springboards – from the tactical aspects of attack TTP, to terrorist propaganda operations, to the role of re-integration programs for former terrorist prisoners, to profiles of host nation CT capabilities, or to the issues of radicalization within specific industries, geographies, or societal segments. The instructor may need to assist the students in settling upon these aspects during post-screening discussions. This is less a group product, although a collaborative framework can be created in which individual papers support a larger work, especially using a wiki production environment.

Despite finding what we feel is a good solution for the time being, we will continue to seek out alternatives for use in other areas of the contemporary intelligence domain beyond the CT sphere – and will of course welcome any suggestions (along with reasoning in defense of the choice) that our wider audience might contribute for general circulation.

Another for the wall of dead terrorists

Once upon a time at a particular institution, new analysts were assigned to a simulation course which involved a model joint terrorism task force. Over the course of time, they built up quite a collection of handheld imagery of various prominent targets, many of which came out of historical case studies. This collection was for a time assembled into an infamous “wall”, in which the sole factor for inclusion was that the target has been serviced and resolved.

Via MESH –Middle East Strategy at Harvard – we learn that the infamous Lebanese Hezbollah leadership figure Imad Mughniyah is dead in a classic Beirut style car bomb. His brother was previously killed in the same fashion.

This one has been a long time coming. We are sure that many of those former junior analysts – now having progressed for quite a number of years in the field, and with many a now forgotten face having been posted to that wall since – may be quietly ordering a round as a toast to a small measure of victory. It does not matter, in that moment, whether this was merely red on red violence, or if some unknown covert action element of the international great game achieved the decisive checkmate. It only matters that the faces now change, and the benefits of Mughniyah’s long operational experience has been denied to the terrorist adversary.

In good Buenos Aires fashion, we think our drinks for celebration shall be the Bellini – perhaps accompanied by a fine bife de lomo.

The use of leaked documents in intelligence studies education

This issue has been weighing upon us for some time, and has sparked perhaps the most violent debate of any subject within a field already crowded with passionate viewpoints. It takes on new prominence this week with the actions of another intelligence studies professor (names are omitted to protect the guilty) at one of the more prominent institutions out there.

We are unabashed supporters of the use of declassified intelligence documents – including finished intelligence papers, raw cables and other message traffic, and any imagery that might be available. These are almost without exception historical in nature, and thus we also advocate the use of unclassified notional intelligence documents produced in the model of current approaches (differing only in those areas that classification requirements dictate). We admit that the latter requires a lot of hard work – both in finding the unclassified or declassified examples from which to build templates, as well as creating the notional products that the students will rely upon in class or in an exercise. Many academic programs simply forgo this altogether for this reason – understandably so, but frankly in our opinion to the detriment of students that need exposure to “real world” intelligence in a form that may be properly used in a classroom.

However, the use of leaked classified documents in education is another matter entirely. Too many prominent names in intelligence studies publishing pad out their books with leaked documents, many of which can be said to be exceptionally damaging to United States interests in the subject under discussion. We have over the years grudgingly assigned these texts, as the better authors still offer some value to students despite the damnable offense of perpetuating leaks. What is most unfortunate in these cases is that those authors – by virtue of unique analysis or concise presentation of complex topics – would be entirely compelling without the leaks, yet apparently do not have the confidence to stand on their own, or the intellectual integrity to present their own work unaided by stolen secrets.

Such matters have long troubled the field – and frankly, have done much damage to the establishment of a respected intelligence studies academia that interacts with its professional counterparts in a mutually beneficial fashion, instead of through parasitic and self-serving profiteering.

There is however a more disturbing recent trend, one abetted by the evolving issues that come hand in hand with widespread electronic dissemination of intelligence products, and the inevitable friction that occurs when attempting to cope with the proliferation of classified networks and channels under wartime conditions. This new issue is the unprecedented availability of still classified documents (and other media) in their original form; leaked from improper handling - or worse yet, deliberate disclosure - onto the public Internet. These are becoming distressingly common enough that there are even now sites dedicated to the propagation of such leaks.

Without commenting on any specific incident, it is understandable that some civilian academics might see these are rare opportunities to provide a window into current intelligence practices for their students. It is also entirely likely that the “cool” factor may have overwhelmed good judgment when dealing with these cases. But we are exceptionally concerned that these classified materials not be routinely incorporated into unclassified academic instruction. Nothing will do more damage to the discipline as quickly as such an outcome.

First, among those students in many unclassified classrooms there are those that hold current clearances or other professional affiliations that impose a proactive and affirmative burden on the individual to report the improper handling of classified materials. It is unconscionable for an instructor to impose through their own deliberate actions this burden of time, paperwork, and ethical dilemma on a professional student.

Secondly, for those students that do not hold current clearances, many will one day face the polygraph process – and the discussion of a half remembered document from a long ago professor is not the most productive way to encounter the less than tender mercies of that process. As it is, too small a percentage of those students will successfully pass vetting; the intelligence studies academia does not need to be encouraging additional obstacles that will further negatively impact those numbers.

Lastly, we fear the creation of perverse incentives for future leaks should this practice become more widespread. We could easily see such pressures being placed entirely inappropriately on serving professionals who are alumni of major intelligence studies programs by their former instructors, or anonymous leaks occurring at the end of a professional’s tour in anticipation of a future academic posting. We cannot condone any activities that would potentially create any similar incentives – especially when such pressures might well result in the end of meaningful professional and academic collaboration partnerships in the intelligence studies field.

