/* */

29 August 2008

Intellectual property claims as denial & deception measures in medical intelligence

Following yesterday’s clear demonstration of the official embrace of open source intelligence comes a sharp reminder of that discipline’s limitations. The field of medical intelligence – and in particular, epidemiological intelligence – has been one of the areas in which OSINT has seen great successes. These successes are all the more important as they have involved the integration of specific scientific and technical expertise into collection, analysis, and visualization of extremely hard problems across very large scale geographies and populations. However, much of the underlying open source information and reference materials have only been made available due to the predominate ethic of free information exchange which prevails in scientific sharing and peer review. A recent Washington Post article (via Futurismic and Open the Future) highlights a new concept that may threaten the fundamental availability of those underlying materials.

This concept - viral sovereignty – immediately brings to mind the worst days of the Cold War, in which the Soviets sought to conceal information regarding large scale disease outbreaks to preserve the illusion of a superior socialized medical system, and in some cases such as the 1979 Sverdlovsk outbreak, prevent revelation of their clandestine biological warfare programs. The newest iteration of these ideas couple the same statist impulse towards censorship with a distorted view of the intellectual property market, resulting in a truly poisonous brew. One might consider such paranoia- and profiteering- driven claims a unique type of denial & deception measure aimed directly at the OSINT mechanisms of governments, pharmaceutical firms, and international organizations.

We would not wish to see a future where fundamental medical information regarding new disease outbreaks is simply not available in certain high risk countries. The potential higher order effects of such short-sighted decisions are readily considered – including the “surprise” global emergence of highly virulent new infection strains from unreported lower level outbreaks. Such a state of affairs could simply not be permitted to exist unchallenged, and as a result it is likely that a number of nations (particularly regional neighbors most likely to be impacted by such outbreaks) might then turn to clandestine collection means to acquire what previously was the open domain of science itself. This raises serious proliferation concerns, if new disease variants are obtained by BW aspirant countries (or non state actors) but are not otherwise widely known among nations which have abandoned biowarfare programs. One could also anticipate a surging demand for such clandestine collection measures for industrial espionage purposes, especially in countries where the legalities and ethics of an open competitive intelligence profession simply does not exist.

Such frictions would not only distort legitimate markets for pharmaceutical advances, but also would fundamentally impact the iterative and collaborative nature of modern medical research. And the first victims of these negative effects would likely be the unfortunate citizens of the country seeking to employ spurious intellectual property claims in this manner.

Labels: , , , , , ,

11 March 2008

OSINT and faint indicators in the new cyber environment

For all of the sound and fury regarding the potential OPSEC implications of military and intelligence blogging, we must continually remind those mired in the old ways of thinking that there are far more pressing problems which inflict damage on the enterprise - be that enterprise government or commercial. While indiscretion will always remain a cardinal sin, the worst indiscretions are rarely committed by those that put pen to paper with proper foresight and consideration of the potential higher order effects of the discussion. The prohibition argument also rarely takes into consideration the kind of deliberate self-censorship that is routinely practiced by those with an active stake in the reputation market of the blogsphere – one that increasingly crosses into normal professional life in much the same manner as do one’s writings in an academic journal. The higher order benefits, on the other hand, of a robust and evolving literature, can be clearly shown to outweigh the actual problems identified in the kinds of studies which call for widespread prohibition of online writings on topics of relevance to the field. Worse yet, if such a prohibition would come to pass, the community will essentially have yielded the floor entirely to those who write without true understanding, and who increasingly lead the discussion further astray from the real issues and opportunities that today’s intelligence professionals face – as well as those critics which seek to deny entirely the legitimacy of the profession itself.

