Correlation of academic performance to professional success in intelligence studies education

Courtesy of Trinity University’s Intelligence Center (a program which few may recall pre-dates the success brought by the more prominent IC CAE now hosted there) comes a piece which surfaces the fascinating history of the less distinguished of the graduates from one of the most elite institutions in the country, the US Naval Academy.

These are stories well worth the read, and we are grateful to the good doctor for recounting them. And while we remain strictly and professionally apolitical as to their import in the current election cycle, we however would ponder the perhaps unintended parallels one might draw regarding the students emerging from the intelligence studies academia itself. In this new enterprise, it has been all too easy to focus on the bright young things and rising stars. But is success in the cloistered ivory tower really a determinant of future excellence in a profession which has grown increasingly distant from the sterile models and dated theories too often propounded by those outside the walls of the vault?

This is a question which truly remains unanswered. There simply has not been a sufficient sample size across an adequate longitudinal depth given the emergent dynamics of the field. Further, the unsettled nature of the generally accepted unclassified curriculum has also worked against such observations. A number of institutions once focused tightly on producing graduates capable of answering the requirements of the working intelligence professional now seem to be increasingly at variance from the community’s needs, while a number of newer schools are simply untested. While we have great hope that from out of this current state the engine of creative destruction will drive new and better approaches, we have yet to see but faint indicators of regeneration.

However, while the plural of anecdote is not data, we do have a few observations that might be called out for future study against the fullness of time. For example, Trinity’s program itself has produced more than its share of intelligence scholars – including those recently minted undergraduates accepted directly into further academic studies at the National Defense Intelligence College, a singular and rare achievement which is clearly indicative of great potential. And the older program at Mercyhurst has produced a number of alumni who were brought into the community even in the leanest years of the hiring freeze by virtue of exemptions granted to those with exceptional academic records.

Yet the concept resonates with the experiences we have seen in others. There have been the equivalent of the anchormen and goats from those institutions (and others in the intelligence studies field) over the years, and many not by virtue of insufficient talent but rather the inevitable result of efforts focused more intently outward against real world objectives vice the acknowledged artificial standards of the classroom. The challenge, of course, lies in distinguishing between those individuals and their counterparts who truly lacked the preparation, initiative, and raw intellect to perform in this demanding field. At the same time, the task is not really easier for those who face the disappointment of having invested in a promising and high scoring young candidate only to find that the professors’ pet cannot perform under real world pressures where the right answer is not simply repeating a canned school solution.

We would daresay the best means of addressing this dilemma is to ensure that the intelligence studies academia always tests its candidates in conditions which mirror as closely as is possible stressors found in the professional intelligence environment. It is for this reason that we emphasize the need for an intelligence crucible when cultivating new professionals.

Regrettably, it appears that this is an idea which has not been popular as of late, especially as class sizes balloon and attrition rates shrink at many programs. While this may be profitable for the institutions concerned, it may prove to be a disservice not only to the agencies and firms which hire untested candidates but equally so to the candidates themselves. Failure in the classroom, even one which may cause an individual to re-assess the course of their future professional options, is far easier than dramatic self-destruction in the face of a burden the individual simply cannot carry. Unfortunately, this is a thing we have seen all too often – especially given the hiring surges of recent years.

While this is not a phenomenon unique to the intelligence profession, we think that it is indeed more pronounced. For this is a field of thinkers and of talkers, and therefore values these skills highly, as a result often seeing such competencies mirrored in the strong academic performers. Yet there is a greater gulf in this profession between the accomplishments of insight or communication, in contrast to the mimicry or sophistry which underlies some successful but otherwise hollow academics. The same can be said of some instructors in the field, as much as of the students. Indeed, one is often found at the root cause of the others.

Theory derived from lived experiences is all well and good, but validation is needed through more rigorous empirical research. That, we fear, will be a matter that must be left to the historians of the generation after next, for only then may the full measure of a cohort’s deeds be taken.

Unintended learning objectives

We have recently had several occasions to ponder the unintended higher order effects that seem to be cascading from academic intelligence studies programs. These chances have come as a new cohort of students inevitably begins to join the workforce from the ’08 classes (at least at those institutions where a graduating class is still measured primarily by spring year group), and as a number of the previous years’ students begin to emerge from the initially overwhelming stages of integration into the community, during which time they were typically near invisible amongst the press of current matters far more serious.

It is usually a good thing to meet a newly minted graduate from any of the intelligence studies programs across the country – and particularly from one’s own institution - as they tend towards an enthusiasm that inevitably and infectiously refreshes one’s own commitment to the mission at hand. In a small but distinct way, it is easy to see in many of these recently graduated students the echo of one’s own early entry into the profession. This is indeed a transferable thing, no matter how one came to the field, for we have seen the dynamic at work even in those for whom intelligence was (as it historically has been) the furthest from the first thing an individual considered as a career path. But intelligence as an activity and a profession has always tended to enmesh those suited for its demands, especially those that spent time as a square peg in other environments – and those individuals are often the first to recognize the same qualities in others. Upon such a dynamic is the entire mentorship structure built, and indeed, as is the nearly feudal system of career progression that marks the professional guilds of the community.