We know the difficulties in crafting an intelligence curriculum to be taught a the unclassified level, but have long felt strongly that to do so forces a focus on the fundamentals of tradecraft unhindered by the restraints of specific organizational niches. While there are many things that simply cannot be taught at the lowest levels, most are frankly more appropriate to a professional in service training and education program as opposed to the outside academic environment in the first place.

It is in part due to these actions that many community professionals entirely discount the role of outside academics – and we fear that with each passing incident, this perception becomes harder to fight. Given the behavior of some academics, it is a perception that may not even be wrong. We recall one particular foreign born instructor who, prior to his dismissal with prejudice from a particularly prominent program, had set out to deliberately acquire as many leaked materials as he could lay hands upon. This created serious difficulties for other academics and students in the program – many of whom were employed in consulting capacities for various official institutions. This is an example that should never have been allowed to be repeated – and current incidents are a slippery slope on that road.

Let us be clear: we at Kent’s Imperative condemn leaks in all forms, and those that would find benefit from them, in the strongest possible terms. Each academic institution which hosts an intelligence studies program should address this issue through internal policy – preferably tied to its academic code, which should consider the improper use of classified information as damnable as the kindred crime of plagiarism. If there is any role for the International Association For Intelligence Education in the promulgation of best practices throughout the field, it is in such matters.

Revisiting analytic rigour

The research currently being done at Ohio State University into the problems of intelligence analysis – including information overload, cognitive processes, and other aspects of the methodology – has from time to time caught our interest. Among the more interesting of these items now in circulation is an excellent lecture that we most highly recommend to our readers, recorded last year during the too often overlooked Google Talks series. The discussion focuses on the evaluation of analytic rigor, and means by which analysis may be strengthened.

We particularly favour the philosophy that Dr. Woods presents, which seeks to avoid dictating a single best methodology or process. We are more than willing to listen to the methodologists, but too often we find a dictatorial approach significantly at odds with the realities of line analysis. We think that the observed case study technique used in the Ohio State team’s research – something too infrequently done by many academics – is key to the validity of their findings. One cannot discuss analytic ideals without involving those who are actually involved in applying tradecraft to real problems. It is also not enough to conduct such research in artificial environments within student populations – real line analysis is too different.

We certainly cannot agree with the apparent off-hand condemnation of “folk” psychology of intelligence analysis – clearly aimed at taking on Heuer’s “bible”. While we think that there is a clear role for the methodologists and their research into strengthen analytic tradecraft, there is also a very real need for interdisciplinary adaptation from other areas of social science, as well as the kind of internal discussions that make up a key part of the maintenance of those oft-criticized, but entirely vital, guilds that are the backbone of the community.

We do however find several key concepts of great interest that deserve wider attention, including the concept of the Supervisor’s Dilemma – the balance of customer outcomes requirements and analytic resource opportunity costs against the relative depth of analytic rigour. We also find the study techniques themselves of interest, especially the concept of elicitation through critique – something we feel will likely have a far greater applicability in capturing the kind of intergenerational knowledge that the community is in danger of losing. We see the technique as one means of making more formal – and scalable - some of the kinds of subtle interactions that characterized the experiences of apprentice and journeyman analysts under the mentorship of a master.

We also find great merit in the good professor’s comments regarding the overconfidence of new analysts, and the satisificing biases that result. We definitely have observed a level of arrogance in too many new hires – and especially those coming out of the intelligence studies programs. The first lesson that an analyst student should learn is the fear of God – and of their own error. Too many programs of instruction are not affording the student the chance to learn that fear from the visceral experiences of their own mistakes, and to take away from the experience a humility that will cause them to productively question their future work toward its improvement. Such experiences are far better gained when the consequences are not fatal, in line with the lessons taught by Red Flag.

There is much food for thought in this lecture, as well as the contributions to the literature that the Ohio State program has generated. We will no doubt have further commentary on the subject in the near future.

Revisiting Twelve Angry Men and legalism in intelligence analysis

For a number of years, the classic black and white film Twelve Angry Men has been a frequent teaching aid in introductory analysis courses dealing with the basics of evidence and argumentation. The conventional use of the film is to provide an accessible means of deconstructing a fictionalized scenario for students with little prior experience with formal debate. Given the current decline in public education, this helps remedy a basic skills deficit that is unfortunately and increasingly all too common.

However, it is with interest that we observe the controversy that has erupted once again over this fifty-one year old movie. The criticisms that have been leveled against the underlying premise of the film deserve some additional consideration – not the least of which because they point out the serious problems in applying much of what is taught as legal logic to the unique problems of the intelligence domain.

The Spectator’s argument surfaces one of the reactions common among many students, but in a far more articulate fashion than any entry level professional might be expected to voice. In essence, this criticism is based on the need to focus on the external worldview, rather than the tactical maneuvering in the courtroom that such kinds of arguments inevitably devolve towards. It is a quite valid point, and among the reasons that we have long decried the trends towards creeping legalism that have lately come to dominate intelligence work. The bulk of a lawyer’s litigative activities – and therefore a disproportionate degree of their education and professional experiences – are dictated by entirely tactical considerations that apply nowhere else but within the limited framework of the legal system. Too often this is easily forgotten, to the detriment of the strategic picture – and the accuracy and veracity of analysis. We have written on these problems before, but to be frank we had rarely considered the myriad of ways in which – by borrowing from the older legal profession’s traditions in teaching basic logic and rhetoric – the intelligence academia may continue to contribute to these unhelpful trends of cognitive bias. Among these, of course, are the kinds of ludic fallacy identified by Nassim Nicholas Taleb.