We have recently had occasion to note counter-examples which prove by comparison the vast gulf between the discretion of those current and former professionals engaged in active current debate in furtherance of the literature, and the kind of negligence and errors of the “official” discussion that if the shoe were on the other foot would provoke widespread (and justified) outrage. The first of these comes from the commercial world, at the Corporate Intelligence blog, where a case study examining the inferences which can be drawn from job vacancy postings is presented. We can recall quite a few similar issues emerging in the national security space, particularly with certain less than discrete contractors that tend to advertise in the major regional papers for rather explicit position descriptions, revealing rather more detail than one would like to see in public. These are rarely cited in prohibition discussions, however, but in the aggregate have likely done far more damage to the community than all of the public deliberative literature over the past sixty years.

We also recommend highly the analysis over at In From the Cold of a recent and much publicized incident involving the F-22 Raptor program, in which a pilot was less than discrete in online discussions. While we certainly feel that the individual responsible for disclosures deserves a long counseling session on appropriate standards for representing oneself in public, we take well the number of points in which supposedly “protected” information was previously disclosed through official public affairs channels. We also find observations of the interest displayed by certain parties more valuable than the information provided back to them, especially when the alternative pathways for those parties to obtain the same answers could have been used through entirely passive means, of which the community might never have been aware.

Of course, OSINT does have its dark side in that the adversary is always capable of using it against friendly interests. However, it requires a level of effort, understanding, and skill to parse through the overwhelming volume of noise to find those faint indicators – a task not unfamiliar to those that have ever worked with publicly available source information. In our view, it is better our adversaries waste that time – not knowing the wheat from the chaff – than they should spend efforts pursuing real collection against more sensitive activities that might yield a return on that investment that is more damaging to friendly interests in the long run.

The modern information environment is increasingly complex, and now that the genie of those technologies is out of the bottle, there is no chance of returning to a simpler era. It thus becomes all the more critical that the discussion regarding the effects of new media and online public discussions focus more narrowly on those areas which are truly essential elements of friendly information that must be protected with exceptional caution, rather than a blanket of prohibition that will harm our own side’s sensemaking and adaptation more than it will impair the enemy’s collection efforts.

Labels: , , , ,

24 December 2007

Systems of systems analysis, with zombies

One of the harder concepts to teach within intelligence studies is the analysis of systems of systems, particularly given the complexities of real world PMESI examples. This is compounded by the natural tendency of students (and instructors with experience on related accounts) to focus on the disruption of systems – terrorism, warfare, economic crisis, etc. – far more than on aspects of resiliency that allow these systems to adapt even under severe strain. (From this originates our most serious criticisms of John Robb’s Global Guerrillas theory.)

Teaching systems of systems analysis in the foreign intelligence environment is one thing. Typically, those students are familiar – or at least interested in learning about – theories of political science, international relations, and macroeconomics that help to understand complex and dynamically adaptive structures. This is not such an easy task when teaching in the homeland security environment. The student population tends towards the far more practical aspects of more narrowly focused and concrete problems – as one would expect from a group comprised largely of cops, firefighters, and emergency medical staff. They also tend to reject what they do not perceive as inherently governmental – no matter how critical the impact of that systems failure might be. Absent a scenario in which they can more readily grasp the implications, it is a difficult if not impossible task to inculcate the perspective required to properly address the evolving all-hazard approaches that homeland security intelligence professionals must grapple with.

And herein lies the rub. Even the most carefully crafted teaching scenario can be challenged by those intent on avoiding the intellectual aspects of the exercise under the rubric of “experience”. Even recent major real world cases, such as Katrina or the California wildfires, are considered to be such anomalous Black Swan events that they are beyond the practical scope of most anticipated homeland security scenarios. This is to say nothing of a potential mass casualty or catastrophic event. This extremeness aversion (covered well within Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s discussions of Mediocristan) makes it exceptionally difficult to address major incident scenarios in a manner that truly engages the participants and forces them to consider the full spectrum of consequence management issues.