However, we have been disturbed by a marked trend observed in such recent encounters – observations which are reinforced by similar reporting from others of great insight and independent accomplishment in the field. A far too high percentage of these students seem now to be emerging from the sheltered cloister of their institutions bereft of key competencies that one would expect from an entry level intelligence professional, yet implacably infected with a degree of arrogance that is simply breathtaking in its scope and ignorance. And in a profession whose practitioners are not often noted for their humility, this is surely something indeed.

We thus take well Megan McArdle’s recent comments on the perils of graduate education. To her scope we would also add undergraduate education focused intensely on the same subjects. (For unfortunately, the great shame of too many intelligence studies graduate programs is that they offer little different from the same courses taught to undergraduates, compressed into a far shorter dwell time. And while graduate students may in some cases come to the task armed with better core skills – among them ordinary research and basic writing – as well as a presumed level of experience and maturity, the decline of the university system does not always assure this is true.)

“The new graduate student, bolstered by the opinions of their professors, tends to become extraordinarily indignant at the notion that anyone would challenge them. Since no one without a graduate degree could possibly have mastered the requisite knowledge, disagreement becomes a sign of willful malice. They stride forth confidently into arguments with professionals armed with the three books they have read on the topic, the opinions of their professors, and enough arrogance to power a high speed monorail between Moscow and Vladivostok. That's when they get their asses handed to them. Even worse, they are often too dumb to recognize this has happened; at the nadir of the disease, they are simply constitutionally incapable of recognizing that a slot at a good school is not the same thing as omniscience.”

We have struggled to characterize the conceits which plague more than a few particular members of these newer generations, in the hope of diagnosing the source. This has proven remarkably difficult to do, not least for the sheer variety of ways in which their hubris seems to manifest. Given that we are perhaps among the most non-denominational of participants in a number of the ongoing debates over current controversies in the community, it is nonetheless disturbing to see so many points in which new professionals deviate from the most basic principles of the craft, while at the same time proclaiming their genius loudly in a most unseemly and self aggrandizing fashion. Unfortunately, we suspect that this is in many cases largely the result of many of these students never having truly learned first principles. In a subset of these cases, the blame may not even lie entirely with the student, given that there is more than anecdotal evidence that many of the foundations of intelligence as a professional activity are simply not now being taught (although blame for lack of humility can certainly be fairly apportioned, even if it is to some degree an inherited trait).

This is perhaps a seasonal disorder, and we could merely wait in hope it shall soon pass. Certainly, it is a disorder in which seasonal changes highlight the observable impacts. But we fear that the symptoms worsen year after year in the nascent intelligence studies academia. There are undiagnosed tumors in the body, and the warning indicators are growing clearer. We do not yet despair, but fain would see the physicians soon attend to their own house.

The use of leaked documents in intelligence studies education

This issue has been weighing upon us for some time, and has sparked perhaps the most violent debate of any subject within a field already crowded with passionate viewpoints. It takes on new prominence this week with the actions of another intelligence studies professor (names are omitted to protect the guilty) at one of the more prominent institutions out there.

We are unabashed supporters of the use of declassified intelligence documents – including finished intelligence papers, raw cables and other message traffic, and any imagery that might be available. These are almost without exception historical in nature, and thus we also advocate the use of unclassified notional intelligence documents produced in the model of current approaches (differing only in those areas that classification requirements dictate). We admit that the latter requires a lot of hard work – both in finding the unclassified or declassified examples from which to build templates, as well as creating the notional products that the students will rely upon in class or in an exercise. Many academic programs simply forgo this altogether for this reason – understandably so, but frankly in our opinion to the detriment of students that need exposure to “real world” intelligence in a form that may be properly used in a classroom.

However, the use of leaked classified documents in education is another matter entirely. Too many prominent names in intelligence studies publishing pad out their books with leaked documents, many of which can be said to be exceptionally damaging to United States interests in the subject under discussion. We have over the years grudgingly assigned these texts, as the better authors still offer some value to students despite the damnable offense of perpetuating leaks. What is most unfortunate in these cases is that those authors – by virtue of unique analysis or concise presentation of complex topics – would be entirely compelling without the leaks, yet apparently do not have the confidence to stand on their own, or the intellectual integrity to present their own work unaided by stolen secrets.

Such matters have long troubled the field – and frankly, have done much damage to the establishment of a respected intelligence studies academia that interacts with its professional counterparts in a mutually beneficial fashion, instead of through parasitic and self-serving profiteering.

There is however a more disturbing recent trend, one abetted by the evolving issues that come hand in hand with widespread electronic dissemination of intelligence products, and the inevitable friction that occurs when attempting to cope with the proliferation of classified networks and channels under wartime conditions. This new issue is the unprecedented availability of still classified documents (and other media) in their original form; leaked from improper handling - or worse yet, deliberate disclosure - onto the public Internet. These are becoming distressingly common enough that there are even now sites dedicated to the propagation of such leaks.

Without commenting on any specific incident, it is understandable that some civilian academics might see these are rare opportunities to provide a window into current intelligence practices for their students. It is also entirely likely that the “cool” factor may have overwhelmed good judgment when dealing with these cases. But we are exceptionally concerned that these classified materials not be routinely incorporated into unclassified academic instruction. Nothing will do more damage to the discipline as quickly as such an outcome.