The folks at Volokh Conspiracy take a different tack, arguing for greater consideration of interdependencies within factors under examination in the film’s fictional trial. This is also a very useful approach for discussions with students, many who likewise tend to view evidence in isolation. It is particularly appropriate when covering structured analysis techniques such as ACH – and one that rarely touched upon, if only due to the frequently too shallow examples offered to illustrate the methodology, which are unable to support a more robust discussion.

Westminster Wisdom rises in defense of the film, and illustrates the more important but also often overlooked value to the piece in the intelligence studies classroom – the discussion of uncertainty. The intelligence professional will always work within a framework of ambiguity, doubt, and frequently, deception. However, the role of intelligence is not merely to reach a lower standard of proof than that used in a criminal trial (or even the lesser civil threshold), as is commonly taught (and in particular, a tenant of faith within law enforcement intelligence). Rather, intelligence’s purpose is to provide accurate insights despite such uncertainty; and where absolute accuracy is not possible, to bound the space of uncertainties for the policymaker in a manner that supports informed decision-making.

In light of all of the foregoing, we continue to search for good alternatives to the film for use in the classroom. Our search is also driven by the simple fact that to the Millennial generation, the black and white format is very nearly entirely alien. It creates such a visceral negative reaction that the first ten to twenty minutes of the film are simply an orientation to the unfamiliar environment. The pace of the thing is also glacial by modern standards, and particularly so to minds attuned to rapid multi-tasking and immersive information environments. While one can make all the arguments one likes about the need for sustained single focus attention, their native preferences are indeed more suited for the kind of world in which they operate as intelligence professionals than the Industrial era conventions that black and white film represents.

The single set format, and the emphasis on argumentation, has however made it exceptionally difficult to find a substitute. Our best – but admittedly still imperfect – alternative has lately been the 1999 film Deterrence, which offered a President’s decision-making process in a nuclear crisis while snowed in at a small diner. Unfortunately, the film’s scenario is constructed around a fictionalized Iraqi dictatorship – which in the modern politicized climate often steers debate too far astray of the real purpose and into the debate over Operation Iraqi Freedom. It also pre-supposes a certain level of student knowledge regarding nuclear warfighting and mutually assured destruction strategy: something not always guaranteed in the post-Cold War cohort. This sometimes makes for quite interesting discussions, to say the least. These are the same problems that incidentally also led us to abandon using the old JMITC exercise that relied on the film version of Hunt for Red October as a notional scenario from which the students would develop practice analytical pieces. While, as a friend recently reminded us, that particular film ages very well as such things go, we recognize that writing intelligence on Soviet era ballistic missile submarines is an anachronism to which few students will respond well –and one that does not serve their real and current professional needs.

All in all, teaching intelligence with films – for as engaging as the technique might be for students bored with lecture – remains a difficult proposition. We hope that in time the development of newer tools for digital animation – and the kinds of interactive scenarios that new gaming engines permit – will render the question entirely moot. But the cultivation of young professional minds remains a terribly stubborn business, and one that is not frequently improved by new technologies. We do wish to see such improvements become effective, and preferably in the near future. But given that the same promises have been made since around the time black and white films first graced the big screen, we remain skeptical.


h/t Overlawyered

The expanding intelligence studies web

We note today a few excellent resources for the intelligence professional newly brought to the online environment. The public internet presence of the community continues to expand apace as the value of Metcalf’s law is realized, and the protocols for an appropriate public discussion of the field slowly continue to evolve.

The National Defense Intelligence College (pronounced JMIC by those seeking to avoid confusion with the ill-starred Drug Intelligence Center by the same acronym) has dramatically expanded its public presence. Most importantly for the intelligence scholar, they are releasing in electronic form a whole selection of works from their press, with the promise of more to come. Many of the files are large, so the usual admonition regarding server courtesy is in order. However, we are exceptionally pleased to see these materials being made available more widely for use in other academic programs. This will do much to combat the problem of seeing the better recent unclassified intelligence literature circulating only as 5th generation samizdat photocopy from hand to hand, due to a limited print run. We hope to see at least a selection of their voluminous collection of theses likewise circulated. We also sincerely wish that the civilian academic programs around the country will take an example from the College and cease attempting to reinvent their own wheels, but rather pursue unique studies of lasting value to the field.

We also note, thanks to our friend Michael Tanji, the venerable and respected OSS Society has also expanded its online presence into something akin to a blog. We look forward to their contributions and stories, which have already gotten off to a good start with discussion regarding the potential rebirth of the Office of Strategic Services in the Long War. Regardless of the relative merits of the proposal itself, the idea does capture the imagination. We would love to see a modern version of the kind of stories told in the classic You're Stepping on My Cloak and Dagger for our new era.

