Imaginary constellations meet visionary capabilities

We rarely comment on ongoing matters in the intelligence world due to the natural restrictions which accompany a professional’s responsibilities. However, the very public intercept of USA193 does touch upon an issue that we have previously discussed in these pages – the disconnect between what assets those planning for the future intelligence community thought they would have, and those that exist in an IC in which we have gone to war with what we actually have.

The shot itself has been extensively discussed by others, including In From the Cold, Arms Control Wonk, Ares, Danger Room, and many of the more mainstream blogs. We will not rehash these public details.

However in this particular instance, we find the contrast between the notional pieces on the chess board (and the detritus they left behind when the model came tumbling down) quite striking against the very effective real world capabilities offered by one of the most condemned warfighting concepts of recent history - hit to kill. These differences are also at the heart of the classic tensions between intelligence and operators. But it also demonstrates the value of innovative vision – and the need for persistent effort towards what may seem an unachievable goal. The operation also shows the adaptability of those capabilities towards missions that may never before have been conceived – particularly when the tools to execute them were first on the drafting boards.

The debates of the past few decades across all of the systems involved, and last night’s operation itself, also brings to mind the Bill Whittle’s now seminal essay on Tribes. The defense space community gave the public an unprecedented glimpse of world of the Gray at the high frontier. The press briefing (found here) is as specific a discussion as ever has occurred regarding a once entirely classified area. One has to remember that only a few short years ago, even the name of the National Reconnaissance Office was not publicly acknowledged – let alone the kind of systems of systems approach evident in this operation. But the briefing also displays strong analytic tradecraft, and an excellent use of estimative language to communicate intelligence and operational information in a transparent manner. It was indeed an impressive display, and is well worth studying for those that are in the business of facing tough talks.

Altogether, this was a unique mission, and those involved will be able to look back on the operation with pride. They have most deservedly earned the drinks being poured last night and this morning. Space control has a new face. Let us hope that this will also be the symbol that inspires future generations of capabilities on the intelligence side of the house, and the desire to avoid any other holes in the imagined sky.

Once and future NIE’s on space programs

One of the great benefits to intelligence scholars in recent years has been the great number of declassified documents released from the archives, carrying significant – if often obscure – historical value. We speak not of the too common game that attempts to use such releases to catch out some supposed error of process or embarrassment of policy from decades past, revived into the current political debate. We feel such shallow attempts serve only to discredit too much of what real history can be pursued using these unique primary documents. Unfortunately, too many of those now writing on intelligence are not interested in history or tradecraft, but rather sensationalism and agenda. Despite this unhelpful trend, there are many fascinating elements to be found in the old documents for those truly interested in the study of intelligence.

Among these items, we often find surprising parallels that help to instruct perspectives on current situations through the examples of the craft of an earlier time. Our case study today comes out of our continuing interest in the development of non-state space programs, and the intelligence challenges and opportunities that these programs represent.

We note the recent news that low cost private space launch will feature prominently in the international scene during 2008 with new initiatives by a major corporate player. The news itself is interesting for those grappling the questions of assured orbital access and space control – something that the industry investment analysts are no doubt covering to a far more comprehensive degree than the intelligence community itself at this point. (After all, even NASA is seeking to leverage private sector capabilities in this area.)

Yet historical synchronicity comes when one reflects upon the older (and now declassified) National Intelligence Estimates discussing the Soviet space programs of the earliest generations in the 1960's, through the late stages of the Cold War in the 1980’s. (Many of these products may be found at the Federation of American Scientists site.)

One cannot help but be struck by a sense of having seen this before, in slight variation. While any estimate of current and future commercial space operations would certainly not be in itself a threat assessment, the framework from which most analysts would begin to approach the questions of dual use and non-state capabilities begins to hint at the what might emerge in the long out years given the inevitable involvement of other, less reputable firms as the industry matures and barriers to entry decrease. We think such an assessment – from a notional futures scenario perspective – would make for an excellent student exercise aimed at encouraging more creative, imaginative, and strategic intelligence analysis.

A launch not to be missed

For those of our readers with continuing interest in space operations and GEOINT, we highly recommend the launch show for DigitalGlobe’s WorldView-1 tomorrow (and for those with invites, the launch party...)

Commercial imagery has come a long way indeed, largely a result of the unprecedented demand for IMINT in the post 9/11 world, but also driven by new commercial markets and unimagined systems of access and display that broke overhead systems out of the realm of the arcane and into Everyman’s reach.

These birds were a story of dot com innovation and the bruising realities of the bubble (does anyone recall how many failed to make orbit successfully? … especially those on the Russian PROTON launch vehicle… but in the 90’s, surplus Soviet ICBM boosters seemed like a cheap orbital access option. In retrospect, perhaps not so clever, but it was the era of early post-Wall globalization.)

Space operations are incredibly demanding, but those involved in birthing this amazing capability in its first private sector incarnations rose to the occasion. It is impossible now to imagine how we once taught the art and science of imagery analysis outside of the classified realm (using only the few dozen of declassified images released from national technical means, usually from air-breathing platforms and always highly obfuscated.)