First, among those students in many unclassified classrooms there are those that hold current clearances or other professional affiliations that impose a proactive and affirmative burden on the individual to report the improper handling of classified materials. It is unconscionable for an instructor to impose through their own deliberate actions this burden of time, paperwork, and ethical dilemma on a professional student.

Secondly, for those students that do not hold current clearances, many will one day face the polygraph process – and the discussion of a half remembered document from a long ago professor is not the most productive way to encounter the less than tender mercies of that process. As it is, too small a percentage of those students will successfully pass vetting; the intelligence studies academia does not need to be encouraging additional obstacles that will further negatively impact those numbers.

Lastly, we fear the creation of perverse incentives for future leaks should this practice become more widespread. We could easily see such pressures being placed entirely inappropriately on serving professionals who are alumni of major intelligence studies programs by their former instructors, or anonymous leaks occurring at the end of a professional’s tour in anticipation of a future academic posting. We cannot condone any activities that would potentially create any similar incentives – especially when such pressures might well result in the end of meaningful professional and academic collaboration partnerships in the intelligence studies field.

We know the difficulties in crafting an intelligence curriculum to be taught a the unclassified level, but have long felt strongly that to do so forces a focus on the fundamentals of tradecraft unhindered by the restraints of specific organizational niches. While there are many things that simply cannot be taught at the lowest levels, most are frankly more appropriate to a professional in service training and education program as opposed to the outside academic environment in the first place.

It is in part due to these actions that many community professionals entirely discount the role of outside academics – and we fear that with each passing incident, this perception becomes harder to fight. Given the behavior of some academics, it is a perception that may not even be wrong. We recall one particular foreign born instructor who, prior to his dismissal with prejudice from a particularly prominent program, had set out to deliberately acquire as many leaked materials as he could lay hands upon. This created serious difficulties for other academics and students in the program – many of whom were employed in consulting capacities for various official institutions. This is an example that should never have been allowed to be repeated – and current incidents are a slippery slope on that road.

Let us be clear: we at Kent’s Imperative condemn leaks in all forms, and those that would find benefit from them, in the strongest possible terms. Each academic institution which hosts an intelligence studies program should address this issue through internal policy – preferably tied to its academic code, which should consider the improper use of classified information as damnable as the kindred crime of plagiarism. If there is any role for the International Association For Intelligence Education in the promulgation of best practices throughout the field, it is in such matters.

The miserable professoriat

Although we continue to object to the increasing introduction of lawyers into the field of intelligence, we also continue to find interesting parallels between the problems (and successful approaches) of the legal academy itself on the one hand, and those encountered in the hard task of teaching intelligence on the other. (These parallels do not mean we suddenly have shifted course to advocate that intelligence professionals should be taught in the same manner as lawyers – but rather that we see commonalities of issues and solutions that may be approached in a similar manner for entirely different purposes.)

Thus we are greatly interested in the debate over the relative happiness, misery, and edginess of “most” law professors that is currently ongoing between Mike Livingston of Rutgers, Stephen Bainbridge of UCLA, Paul Caron of the University of Cincinnati, Ilya Soman of George Mason, and Dave Hoffman of Temple.

We stipulate that the discussion starts from an unproven conjecture – that law professors are somehow less happy than other professionals in other fields, and that this unhappiness if manifest to a greater degree than in other academic specialties. The resulting responses cover a range of interesting factors both responding to this conjecture as well as challenging its initial formulation. However, while the debate has been re-framed and argued to the wider question of happiness / misery, the original impetus was intended to describe and seek to explain individual unease – “edginess”.

That first question is indeed a slightly different wicket – and one that we certainly ourselves have observed in the intelligence academy. Livingston offers the following towards a more comprehensive explanation of the cause:

“For the professorate, according to my friend, is one of the few activities that is (a) very competitive, (b) primarily personal (that is, noncooperative) in nature, and (c) almost entirely devoid of objective standards that might be used to measure success or failure in the activity. Competitive, both because of the kind of people who go into it and the endless run of tenure, promotions, offers at supposedly better institutions or publications, and so forth. Individual, because our teaching and scholarship is with very limited exceptions done alone. But almost entirely subjective, because beyond the sheer volume of articles or citations, no one has ever come close to a rigorous system for evaluating academic performance or even what such a system would try to measure. The situation is, one suspects, even worse for law teaching than (say) physics or sociology, where there is at least some accepted body of materials one is expected to have read and a more or less established system of peer review for books, articles, and other publications.”

We would concur with these points, and in particular, the difficulties created by a lack of consensus regarding even the skeleton of a canon, and an otherwise immature literature. This dynamic is witnessed by the continual reinvention of basic concepts and revisiting of arguments – starting from first definitions and ranging across every other aspect of the field which is publicly known.