The imperative of Sherman Kent’s original vision of an intelligence literature continues to call to professionals. We are grateful to see the benefits to the history and the appreciation of the field that have already resulted, and we look forward to future developments.

Revisiting primary sources – the Allen Dulles collection at Princeton

We have been recently quite frustrated by the continued reliance of those in the intelligence studies field on secondary and other derivative works for academic purposes – particularly when so much primary source material has been recently declassified and digitized. We feel there simply is no substitute in many of the great matters of controversy to a student actually reading the original documents themselves, with derivative works used to provide commentary and illumination. It does require one begin to acquire the skills of piecing together fragments of documents – never a bad thing for a prospective intelligence professional. But the technique also illustrates sharply the true nature of one’s limited knowledge when discussing these matters in an unclassified forum, even decades after the events – a lesson many students (and a good number of their less humble professors) would be well advised to internalize at an early date. There will always be pieces of the profession which any particular individual will not see, and the sooner a scholar learns to work within these constraints, the better off that student will be – and the less likely to make a fool of themselves through wild assumptions or arrogant airs.

It is thus with great interest we note that Princeton University has opened a digital archive of the private papers belonging to former DCI Allen Dulles. The variety and volume of materials is simply extraordinary, and although it is organized by librarians (rather than intelligence professionals or modern search engine experts) it is well worth the time to explore these virtual stacks. Given that the gentleman’s 1963 text The Craft of Intelligence, is still reprinted for use as a basic text at many university level programs, these further materials are both substantively illuminating and historically invaluable. Of particular interest are the French and German language items, which may never have been previously referenced in depth during intelligence studies research on the matter.

We of course would be remiss if we did not mention one of the more valuable secondary texts which would provide a framework to the scholar seeking to interpret these materials. James Srode’s text, Allen Dulles : Master of Spies, is a modern and accessible work that covers Dulles’ career and legacy, and can prove a valuable guide to the nearly undifferentiated mass of the digitized documents.

The entire collection is over 1.5 gigabytes of data. One day very soon we will no doubt laugh at this as a trivially small volume in the age of the exaflood – but for now, please do be kind to the university’s servers and stagger your requests over time if you choose to download sections for your perusal. They do run a pretty fast pipe, but we would not wish to see a tragedy of the commons deny this resource to other researchers.

We would love to see these kind of digitization efforts other libraries holding such vital collections of import to the intelligence studies field – and hopefully in conjunction with a good OCR and search capability such as Google Books or its counterparts now offer. We can think of few greater wartime contributions that the intellectuals of this country may offer than to assist in the rebuilding and expansion of its intelligence capabilities for the Long War.

We also hope to see a commensurate response from the intelligence studies academia itself. There is easily enough material for countless numbers of good journal articles and even a thesis or two, plus a large selection of case studies focusing on aspects operational and analytic tradecraft. Let us hope that the investment of the field’s thinkers will equal that of the library’s digitization program.

Further to the limited impact of university level intelligence scholarship

Our earlier comments decrying the essential irrelevance of much of the intelligence studies academy to the professional practitioner has provoked no small measure of reaction over the past month. Most comments have come from those still serving, with anecdotes – in truth, mostly horror stories – of the failure of numerous attempts to reach out to the scholars in the field. It seems there is a certain degree of stubbornness – one might even say a profound expression of anchoring bias – which ties the professoriat to lines of inquiry that contribute only marginally to the art and science, despite clear needs in other areas.

The esteemed Dr. Barton Whaley reflected upon this problem in a recent article, which in part examined the academic tendency to continually try to re-invent the wheel. (For those interested, it may be found in the Defense Intelligence Journal, Volume 15, Number 2, 2006.) His personal list of such wheels covered includes the “re-discovery” of the problems of strategic surprise. In this spirit, we might add our own list of those topics we think more than adequate attention has already been paid, given the other gaps in the literature. Among these are the continual attempt to revisit the foundational definition of intelligence, the endless rehashing of debates over words of estimative probability, and the needless attempts to impose a false and entirely arbitrary numeric precision in intelligence writing.

One of our colleagues put it best: the primary reason these sorts of academic wittering continue unabated has been the small number of professionals who have actually read such irrelevant stuff. And even fewer will have dwelt upon it long enough to respond, rather than laughing it off. Unfortunately, even those that have gone through the difficulties of finding time apart from the pressing business of current accounts, and fought through publication review in order to convey substantive examples from inside the vault, rarely make a dent in the external discussion, given how few pages emerge to compete with the growing corpus of distraction.

But we strongly suspect there are yet other intelligence studies academics that may indeed be well worth listening to, and we continue our discussions in the forlorn hope of surfacing their work more widely within the community. Thus we were most grateful for the insightful commentary regarding the same earlier post, provided by a learned individual whom we shall describe (with permission) only as a Western intelligence scholar, and full professor at a top tier university. The gentleman sought to enlighten your humble authors regarding the flipside of the equation of intelligence scholarship from the university’s perspective, and raised points well worth wider consideration. (Reproduced here with only minor editing to preserve the anonymity upon which all of our skunkworks relies). His response speaks to “two central factors which have inhibited not only the volume and quality of (ivory) tower scholarship on intelligence matters, but also the impact of scholarly work on the IC.”