One potential answer that we have found is taken from the realm of the jesters that occasionally visit the futurists’ table. Since the fundamental premise of national event training scenarios are often rejected by participants who cannot visualize the circumstances under which they personally would be involved in the response, no matter how plausible the simulated injects, we change the premise entirely. Rather than attempting to force a willing suspension of disbelief in a plausible, realistic scenario – no matter if the participants should believe in the first place – we introduce a completely unrealistic scenario that borders on the ludicrous. However, it is precisely this over the top element that stimulates not only engaged participation but what rapidly evolves into a serious discussion within a more grounded analytical framework.

The scenario, of course, is a wide-scale zombie attack. Yes, as in the undead - not the computer type beloved of the boffins out there. The staple of countless bad movies requires little explanation –almost everyone is familiar with the rules of zombie behavior and infection. (For those that are not, a review of the “literature” is one of the more enjoyable homework assignments, no doubt.)

The underlying principle of why this scenario works to engage even the most reluctant of participants should of course be very familiar to intelligence professionals. It is identical to the purposes of the analytical technique of divergence. And it is an excellent way to keep discussion at the unclassified level when working in mixed groups of professionals that have varying degrees of access (thus preventing arguments based on “inside information” which may or may not actually support the point under contention), in a way that no scenario grounded in a real world event necessarily could.

The real key to making the scenario work for a good systems of systems discussion depends entirely on the ability of the instructor (or facilitator, in breakout session groups) to tie the discussion back to PMESI effects. This can be quite an enjoyable exercise, however, in a manner that avoids many of the traditional objections raised by those insistent on the limited focus of the classic inherently governmental perspective.

Fortunately, we recently found an excellent work of fictional speculative “history” that presents an excellent look at the higher order effects of such a scenario, called World War Z. While it goes far beyond the level we typically would focus on for a homeland security class or table top exercise, it is quite well executed and entertaining in its own right. Its interview style structure gives it unique potential value to the educator, as most of the presented chapters can be used in whole or in part to introduce the scenario. For this, we actually recommend the audio book version, with excerpts played as scenario injects or to introduce break out discussion sessions.

As an instructional exercise, this becomes certainly a far more ludic activity than we traditionally seek in the serious business of thinking about the unthinkable. Nonetheless, we see it as an excellent way to introduce some difficult high level concepts to audiences which might not otherwise want to engage them. We think the results are far better than the limited appreciation retained after a dry lecture, or a hot but entirely off topic debate over the plausibility of underlying events of a different scenario.

Labels: , , , ,

15 November 2007

Lessons of the strike

We have never been much a fan of unions in this modern era of incredible individual opportunity and rapid innovation – qualities seemingly quite at odds with the behavior of most forms of organized labor. We do however freely admit that unions have their place in a competitive market economy so long as individuals are free to choose to organize (or not) as their preference dictates, free from pressure or intimidation. For a variety of reasons, however, we have never had much call to consider organized labor within the context of the intelligence community (though the actions overseas unions were indeed a prominent feature of political analysis during the Cold War.)

Thus, the ongoing Hollywood writer’s strike is quite unfamiliar territory to contemplate. We have long known that the studios which drive that town are essentially specialized forms of financial vehicles designed to leverage investment against the high initial costs of media production and distribution against a potential return measured in popularity (and attending profits). In the course of our musings on the death of other forms of traditional media – particularly those of the fishwrapper variety - we have enjoyed the analysis of various contemporary commentators and pundits who sought to describe the impact of the digital revolution on these entities’ future. However, in the past they had seemed sufficiently disconnected from the concerns of the community’s own revolution in intelligence affairs that we could discern no potential lessons learned – with the possible exception of the fiasco that digital rights management (DRM) implementations have become, and the attending incentives for new cryptanalysis and covert communications technologies that emerged for defeating such DRM and related copyright enforcement systems.

However, the serial entrepreneur (and philanthropist) Marc Andreessen offers up a new piece regarding the strike that has spurred us to reconsider that opinion. His take on the situation is a classic example of opportunity analysis - and one well worth reading not merely for its insight into the potential of a Silicon Valley business model for the next generation media business.