We would also to this attempt at explanation add that the competition for faculty positions in the intelligence field is even more intense, due both to the limited number of billets open as well as the increasing tendency of many schools to fill those billets with individuals who are palatable to the other faculty – but whom have had little place in the intelligence field itself. Many of these individuals would not be qualified to perform even as a junior analyst on a high priority account in a working level shop, yet have been granted a position from which to influence and shape the next generation of intelligence professionals. Little wonder then that they should be uneasy – and that their teaching and scholarship should reflect this. The result is conveyed as a distinct sense of brittleness – when questionable competence in what are basic aspects of the tradecraft is combined with ego, the result is not pretty. (We are the first to admit that a little ego is absolutely necessary to perform the hard task of singing for one’s supper in front of a crowd, day in and day out, but that this typically expands into a far more poisonous sort of thing in the unchallenged and isolated incubator of academia.)

The response created by the pressure of this brittleness too often leads to exactly the worst path an intelligence studies academic can choose. Instead of connecting further with practitioners, and pursuing those aspects of the field which would lead to greater relevance within the field, such a person cuts themselves off still further – welding their own ever more elaborately gilded echo chamber. The detrimental effects of such a path are most clearly observed in the students which emerge from such a style of instruction – arrogant without cause, boastful without substantive mastery, and both narrowly and shallowly constructed. These are students, which like their formative professors, who may never face Smoking Mirror. (Though the smarter – and more salvageable - among them may rapidly evolve after their first bruising encounters with the real world of the intelligence profession.)

There are of course other factors which contribute to uncertainty for those academics that do not have the problems of their counterparts with insufficient credentials. These include the highly variable supply of contract research dollars – much of which is vulnerable to competition from the increasingly far more sophisticated offerings of privatized intelligence shops. Other factors may come into play, such as the role of online and distance learning programs in changing the traditional distribution of student bodies across programs. (Though the growth of such programs for the moment does serve mostly to increase the total pool of students. This does creates its own problems when such programs are not paired with a solid applied and practical component as well as a career and clearance track.)

We view this uncertainty among the intelligence academy in a mixed light. We want a stable and growing professoriat, comprised of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds. But we also are acutely aware of the rapid effects of stagnation in “comfortable” positions, and view a little edginess as a good thing. Of course, this is one of the classic paradoxes of innovation.

Potential solutions to such issues – addressed briefly in the legal academy’s responses - are another discussion entirely. We seek here only to surface the debate, and bring it into the context of our profession and its academy. This is by no means our last word on the subject, as it deserves a far more substantive discussion in its own right.

Training versus education in intelligence studies

We have entirely had our fill of the debate over the supposed differences between training and education when examining the development of new entrants to the intelligence profession. This is at its core as profoundly anti-intellectual as it is diametrically opposed to the applied art and science of the field. The argument ill serves both the students it is aimed at improving as much as the instructors and professors that it is designed to elevate.

The typical argument goes something as follows: a particular aspect of professional tradecraft is highlighted and disputed, with the academics claiming that instruction on the topic is “mere training”. From the other side, a complex concept or idea is criticized as being “too theoretical” and of no practical value to the working level analyst. In both cases, it is almost always the subjective biases of the individual commentator that is most clearly reflected. (Though we do allow some small exception, and a full measure of understanding and sympathy for those rare folks – almost entirely within the training model camp - that are simply fighting the never-ending balance of trying to fit too much teaching material to too little student time and attention.)

The predominate origin of this argument is from the perspective of those that would denigrate most tradecraft – especially those fundamental building blocks of the profession - as merely training. We are frankly astounded by this argument. No one disputes the need to teach medical students basic procedures such as incisions or injections, nor budding economists the basics of financial analysis, nor law students the art of legal writing. Yet the argument is somehow given great deference when it comes to applied intelligence practice: in analysis, writing, or the more specialized forms of functional disciplines. Typically, such criticism relies heavily upon an implied appeal to authority, used as the worst sort of bludgeon to halt further debate.

It has taken us some time to understand this dynamic. We are however now convinced that its primary perpetuation comes from the deep unease displayed by many academics towards the actual business of doing intelligence as an activity. We agree that it is a far more comfortable life to offer critique upon the history and current activities of others. This is not a luxury given unto most – and should not be the model to which one’s students should be prepared. Those that are not themselves practicing professionals – particularly given the gap between practitioners and the academy – tend to ignore the very things that are needed most in the cultivation of new intelligence professionals. These things are not valued within their world-view, and are frequently not even understood by those that have not walked within the community (or who did so for too short a time).

This state of affairs is simply unacceptable. We cannot imagine a field in which students emerge after years of preparation nearly unable to perform even the most basic of tasks without weeks or years of further training. We acknowledge that there will be entire realms of new learning specific to their assignment that will always be required – particularly when academic teaching is conducted at the unclassified level. However, let us be done with the specious argument that those aspects of tradecraft commonly deemed “training” are inappropriate for the academic environment. We are not building a generation of comparative theory critics – we are building the generation which will have to fight, and win, the Long War.

The students which endure in the cold

The expansion of the intelligence studies field as an academic discipline in a number of institutions around the country has not been an easy endeavor. Even in the post 9/11 world, facing the hard realities of the Long War, there remains the stubborn and reflexively anti-government radicalism of many entrenched faculty and their indoctrinated followers in the student Mobb.