“First—and this holds true for a variety of areas, and not just the IC—most scholars simply have no sense of how bureaucratic and government processes, let alone the military and IC, operate. It is not anything taught in graduate school, where the emphasis is very much on mastering the theoretical masters of the field. The majority of academics have fairly predictable career paths from undergraduate degree through to MA and PhD, with little outside-academia work experience (the exceptions being "professional" schools of diplomacy and foreign service, which place more emphasis on recruiting staff with professional experience, and also many scholars working in the aid and development field). I would register a disagreement with your observation that: "Lacking in-depth target knowledge, substantive understanding of applied analytical tradecraft, and relying on a too short tour (if even that) at a three letter organization or two, the result becomes a sort of punditry entirely divorced from the profession itself." More specifically, while I don't disagree with the broader point that you are making, I would argue that the quality of academic literature on intelligence, war, and diplomacy would be substantially improved by even relatively periods spent inside an agency, or foreign or defence ministry.”

Second, the professional reward system within academia neither rewards policy-relevant output, nor does it place much value on material published outside the regular scholarly channels. Indeed, even the latter are carefully weighted (formally or informally) by their academic prestige within a disciplinary field, with leading university presses and peer-reviewed journals coming first, lesser presses and journals second, and everything else a very scant third. In other words, the benefit that accrues to a scholar is almost in inverse proportion to the actual policy impact (or, in this case, impact on the intelligence community).

Although most scholars don't think directly in these terms, it is possible to put some numbers on this. Let us take the hypothetical example of an excellent scholar who forgoes publication in a top-ranked journal (say APSR or World Politics), and instead produces a online piece or occasional paper in easily disseminated and digestible form with direct IC implications. Come annual salary increment time, the former might well be worth $750 (or more) in annual pay increase… the latter perhaps $150 (or less). Lets also make them 34, with a thirty year career ahead of them. The lifetime loss from writing the latter is (ignoring inflationary effects, etc) a minimum of $18,000. If they did it every year--well, quite apart from the tenure and promotion consequences, you can see that the implicit disincentive is substantial. Equally important are the validation messages that fields send to themselves, and the prestige and value one is accorded within academic networks and other peer groups.

This is quite apart from other inhibiting factors.”

We confess that we had not properly considered the economic incentives in the equation – thinking primarily of the thing as an unambiguous good in its own right. Of course, this is also a product of our own cognitive biases – rarely in the IC do contributions to the literature translate directly into one’s pay packet in the same manner (perhaps one reason why the literature advances so slowly.) Neither should the currency of the reputation market be lightly discounted.

If the community is to encourage the kind of the scholarship in the intelligence studies field that will actually serve the profession’s interest, these factors need to be taken into account. The learned gentleman does offer a few potential solution pathways, which merit further discussion.

“How can this be addressed? The recent proliferation of peer-reviewed academic journals on intelligence and security matters certainly helps, although it doesn't necessarily contribute to scholarly output with IC impacts. Sporadic efforts to get scholars inside government for a year or two, whether as scholars-in-residence or in an actual functioning capacity, ought to be expanded upon, and designed to have benefits (such as in-built research funds) that offset the apparent career liabilities of "wasting" (to quote a departmental colleague) one's sabbatical in this way. Finally, the intelligence community needs to reflect on whether its frequent aversion to providing "visiting" scholars with high-level security clearances needs to be rethought. There are certainly substantial security issues involved, given that scholars might well be lecturing on a country in class shortly after reading highly sensitive COMINT or HUMINT on the same. On the other hand, its not clear how they can understand what is going on--let alone contribute to the betterment of IC functions--if they are entirely kept out of the loop. At this point (and at the risk of paraphrasing Donald Rumsfeld), most don't know what they don't know.”

Money can be found, but its application towards productive ends has been problematic. Unfortunately, too often research funds have done little to redirect a faculty to more relevant pursuits, being simply contracts which were serviced using largely student labour. (Again, as in many cases of suboptimal contract performance, the fault may lie as much with the contracting agencies management of the project, but the history is what it is.) While cleared scholarship is an interesting concept, this is typically also done through a contracting vehicle – which tends to take the work product out of the academic realm and into the community itself, greatly limiting distribution elsewhere in the intelligence studies field. Many academics – with some justified reason – are also reluctant to accept the kind of future publication constraints that a term of cleared service will inevitably impose.

These are matters that deserve greater consideration, and we no doubt will return to in future discussions. We are grateful as always to our readership, and in particular to our commentator, for helping advance this discussion in ways we never could have anticipated when this small effort was begun.

Hazards of blogging for intelligence professionals

August Jackson, most notably of the Washington DC chapter of the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, reflects on the issues created by blogging with the same candor that one addresses intelligence assessments.

His comments raise interesting points from the perspective of professional ethics and the obligations of duty – perhaps something roughly equivalent to the concept of giri.

"In competitive intelligence you can't be a Kool-Aid drinker, and often you have to tell executives when they're on the wrong path. Companies make their moves in public, so it's only natural that management should expect to see criticism or praise in a public forum. I've had three different jobs and a number of different contracts since I have been blogging, and I have never disclosed proprietary information. Not once. Ever. I never will. Any time I've been involved in the formation of a business decision I've kept my opinions private whether I've agreed or disagreed. This, to me, is a more important measure of professionalism in blogging than never commenting on any company's policy."