While we differ with those who characterize the profession of intelligence as a specialized form of journalism or (albeit wonkish) media, we cannot argue with many of the very real parallels between intelligence community production processes and consumer outcomes issues to those experienced in the “Industry”. Among the similarities we will concede are the eternal quest for consumer attention, the need for a perceived return on investment of that time for the consumer, and the increasing demands of a more mobile consumer base more closely attuned to 24/7 information streams, and the increasing availability of numerous alternative sources of substituting products. We also see the same kinds of monolithic industrial age structures – adapted for the demands of an earlier age, and often adrift in the current environment.

Thus Andreessen’s piece strikes a unique sort of chord as we contemplate the vast legions of line analysts and field collectors who toil under cumbersome layers of management bureaucracy – both within government and their contractor counterparts. Increasingly, the barriers to entry for those attempting to produce high quality finished intelligence based on unique information sources not commonly available are falling ever faster. In many cases, only the inertia of the incumbents and the market-distorting effects of a cumbersome clearance process are arguably the only reasons why alternative products based on open source information and other, non-governmental intelligence efforts do not surface to defeat entrenched but uncompetitive offerings. But the incentives for the development of alternative models are clearly also present. And in key emerging issue areas, such as the cyber domain, there is the earliest indicators that such alternative may yet develop – perhaps paving the way for other efforts targeting other key accounts.

There is also a line that we note particularly well in the context of our earlier examination of the numbers of intelligence students graduating from the academic programs that will likely never hold a clearance, but will still seek employment utilizing their professional skillset and education. “after all, if you really can't work for the Man, why not start your own company, if you can”? We have no doubt that many of those not in the favored 28% will also take note – and we would not be willing to bet against their chances of success.

Labels: , , , ,

09 November 2007

Implications of publishing open source IMINT analysis

Some time ago, we added the excellent IMINT & Analysis blog to our sidebar for further watching. The effort is a superb example of the quality of contributions that can be made from unclassified, open source research through the application of basic analytic tradecraft. It pains us that this was not more routinely done by others in the space years ago. The technologies have been in place for some time – all that was lacking was the right mind and a willingness to devote the energies such a project would require.

To be sure, individual findings from selected research – such as Chechen urban battle damage assessments, PRC submarine activities, and the recent destruction of the Syrian suspected nuclear facility have all been chronicled using imagery. But the systematic assessment of multiple imagery sets in order to produce and publish something akin to finished geospatial intelligence is another matter entirely. Frankly, all that is lacking is cross reference to BE numbers, else one could easily mistake this as the output of a government system stripped of its markings and logos.

On the one hand, this is an unprecedented teaching opportunity for new analysts coming out of the academic side of the house. Geospatial intelligence has long been among the hardest of disciplines to inculcate within the student cohort, and many promising analysts have no doubt been steered in other directions simply by the lack of availability of resources and expertise to inspire them to pursue the path.

However, the wider availability of such products does raise concerns regarding the potential to feed adversary denial and deception efforts. High resolution commercial imagery has long carried the risk that adversaries without access to, or understanding of, the true nature of imagery collection would evolve more rapidly means to defeat such systems based on new commercial products. These risks are magnified when one can begin to glimpse the thought processes and tradecraft applied to imagery intelligence problems over the course of the production cycle.

We believe that the publishing of these kinds of finished products on an open blog such as IMINT and Analysis is not itself the problem. The real challenge arises out of the changing nature of the information environment itself. When the potential for such developments exist, they will inevitably arise in one form or another. It is better to consider their implications from a perspective of open discussion, than to attempt to second guess the effects of such activities in another context – for example perhaps that of an adversary’s intelligence service’s open source unit conducting their own version of a Red Cell assessment.