We know the phenomena well, having faced first hand the protests against even the most scholarly of historical educational activities – often nominally driven by issues so far removed from the real activities of the intelligence community as to be the stuff of tinfoil hat madness (and we might uncharitably say, laudanum or analogous substances frequently consumed in the dorms of many schools). But we have recently been encouraged by the increasing mainstreaming of the profession – and the continued honorable and upstanding conduct of the students which seek to pursue its study. Thus we frankly had allowed ourselves to forget the open hostility which many students must continually endure in order to continue their chosen course of intellectual inquiry.

A recent editorial in the Mercyhurst College student newspaper has given cause to remember this unthinking rejection of an entire field, out of the dictates of a politicized worldview distinctly at odds with collegiate ideals of intellectual freedom. An otherwise entirely unremarkable student writer chose to give written voice to what is likely quite literally a sophomoric argument under the guise of examining whether an intelligence program “belongs” at the school – though unfortunately an argument also heard frequently from some faculty at the institution itself. To the College’s shame, a program which has brought record enrollment and outside funding into what otherwise would be a small, failing and scandal plagued liberal arts school in a decaying industrial town, remains both literally and figuratively out in the cold. It is unsurprising then – though still disheartening - that so many of the recent developments in the intelligence studies academia have bypassed the first civilian university to enter the field more than a decade ago.

But we also note the overwhelming response by a far more articulate – and accomplished – group of intelligence studies alumni and current students in correspondence with the Merciad. (UPDATE: We note regrettably that these some dozen letters or so at the previous link have now been removed from the paper's website.) Perhaps one might have reminded the original piece’s author that while the freedom of expression and the press are among fundamental right of the democratic society that these students have dedicated themselves to protecting, these are not a grant of immunity from criticism and response – especially when debating with individuals that also buy their pixels by the barrel. If nothing else, it is fascinating to see the numbers of successful students that can now speak from their experiences in the program. They as a group – engaged, outgoing, and openly able to cite their contributions to both the community and to society as a whole – are a far cry from the few quiet individuals, tucked away in unacknowledged intellectual labour at all hours of the day and night, that characterized the program in years past.

And if the institution cannot address the problems of its narrow-minded and anti-intellectual culture, perhaps it will find that student body, alumni contributions, and research funding departing for far more hospitable climes (in both the scholarly and meteorological sense) of the educational alternatives that are now developing elsewhere. Then one might well consider the question of what best “belongs” on that excellent piece of real estate up on the hill.

But it is still worth sparing a thought – and kind word - for the hard working young intelligence students which must constantly struggle in the face of this kind of sentiment – and in the face of very real consequences to their grades (and levels of personal stress), at a time when they are fighting to break into one of the most demanding and elite of professions. The program might not today have the same brutal attrition rate of years past, but it is by no means a cakewalk - and these kids deserve far better than to be made pawns in political games on campus.

Breaking the barrier between the academics and the practitioners

We note the following from Harvard, via the folks at Volokh, regarding efforts to introduce more current practitioners into the faculty of the law school.

“one of the reasons so few practitioners are hired by law schools these days is that very few people with substantial practice experience are actually putting themselves forward for entry-level academic positions. The market has shifted such that a much higher percentage of applicants are coming straight from law school or a fellowship.

Part of this may be due to the difficulty of producing published scholarship while working as a practicing government, nonprofit, or private sector lawyer. "I think that's a shame," said Kagan. "We'd like to see people with more practice experience who also show scholarly potential…”

We could not agree more with these observations when it comes to similar issues the intelligence field. We have seen too much recently of those with little real world experience suddenly holding forth in the halls of institutions which entrust to them those that will become the next generation of the profession. Lacking in-depth target knowledge, substantive understanding of applied analytical tradecraft, and relying on a too short tour (if even that) at a three letter organization or two, the result becomes a sort of punditry entirely divorced from the profession itself. The heart of intelligence scholarship must start with self-reflection, and is adrift when absent a body of personal experience upon which to reflect. It is for the same reason that those with uninteresting lives produce execrable novels – there simply is not enough formative material to work with, no matter how much the would-be author reads of others’ stories.

We know a few recent exceptions, where experienced professionals do indeed accept positions in academia, but generally it is not a welcoming place for those whose credentials are well nigh unrecognizable, except to others likewise in the know. But unfortunately, it is precisely those credentials which are needed most in order to build an independent and rigorous intelligence studies discipline – as opposed to one which is a pale copy of history, political science, or (shudder) even philosophy.

And while we are great fans of knowledge transfer between the generations, the profession needs more than just the war stories of the retired GS’ers attempting to augment their pensions and fill their days. As much as also believe those stories need to be systematically captured and explored for lessons learned, the new face of the community is very much needed in academia. It is a tough thing to accomplish, as the demands of the current craft - especially in the teeth of the Long War – are diametrically opposed to the kind of time and energies that must be devoted to successful education and research. But nonetheless, it is increasingly clear that if the academy is to continue to have relevance, and to produce the kind of education that will successfully shape a new cohort of professionals grounded both in theory and application, it must reintroduce those that actually do intelligence back into the halls where it is discussed.