It is interesting for us to see this discussion in a commercial intelligence perspective. Those in the public sector have a far more clear set of distinctions – and enforced by far more than mere civil tort – that bound words and deed. This by necessity limits to a much greater degree the range of topics we can address in public pages, and to avoid even the appearance of impropriety one’s opinions must be even more carefully circumscribed on any matter that might be seen as leading to politicization. Intelligence practitioners must be professionally apolitical, in all aspects of their public presence – something too often forgotten in the current Beltway atmosphere.

Most organizations simply do not permit an intelligence professional to blog in public at all. Some of those efforts which are allowed to exist may only do so under a high degree of restriction. (We suppose our humble effort falls into the latter category.) In government service, there are of course alternatives on other networks for those that wish to speak more freely about matters of more direct impact to their daily working lives. (As for us, we appreciate the chance to step away from the issues of the day and examine the craft in a more holistic fashion – but this is not for everyone.) But this is not the first time we have looked to this subject.

We have also previously discussed the implications of academic blogging. However, for the most part, our comments (and those of others) have reflected upon the professoriat. Intelligence studies student blogging is another question entirely. To date, student participation in the intelligence blogsphere has been very limited – largely because they are struggling to master a learning curve that has been compared to a brick wall, and recognize that they have little of interest of their own to say. There are a few quite notable exceptions, however, that are well worth the attention invested. It is for this reason that we feel student bloggers should indeed be cultivated, but carefully so. They will have to make hard choices – many which might impact their future career for years to come – especially if they are overt intelligence professionals from a young age (precluding other activities in later years.) It is also due to these pressures that we have witnessed a number of blogs simply drop off, as their authors come under new publication policies as they take professional jobs.

We further view with grave concern the current fashion among academics of assigning blog writing tasks as class requirements, as most have been authored under true name (or readily identifiable associations thereof), and explicitly link the student to an area of study that as a professional they would likely never acknowledge so publicly, even as overt practitioners.

Against this backdrop, why does intelligence studies blogging endure? We think it is because the benefits that accrue to an individual author’s mind far outweigh the potential downside, as long as one adheres to the strictest standards of professionalism (and security). That these benefits result in a public good which advances (to whatever small degree) the intellectual discussion of the intelligence studies field, and its literature, is a happy higher order result – and one that should be encouraged within the boundaries of propriety and discretion.

The miserable professoriat

Although we continue to object to the increasing introduction of lawyers into the field of intelligence, we also continue to find interesting parallels between the problems (and successful approaches) of the legal academy itself on the one hand, and those encountered in the hard task of teaching intelligence on the other. (These parallels do not mean we suddenly have shifted course to advocate that intelligence professionals should be taught in the same manner as lawyers – but rather that we see commonalities of issues and solutions that may be approached in a similar manner for entirely different purposes.)

Thus we are greatly interested in the debate over the relative happiness, misery, and edginess of “most” law professors that is currently ongoing between Mike Livingston of Rutgers, Stephen Bainbridge of UCLA, Paul Caron of the University of Cincinnati, Ilya Soman of George Mason, and Dave Hoffman of Temple.

We stipulate that the discussion starts from an unproven conjecture – that law professors are somehow less happy than other professionals in other fields, and that this unhappiness if manifest to a greater degree than in other academic specialties. The resulting responses cover a range of interesting factors both responding to this conjecture as well as challenging its initial formulation. However, while the debate has been re-framed and argued to the wider question of happiness / misery, the original impetus was intended to describe and seek to explain individual unease – “edginess”.

That first question is indeed a slightly different wicket – and one that we certainly ourselves have observed in the intelligence academy. Livingston offers the following towards a more comprehensive explanation of the cause:

“For the professorate, according to my friend, is one of the few activities that is (a) very competitive, (b) primarily personal (that is, noncooperative) in nature, and (c) almost entirely devoid of objective standards that might be used to measure success or failure in the activity. Competitive, both because of the kind of people who go into it and the endless run of tenure, promotions, offers at supposedly better institutions or publications, and so forth. Individual, because our teaching and scholarship is with very limited exceptions done alone. But almost entirely subjective, because beyond the sheer volume of articles or citations, no one has ever come close to a rigorous system for evaluating academic performance or even what such a system would try to measure. The situation is, one suspects, even worse for law teaching than (say) physics or sociology, where there is at least some accepted body of materials one is expected to have read and a more or less established system of peer review for books, articles, and other publications.”

We would concur with these points, and in particular, the difficulties created by a lack of consensus regarding even the skeleton of a canon, and an otherwise immature literature. This dynamic is witnessed by the continual reinvention of basic concepts and revisiting of arguments – starting from first definitions and ranging across every other aspect of the field which is publicly known.

We would also to this attempt at explanation add that the competition for faculty positions in the intelligence field is even more intense, due both to the limited number of billets open as well as the increasing tendency of many schools to fill those billets with individuals who are palatable to the other faculty – but whom have had little place in the intelligence field itself. Many of these individuals would not be qualified to perform even as a junior analyst on a high priority account in a working level shop, yet have been granted a position from which to influence and shape the next generation of intelligence professionals. Little wonder then that they should be uneasy – and that their teaching and scholarship should reflect this. The result is conveyed as a distinct sense of brittleness – when questionable competence in what are basic aspects of the tradecraft is combined with ego, the result is not pretty. (We are the first to admit that a little ego is absolutely necessary to perform the hard task of singing for one’s supper in front of a crowd, day in and day out, but that this typically expands into a far more poisonous sort of thing in the unchallenged and isolated incubator of academia.)