There will never be another day in the 21st century when the adversary will have less access to what was once the most sophisticated of the 20th century intelligence technical collection techniques than they do at present. The means by which such technical means may be defeated will only be easier as time passes, technology grows more common and less expensive, and the understanding of these systems from civil applications and open sources grows more sophisticated. The denial and deception problem - applied in the context of national technical means - will only get harder. The challenge to the Intelligence Community is to accelerate the pace of innovation in order to overcome the adversary’s attempts no matter how much easier the deceiver’s task may become in the future. Towards that end, we strongly suspect that the robust discussion of analytic tradecraft – including counter-deception – will do more to advance that innovation within the intelligence profession than in a closed and narrow conversation from a limited range of perspectives.

Labels: , , , , ,

31 October 2007

Reverberations of Yamamoto

The fine folks over at the Volokh Conspiracy have provided the intelligence studies field with yet another interesting angle for consideration when discussing decision-making in the SIGINT environment.

The case study of the interception and shoot down of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s transport flight, based on successful cryptanalysis of Japanese coded communications traffic, has long been one of the most clear cut examples of the difficult calculus which must be weighed between using a unique intelligence source to immediate operational benefit, and risking the long term consequences of losing that source based on the higher order effects of the enemy’s possible reactions.

Generations of students have grappled with this case, but rarely is it mentioned that a serving Supreme Court Justice is among those who were decorated for their role in the operation. Nor, until now, has it been disclosed that the Justice has chosen a rather unique perspective from which to view the deed – seeing it as a questionable action, and evaluating future state sanctioned killings (such as judicial execution) through the prism of that experience.

Now, of all the ethical questions to be raised in the intelligence field, we rarely consider the morality of warfare itself. Just war theory and generations of thinkers before us have rendered this well trod ground. An intelligence officer is no less of a moral actor in supporting through analysis or action the ethical conduct of military action, in accordance with the civilized norms of warfare and customary international law. It is very much true that the intelligence professional is, through the chain of events he sets in motion, in a way responsible for the deaths of those who are killed on the kinetic end of the military deed. Yet these casualties are measured against the potential loss of friendly forces, and the potential effects of defeat in the conflict. In a just war, those casualties are almost always deemed necessary to prevent further, greater harm to those the intelligence professional is charged to protect. And if justified, the Western way of war dictates that the operational and tactical means by which the mission is carried out should imperil one’s own side to the least degree possible, and introduce effects as soon as is practical. Intelligence enables this – and targeted killing, especially through interception and engagement of fighter aircraft far from any civilian area, accomplishes this with the least possible harm to uninvolved bystanders.

This is not an abstract question of historical interest. Every day in the Long War, intelligence professionals seek to find and identify enemies which in their own way are no less cleverly dangerous than Yamamoto. In many cases, the dangers in attempting to apprehend those enemies on the battlefield – or even to attempt to engage them directly through infantry action in what is typically dense urban terrain, is to risk the death of friendly forces, the failure of the mission, or potential unintended collateral damage and civilian causalities. If the potential intelligence value to be gained by the capture of the individual does not outweigh the risk of the operation, and the operation does not imperil the intelligence sources and methods which allowed for the identification and location for the target, targeted killing through engagement standoff weapons may be the most ethical and moral choice. The Western way of war is to expend materiel, not our people, to obtain victory. While some have disingenuously attempted to declare such actions “state terrorism”, they are part and parcel of the legal and ethical framework by which the Western World has waged warfare for generations.

The introduction of Justice Steven’s comments in the ethical debate over targeted killing is most troubling. There are good men who grappled with damnably hard decisions regarding such matters daily, and who frankly display far better arguments - on both sides of the issue – backed by more solid reasoning and analytical judgment. Perhaps those engaged in the fight may choose to put forth a paper regarding such discussions. The
well regarded International Symposium for Military Ethics / Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics would seem to be the perfect venue for addressing such issues. And of course, this is excellent fodder for the intelligence studies academic classroom, for both the ethics of intelligence and SIGINT operations courses.

See also Ace of Spades for further uncensored commentary, and the excellent fictional treatment of the engagement (from Cryptonomicon) reproduced today at Volokh.