Further to the scholarship of blogs

We recently noted the ongoing discussion regarding the impact of blogging on scholarship in a number of fields, and to be honest, it is a matter we had rarely had occasion to reflect upon. In our own experience, the continuing conversation of the blogsphere (in both public and other networks) is to a great degree the enabler of new ideas and further discussions across a wide range of environments – from the formal journals to the internal ephemera of countless working shops.

Thus it is with some puzzlement we have observed the response to the discussion of the intellectual merits of scholarly blogs by those who would claim to be enforcing some alleged degree of academic standard. We have quite a bit of recent correspondence on this issue, such that we believe it merits wider response in a more general form, if only perhaps to advance the conversation more widely among those with new perspectives.

In some ways, we see the intelligence studies blogsphere - nascent though it currently may be in comparison to other more established fields such as law) - as the modern day equivalent of the circulated letters that used to pass from hand to hand amongst the academy of old – only conducted on a far more rapid timeline to a far greater degree of visibility. It was not uncommon for such correspondence – particularly involving multiple thinkers over time – to be used as the basis for a range of other publications. We still frequently encounter writings from this era, in which the correspondence or private discussions are footnoted accordingly.

We see no great difficulty therefore in extending the same consideration to the correspondence of the blog. Indeed, given the volume of unique and primary source information that is now conveyed by the authors of many blogs – including many new forms of online journalism, research, and expert discussion – it is incredible to us that such material would be ignored in more traditional modes of the literature. To do so would be to dismiss important aspects of contributions by those on the ground in conflict across the globe, or otherwise engaged in the practical pursuits of the profession.

The sharpness of the recent discussion reminds us of the vitriol also displayed towards other forms of evolving academic practice, such as the online engagement of distance learning studies; or the disdain for wiki-based collaboration models. While the discussion of the academic uses of the ever controversial Wikipedia (and its counterparts of technology) is in our minds an entirely different matter – being a thing of more ephemeral nature than the recorded conversations of the blog – we see many of the same rice bowls threatened by these technologies. We also find ourselves distressed by the increasingly fine distinctions of supposed authority that too many in the intelligence studies field now are attempting to impose, in order to preserve those rice bowls – such as one recent assertion that the field’s longest standing publications such as Studies or the JMIC / (new) NDIC papers are not “real” academic works, and therefore could not “count” in the eternal publish or perish world of those seeking tenure.

These arguments are very much the opposite of academic, in our view. The encouragement of critical review and analysis of any source material is fundamental to the practice of intelligence scholarship – and even moreso to the practice of the profession such scholarship purports to study. Credibility is not established by institutions alone – a point reinforced recently by the scandals which have afflicted many otherwise respected establishments - but rather more importantly through the continuous evaluation of ideas and their expression.

This debate will likely seem very odd in only a few short years hence, as the pace of evolution overtakes the academy far more rapidly than those within its walls are prepared yet to grasp. And there will be yet those who evolve and master the currents and complexities of this new domain – where the words of a forward deployed officer carry more impact to the literature than a number of dry treatises recycled on dusty pages, or where a student’s work may offer more promise than that of a tenured professor. Those members of the academy which can adapt – as many within law schools clearly have – will find themselves in a far different future than they might have otherwise envisioned. It will still however be a future in which the intelligence studies academia has much to offer, if it is willing to join the conversation as it is actually happening in the larger world, rather than as they might wish it to remain in their hermetically cloisters.

False prophets abound

Our good friend Monsieur Tanji over at Haft of the Spear, has apparently had recent reason to bemoan the sad state of intelligence studies academia – and specifically, the increasing number of frauds that attempt to pass themselves off as instructors in a burgeoning marketplace. We take his points well, and in our own experiences have regrettably seen many parallels.

We have written before about such false prophets, having known more than our share over the past decade. One notable civilian institution even employed such a worthless and contemptible individual for several academic years before his fraud was uncovered – and he removed back to his country of (allied) origin. The damage done by that incident still lingers with the wronged institution.

Unfortunately, we fear such cases will only continue to surface as the new academic discipline expands. The tension between the academy and the intelligence community over the past several decades has led to a distinct disconnect between the qualifications recognized within the house of deed versus those recognized by the schoolhouse. This is a regrettable state of affairs indeed, and one in which the academy is not without substantial blame. In fact, we recently spoke with one of the leading members of the professoriate in a new program established this year, who insisted that his new curriculum and related instructional design was entirely revolutionary and far superior to any existing program. Yet this individual refused to publish any details for peer review and commentary in the common community literature, claiming that even longstanding publications such as Studies “didn’t count” for his purposes as they were not mainstream academic volumes. No amount of discussion could dissuade him otherwise, to our great sorrow – and no doubt, to the detriment of his students, who will now suffer instruction which has never been tested by those in the intelligence community.

Unfortunately, we see this disconnect more and more frequently, however, and in a variety of other contexts. In part it comes from the ignorance of many which have managed to find themselves positions in the intelligence studies academy, despite in some cases unconscionably short terms of actual service in the real world of the intelligence practitioner. It is also driven by a kind of arrogance displayed by many in the intelligence studies academy, which claim to forge a new path but refuse to listen to feedback of those who walk the harder roads on a daily basis.