The response created by the pressure of this brittleness too often leads to exactly the worst path an intelligence studies academic can choose. Instead of connecting further with practitioners, and pursuing those aspects of the field which would lead to greater relevance within the field, such a person cuts themselves off still further – welding their own ever more elaborately gilded echo chamber. The detrimental effects of such a path are most clearly observed in the students which emerge from such a style of instruction – arrogant without cause, boastful without substantive mastery, and both narrowly and shallowly constructed. These are students, which like their formative professors, who may never face Smoking Mirror. (Though the smarter – and more salvageable - among them may rapidly evolve after their first bruising encounters with the real world of the intelligence profession.)

There are of course other factors which contribute to uncertainty for those academics that do not have the problems of their counterparts with insufficient credentials. These include the highly variable supply of contract research dollars – much of which is vulnerable to competition from the increasingly far more sophisticated offerings of privatized intelligence shops. Other factors may come into play, such as the role of online and distance learning programs in changing the traditional distribution of student bodies across programs. (Though the growth of such programs for the moment does serve mostly to increase the total pool of students. This does creates its own problems when such programs are not paired with a solid applied and practical component as well as a career and clearance track.)

We view this uncertainty among the intelligence academy in a mixed light. We want a stable and growing professoriat, comprised of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds. But we also are acutely aware of the rapid effects of stagnation in “comfortable” positions, and view a little edginess as a good thing. Of course, this is one of the classic paradoxes of innovation.

Potential solutions to such issues – addressed briefly in the legal academy’s responses - are another discussion entirely. We seek here only to surface the debate, and bring it into the context of our profession and its academy. This is by no means our last word on the subject, as it deserves a far more substantive discussion in its own right.

Training versus education in intelligence studies

We have entirely had our fill of the debate over the supposed differences between training and education when examining the development of new entrants to the intelligence profession. This is at its core as profoundly anti-intellectual as it is diametrically opposed to the applied art and science of the field. The argument ill serves both the students it is aimed at improving as much as the instructors and professors that it is designed to elevate.

The typical argument goes something as follows: a particular aspect of professional tradecraft is highlighted and disputed, with the academics claiming that instruction on the topic is “mere training”. From the other side, a complex concept or idea is criticized as being “too theoretical” and of no practical value to the working level analyst. In both cases, it is almost always the subjective biases of the individual commentator that is most clearly reflected. (Though we do allow some small exception, and a full measure of understanding and sympathy for those rare folks – almost entirely within the training model camp - that are simply fighting the never-ending balance of trying to fit too much teaching material to too little student time and attention.)

The predominate origin of this argument is from the perspective of those that would denigrate most tradecraft – especially those fundamental building blocks of the profession - as merely training. We are frankly astounded by this argument. No one disputes the need to teach medical students basic procedures such as incisions or injections, nor budding economists the basics of financial analysis, nor law students the art of legal writing. Yet the argument is somehow given great deference when it comes to applied intelligence practice: in analysis, writing, or the more specialized forms of functional disciplines. Typically, such criticism relies heavily upon an implied appeal to authority, used as the worst sort of bludgeon to halt further debate.

It has taken us some time to understand this dynamic. We are however now convinced that its primary perpetuation comes from the deep unease displayed by many academics towards the actual business of doing intelligence as an activity. We agree that it is a far more comfortable life to offer critique upon the history and current activities of others. This is not a luxury given unto most – and should not be the model to which one’s students should be prepared. Those that are not themselves practicing professionals – particularly given the gap between practitioners and the academy – tend to ignore the very things that are needed most in the cultivation of new intelligence professionals. These things are not valued within their world-view, and are frequently not even understood by those that have not walked within the community (or who did so for too short a time).

This state of affairs is simply unacceptable. We cannot imagine a field in which students emerge after years of preparation nearly unable to perform even the most basic of tasks without weeks or years of further training. We acknowledge that there will be entire realms of new learning specific to their assignment that will always be required – particularly when academic teaching is conducted at the unclassified level. However, let us be done with the specious argument that those aspects of tradecraft commonly deemed “training” are inappropriate for the academic environment. We are not building a generation of comparative theory critics – we are building the generation which will have to fight, and win, the Long War.

Systems of systems analysis, with zombies

One of the harder concepts to teach within intelligence studies is the analysis of systems of systems, particularly given the complexities of real world PMESI examples. This is compounded by the natural tendency of students (and instructors with experience on related accounts) to focus on the disruption of systems – terrorism, warfare, economic crisis, etc. – far more than on aspects of resiliency that allow these systems to adapt even under severe strain. (From this originates our most serious criticisms of John Robb’s Global Guerrillas theory.)

Teaching systems of systems analysis in the foreign intelligence environment is one thing. Typically, those students are familiar – or at least interested in learning about – theories of political science, international relations, and macroeconomics that help to understand complex and dynamically adaptive structures. This is not such an easy task when teaching in the homeland security environment. The student population tends towards the far more practical aspects of more narrowly focused and concrete problems – as one would expect from a group comprised largely of cops, firefighters, and emergency medical staff. They also tend to reject what they do not perceive as inherently governmental – no matter how critical the impact of that systems failure might be. Absent a scenario in which they can more readily grasp the implications, it is a difficult if not impossible task to inculcate the perspective required to properly address the evolving all-hazard approaches that homeland security intelligence professionals must grapple with.