Labels: , , , ,

25 September 2007

Real strategic communications and the wages of ignoring diplomacy

We have long noted our continuing interest in the world of soft power, and in the intersection between it and the harder aspects of military and intelligence instruments. It seems the topic gains much momentum in recent days, to our great pleasure. Zenpundit brings up a series of interesting points regarding the challenges of the contemporary information operations environment, and how these differ from the world of Kent, Langer, and his younger brother – a pioneer in the field of leadership analysis. The incomparable Mountainrunner has been leading an examination into the continued misinterpretation of Smith-Mundt, along with excoriation of the ineffective machinery for public diplomacy at State – a discussion also joined by Swedish Meatballs and Political Warfare.

In these discussions, several important concepts continually resurface in various forms. The first is that of the information threshold – the sensemaking barrier below which modern attention deficit and information overload so degrades signals in the IO environment as to render them meaningless. Related is the idea that certain actions will always speak louder than words, especially in given unanticipated higher order effects.

It is against this backdrop which we measure the shameful performance of Columbia University in giving a podium to our adversary’s propaganda. Ridiculous though the Persian pretenders statements may be to Western ears, one cannot help but reflect how many times a Farsi narrated video of the events’ dubious “highlights” will be shown to legions of adoring Basiji and the true believers among the Pasadaran.

We feel that one who previously violated the sanctity of international diplomacy should not be allowed to rest secure in its protections when it is convenient for them to seek to do so. In an alternative history, yesterday’s events could have provided a platform for a real strategic communications message of lasting historical import – as opposed to the disgraceful, but ultimately brief, irrelevance that transpired.

A nation that understood the value of actions in its public diplomacy, and the strategic worth of unpredictability, would have seen the Iranian hostage taker seized by the Mobbe – a body of men that would have been comprised of those NYPD, NYFD, and ordinary citizens who remember well the costs of inaction. It would have seen the very cranes once used to remove the remains of the fallen towers now choking the life from a man whose orders are also responsible for the deaths of Americans, in the same manner in which his own regime carries out its hangings in the public square. The image of his kicking feet would have graced the front page of every fishwrapper and news weekly across the globe this morning.

In this alternative history, America’s cowboy image is used as a weapon against our enemies – not as a strategic weakness which must be overcome through perception management and re-branding efforts. It is an alternative history which would have evoked an earlier time, when the affairs of nations were conducted by serious men for real stakes – rather than in the senescent pretence of “dialogue” with one who comes to the table in bad faith, with the blood of our people on his hands from an undeclared war stretching across the decades.

Troubled times call for difficult actions. We fear that only more dark days lie ahead because the nation is unwilling to undertake the kind of messages carried by that brief counterfactual thought experiment.

Labels: , , ,

17 September 2007

(Black) Markets in everything

There are few things more bizarre for those of us in the transnational issues side of the intelligence business than to observe the development of new black markets based on government distortions of functioning economies – usually for short sighted political regulation attempting to accomplish what otherwise would be a difficult proposition to sell through free competition.

Many of these illegal markets are driven by burdensome and typically ineffective “environmental” legislation and regulation. One can point to the much lampooned cross border trade in high flush capacity toilets - or to the more serious illegal business of Freon smuggling.

We note a warning scenario for yet another such black market in reaction to overreaching green legislation – this time for the humble incandescent bulb. One commentator at Chronicle of the Conspiracy predicts stockpiling as “some folks will back up the SUV at Wal-Mart and buy cases and cases of the old standby…”

What next, an illicit market in washing machines?

We hear also there may be a new source of machinery and spare parts for phosphate separation (always important for high quality cleaning) on the market soon… seller reports condition, slightly used with occasional catastrophic kinetic damage from falling Israeli iron and energetic materials. Be sure to check the UN trade leads postings for Syria, or contact your local AQ Khan network representative...

Labels: , ,