On some days, we despair of ever correcting this disconnect. For despite a number of efforts to reach out and bridge that gap, it seems there are those in the academy which are insistent on hurtling headlong into an irrelevance of their own making – reigning in a hell of their own design, in which their accomplishments may be lauded without fear of the bruising encounters with harsh realities of the practice of the profession.

We do not wish to see a bifurcation of intelligence education, between those institutions which retain connectivity to the community and those which would ignore the real world. But we fear it is occurring, and will proliferate unchecked unless the academy is willing to face the same test of the Smoking Mirror that those in the real community must endure on a daily basis.

State blogging – and not blogging

Mountainrunner has been providing excellent coverage and commentary regarding the new developments out of Department of State’s online diplomacy efforts, including DoS’s new blog. We are please to see the efforts of those at Foggy Bottom advancing into the new century. State’s efforts were often the kind one would damn with faint praise – let us hope that this new initiative does not travel the same path. They would do well to heed (and preferably, quickly hire the unique expertise of) the gentleman blogger on such matters, particularly as he explores subjects of key interest – unmanned systems, private military companies, and public diplomacy unfettered by incorrect interpretations of half a century old legislative arcania.

At the same time, however, State has silenced a different interesting voice in the intelligence and foreign policy space. Arms Control Otaku will be ending formal blogging at official request that came out of an ongoing background investigation. We have mixed feelings on the matter – not least of which because this is an area that can ill afford the loss of thinkers and bloggers in the public space. However, we are the first to recognize the inherent tensions between the effective performance of one’s official duties, and the academic pursuit of advancing the literature. That conflict was likely far more pronounced the Otaku’s case, given the essential overlap between what one would presume about the demands of a Presidential Management Fellow’s assignment and the published record of that blog.

We are fortunate in the our humble endeavor suffers less from such potential conflicts due to a very deliberate series of choices to separate the stuff of our contributors’ professional accounts from the discussions on this blog. One can, given care and attention, find an acceptable way to further the academic conversation on larger issues of professionalization in a manner which does not come into conflict with one’s working responsibilities or one’s sacred oaths of secrecy. We are also fortunate to have had a favorable review which early on encouraged this effort (but of course, not as an endorsement), given entirely sensible and appropriate restrictions. Some of those peculiar features have drawn negative comment from others in the academic world - such as the lack of comment features - but overall it is a small tradeoff in return for the benefit of participating in the ongoing discussion regarding the future of intelligence. And since this blog generates no financial or other incentives, such intangibles are critical to our contributors.

Thus, we hope to see the Otaku’s writing some other time and place. We have enjoyed the work, even as we might disagree on occasion. And we were also pleasantly surprised to learn that once upon a lifetime, one amongst our number happened to be in the same movie theatre at the same time – despite being far from the usual stomping grounds - in one of those odd coincidences that marks life passing through the Beltway.

However, we also note that there are plenty of other outlets for creative energies in more professionally accepted fashion – though few so low-friction as lightweight online publishing. Perhaps an Intelink blog would be in order for the gentleman – and offer the Otaku the additional benefit of accruing professional respect within the community under true name, albeit within the more limited audience of the classified world.

This matter also provides a fascinating case study, one that we see as the leading edge of an issue that will increasingly come to define the role of the intelligence and foreign policy professionals of the next generation. Blogs and other online contributions will increasingly be a key part of their publication record – and increasingly will occur under true name (for good or ill). For some potential recruits to the community, the choice to accept the isolation of the vault, and abandon what may be their most significant professional contributions and activities to date, is one that they may be unwilling to accept in return for a low level GS position in some minor bureaucracy. This will be particularly an acute problem as other alternatives continue to become far more attractive than life as a blue badger as the privatization of intelligence continues apace. Better solutions have to be found.

Fighting plagiarism beyond academia

We have lost track of the number of times in which we have had to gently (or perhaps more sharply, in a few cases) remind colleagues that the admonition against plagiarism is not merely a conceit of the academic world. Unattributed verbatim copying of others’ text is not an acceptable practice given the importance of national intelligence, and the need to be constantly vigilant against the possibility of deception.

If nothing else, we should think that the rather high profile plagiarism case of the British intelligence “dossier” in the lead up to the 2003 start of operations in Iraq would have provided ample warning to those in the community of the dangers, and the embarrassment, of recycled texts. Regrettably, this is not always so – and with the advent of so many new intelligence shops (particularly those at the state, local, and industry level within Homeland Security), this is one of the lessons of good tradecraft all too often forgotten, or never learnt in the first place as struggling new analysts attempt to meet implacable production demands by shuffling and re-shuffling derivate reporting into ever more diluted distributions.

We recall one particular case in which a senior executive would routinely hack together documents consisting of nothing but large chunks of text copied and pasted into some semblance of a paper – often with inexplicable digressions and other non-sequiturs as the inevitable result. (This individual’s behavior was driven in no small part by the common practice in OSINT of the 90’s – where he spent a good deal of time – of assembling “summaries” consisting of the full text of various news articles pasted into a single document – a glorified clipping service. Bad habits die hard, even years later.)