And herein lies the rub. Even the most carefully crafted teaching scenario can be challenged by those intent on avoiding the intellectual aspects of the exercise under the rubric of “experience”. Even recent major real world cases, such as Katrina or the California wildfires, are considered to be such anomalous Black Swan events that they are beyond the practical scope of most anticipated homeland security scenarios. This is to say nothing of a potential mass casualty or catastrophic event. This extremeness aversion (covered well within Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s discussions of Mediocristan) makes it exceptionally difficult to address major incident scenarios in a manner that truly engages the participants and forces them to consider the full spectrum of consequence management issues.

One potential answer that we have found is taken from the realm of the jesters that occasionally visit the futurists’ table. Since the fundamental premise of national event training scenarios are often rejected by participants who cannot visualize the circumstances under which they personally would be involved in the response, no matter how plausible the simulated injects, we change the premise entirely. Rather than attempting to force a willing suspension of disbelief in a plausible, realistic scenario – no matter if the participants should believe in the first place – we introduce a completely unrealistic scenario that borders on the ludicrous. However, it is precisely this over the top element that stimulates not only engaged participation but what rapidly evolves into a serious discussion within a more grounded analytical framework.

The scenario, of course, is a wide-scale zombie attack. Yes, as in the undead - not the computer type beloved of the boffins out there. The staple of countless bad movies requires little explanation –almost everyone is familiar with the rules of zombie behavior and infection. (For those that are not, a review of the “literature” is one of the more enjoyable homework assignments, no doubt.)

The underlying principle of why this scenario works to engage even the most reluctant of participants should of course be very familiar to intelligence professionals. It is identical to the purposes of the analytical technique of divergence. And it is an excellent way to keep discussion at the unclassified level when working in mixed groups of professionals that have varying degrees of access (thus preventing arguments based on “inside information” which may or may not actually support the point under contention), in a way that no scenario grounded in a real world event necessarily could.

The real key to making the scenario work for a good systems of systems discussion depends entirely on the ability of the instructor (or facilitator, in breakout session groups) to tie the discussion back to PMESI effects. This can be quite an enjoyable exercise, however, in a manner that avoids many of the traditional objections raised by those insistent on the limited focus of the classic inherently governmental perspective.

Fortunately, we recently found an excellent work of fictional speculative “history” that presents an excellent look at the higher order effects of such a scenario, called World War Z. While it goes far beyond the level we typically would focus on for a homeland security class or table top exercise, it is quite well executed and entertaining in its own right. Its interview style structure gives it unique potential value to the educator, as most of the presented chapters can be used in whole or in part to introduce the scenario. For this, we actually recommend the audio book version, with excerpts played as scenario injects or to introduce break out discussion sessions.

As an instructional exercise, this becomes certainly a far more ludic activity than we traditionally seek in the serious business of thinking about the unthinkable. Nonetheless, we see it as an excellent way to introduce some difficult high level concepts to audiences which might not otherwise want to engage them. We think the results are far better than the limited appreciation retained after a dry lecture, or a hot but entirely off topic debate over the plausibility of underlying events of a different scenario.

Explaining the limited impact of university level intelligence scholarship

Among the more damning aspects of the current state of intelligence studies academia is the near irrelevance of what few contributions to the literature that it does produce – at least in its incarnations at civilian universities. Our continued search for interdisciplinary contributions in no small part stems from the need to fill this void – and especially to find something other than the tired rehashing of reform discussions and notional sketches of some ideal fantasy of a unified new organization chart.

The khaki tower – the military service institutions and war colleges – has done more than its fair share to advance the field in new directions. In fact, without this literature we might be looking at a far sparser landscape of research and writing on those subjects most critical to our field. Unfortunately, for reasons which at this point are beyond irrational, we continue to observe that the civilian academia largely ignores these works no matter how key their contributions. The standards of scholarship and academic rigour at many of the khaki institutions are by any objective measure equal to the best universities in the world – and far exceed that which frequently serves to pass muster at the middle tier civilian schools. Yet the civilian university has offered little in its own right as an alternative.

We do not seek here to re-fight the debate over the relative levels of theorization in intelligence, and the relative importance of such theory. (Dr. Andrew and Dr. Davies carry that banner far more persuasively, whichever side one might choose to believe.) Instead, we question why what few contributions to the literature that have emerged from the civilian university have had such limited impact within the intelligence community as a whole?

We freely admit the question far exceeds the capacity of a humble blog to answer. We may point towards a few elements which we think contribute to the problem, but the issue will by no means be an easy one to fully trace – let alone resolve.

The first underlying factor we might identify stems simply from the limited circulation most civilian academic work receives within the intelligence community. At most, only a few copies of any given paper or journal might be found in the stacks of the major agencies’ own libraries. And these are institutions rich in resources indeed when compared to their counterparts in more isolated locations, or at less rarified levels. While electronic databases may solve this problem for some of the major publications, the range of access to these is also limited (though, to be fair, improving.)

But these databases do not encompass a wide range of publications which float in the gray literature