The new generation of systems will offer half meter resolution – something deemed impossible (for the private sector) less than a decade ago. And most critically, commercial imagery has won over the last bastion of resistance – not the cloistered world of the IC (who at least recognized a good thing when they saw it in operation), but the insular world of the academics who are the primary users of overhead imagery for scientific research. The argument has advanced a long way from the early days of the quasi socialist impulse of free “open access” to all imagery “in the name of science”, regardless of acquisition, transmission, and storage costs. (While we support open access to publications and journals, and might have supported it for overhead imagery of scientific value, we recognized that the capabilities required a market mechanism to support its continued operation and development. Open access journals have gone much further to solving that – albeit for a function requiring smaller cash outlays.)

The continued expansion of commercial imagery constellations raises fascinating issues for space control debates, especially given the recent hostile actions demonstrating PRC anti-satellite and counterspace capabilities. The spectre of space warfare has the potential to dramatically alter the insurance implications for operating an expensive and difficult to maintain on orbit asset, complicating private sector efforts in the area. Likewise, engagements of private sector systems by nation-state offensive capabilities will raise not only the prospect of conflict initiation, but also a host of legal and financial repercussions which are difficult to predict in advance. Indeed, the prospect of court ordered asset seizures in compensation for the loss of the platform may at some point even weight into the balance of deterrence (assuming rational actors and a continued desire on the part of the hostile country to maintain ties with the global economic system.)

The first generation of academic papers – most out of the khaki tower of the military war colleges and service schools – helped pave the early way for what would happen when commercial imagery became operational reality. (Even if, as always, real world events progressed far faster, and far stranger, than any prediction could foretell.) Much remains to be explored in terms of how the capability might yet evolve, and the new structures and systems that might yet be forged to exploit these unique eyes to solve new geospatial problems.


h/t O’Reilly Radar

Duel of the navigators

Space policy is a thing in two worlds – and we are not referring to the celestial versus the mud. National space programs and their results are among the most enduring symbols of the 20th century industrial age on the cusp of futurity. In the 21st century, those locked outside of the superpower race of the Cold War are still desperately attempting to demonstrate their national prowess using the same old game.

This is not to say the benefits of space activities are without value – but rather, that many of the space programs seeking the national prestige of a bygone era rapidly show the shoddy signs of age and irrelevance.

Thus, we are grateful to EU Referendum for raising the continuing discussion of the European Galileo navigation satellite constellation. This is one of those programs whose utility could have been much greater than its political aspirations doomed it to face.

The underlying tensions of the Galileo program have even less to do with its (questionable) practical utility in the everyday mundane but essential applications that GPS has come to fulfill in the civilian world. Rather, Galileo is at its heart an attempt to provide the same military applications that the US GPS constellation has demonstrated so masterfully – but in a fashion independent of the (rarely exercised) US options to control, degrade, or deny access to that system’s benefits to enemy combatants. It is yet another of the programs in which the EU is seeking to demonstrate parity with the US, without having to commit substantively to ensuring its own defense.

This is debate of the 90’s for which the time of hard decisions has finally come. It is no longer a matter of abstract defense “strategery”, but concrete operational decisions that will have to be made in the first hours of future conflicts. A European system (or even its PRC counterpart) would be the first choice of belligerents expecting to lose access to US provided signal. Such as system would constitute a key center of gravity for sophisticated adversaries, particularly if those adversaries employed precision-guided munitions (in addition to any of the other friction-reducing C4ISR benefits of good navigation capabilities). It is far more likely that non-state actors would rely on such a system, particularly if their hostile status is also contested in the Byzantine diplomacy of other EU institutions.

One can surely expect that terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, relying upon the ambiguity of EU perceptions won largely through their propaganda successes, would eagerly seek out this option in future conflicts. And given their demonstrated ability to deploy rather sophisticated guided weapons systems in the past, the capability may not be far out of reach.

Given this, the spectre of space based engagement of navigation assets becomes all the more likely for the great power combatants in a serious major theatre crises of tomorrow. The related problems created by the proliferation of ASAT capabilities, and the deep consideration of other more terrestrial options for navigation warfare (NAVWAR), are definitely in the intelligence community’s future for a long time to come.

Some excellent work has already been done in this area within the think tanks – and among the most prominent pieces have been the recent products out of MIT. More remains to be seen, and this again is again one of the unique (but increasingly frequent) areas in which much of the raw information is available to feed high quality analysis outside of the enclosures of the vault.

UPDATE: It appears that between the time this post was written, and went up at this blog, exactly that sort of quality analysis has been rapidly emerging from the wilds of the blogsphere. See also Belmont Club and Open Europe Blog. But then again, we should not be surprised. Few things are as likely to spark a blogswarm on an issue than a mention by Instapundit.

We are glad to see serious thinkers begin to demonstrate the robust value of the distributed analytic mechanism which is the national security / foreign affairs / policy community of interest in the blogsphere. It is a strong argument towards the increasing privatization of intelligence – for if an spontaneous, emergent, amateur and hobbyist activity such as blogging can produce such results, how much better would the community be if such efforts were encouraged and energized through market mechanisms?

Unfortunately, this argument all too often falls on the deaf ears of those that would pursue an intelligence community of symbolic national prestige, rather than one that provided practical applied value for its consumers. Against this worrying trend, the example of such costly white elephant programs as provided by the EU should be foremost in mind.