We note a recent case of explicit sanction against such behavior in the legal profession, courtesy of the Volokh Conspiracy. It seems one lawyer, attempting to shortcut his workload (and no doubt generate additional billable hours), was caught recasting the text of legal articles as “arguments” in a brief presented to the courts. We were not aware that this was considered not only gross professional misconduct but actually the offense of misrepresentation – as well it should, upon reflection. In this case, the offender was sent to remedial law classes – no doubt as much for personal embarrassment as professional education.

We believe it is time that managers in many intelligence shops institute similar sanctions. And of course, intelligence studies academia must instill into its students the absolute taboo against plagiarism – including even too frequent copying of attributed data such as the citations lists noted in the Volokh cases- something that has not always been a priority in many classrooms. We recall recent products which included verbatim sections of popular community reference resources such as the Factbook… and while one can argue whether such material is plagiarism under the legal precedents noted above (even if clearly marked as to origin), it is certainly a poor production model.

Consumers do not need recycling of the dry statistics of other shelfware products – they need unique insights, clear writing, and strong assessment based on solid sources and analytic tradecraft methods. Padding merely detracts from these objectives, and is certainly achieves the opposite of the presumably desired effect of displaying a semblance of rigour not otherwise earned. Students do not need to be taught to fill in checklist style product templates in which form trumps content, but rather they should be encouraged to choose among the many models within the community and develop their own unique approaches consistent with the blending of best practices from multiple agencies and traditions.

Politicization and the leak culture

We have recently had reason to revisit the old historical materials on Service I of the First Chief Directorate of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, which was responsible for analysis of foreign political and military intelligence - such as it was within the confines of a culture focused nearly exclusively on collection operations, and in which decision-makers from Stalin onward nearly always chose to act as their own analysts.

In short, it was the epitome of a dysfunctional intelligence-policy relationship. In his second volume reviewing the incredible Mitrokin Archives – a secret collection of handwritten notes copied from the internal files of the FCD by a patient archivist, who spent 20 years accumulating the most sensitive files before fleeing the Soviet Union as one of the most amazing defectors ever to emerge from the Cold War – the noted intelligence historian Christopher Andrew put it best: “Though the politicization of intelligence sometimes degrades assessment even in democratic systems; it is actually built into the structure of all authoritarian regimes.”

We fear greatly that politicization is well on its way to becoming ingrained in the next generation of analysts entering the profession. Too many times recently we have seen instructors attempting to insist on degrees of political correctness that would make a commissar blush, and to outright excise materials that conflict with their favoured line of thinking from student work. There is an increasing emphasis on process, and the fig leaf numerics, to hide what otherwise might be transparent biases under the pretense of rigour. And unfortunately, the Millennial generation is exceptionally receptive to being shaped into this mold, having spent a lifetime growing up under increasingly indoctrination oriented education systems which fail to instill critical thinking skills yet insist on ever more dogmatic judgments.

We have said before that the wrong lessons have been drawn from the intelligence lead-in prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and we are increasingly concerned by the number of academics that would rely on partially declassified materials (and damnable leaks) in an attempt to teach their own concept of intelligence “reform” to an eager audience which has nothing else against which to compare.

This is normalizing a degree of conformity in judgment, and excusing away the unacceptable behaviors of those who would break their sacred oaths. This is an institutionalization of a new culture, hitherto alien to the intelligence community, in which individuals claiming to “speak truth to power” place their own assessments, typically made in lockstep with the unexamined assumptions of an inherently political philosophy, above the requirements of professional tradecraft or even the needs of the mission. And when these individual perceive that their viewpoints do not carry the day – no matter what evidence may be assembled in favour of an alternative hypothesis (or against their preferred theory) – they choose to voice their displeasure to the press.

We view this with the gravest of concern, and heed well the related points made by Former Spook regarding the impact of such dysfunctional cultures in the origins of cascading failures. The warning signs are always apparent, and in hindsight may be castigated easily. It takes a far different effort, however, to change them before disaster befalls the unwary.

We see constantly in recent analytic debates the pressures to find false certainties, and a profound lack of respect for the “unknown unknowns” – at a time when the means of collection are ever more challenged, and the range of targets growing ever wider. Substantive expertise has become scarce, and is often a millstone in the face of a radically changed environment which offers no precedent upon which to rely – although few anointed experts are yet willing admit this when it occurs, and to face Smoking Mirror).

We wonder if somewhere in this increasingly damaging culture there is a patient Vasili borne of these failures, squirreling away the latest assembly of damaging leaks - not out of righteous conviction in the face of an evil system (as was the case for Mitrokin), but out of base ego and the desire political profit.

Without strong leadership, not merely at the highest levels but down to the line functions themselves, it is only a matter of time before these leaks destroy the community. We have insisted before that defeating politicization requires an individual commitment on the part of every intelligence professional – whether analyst or operator, administrator or briefer. But we fear that the current intel studies academia is not doing nearly enough to instill such a commitment, but rather reinforcing the damnable drivers which have brought us to such a dangerous point in the history of the community.

Anticipating the politicization of future history

We note (albeit somewhat delayed) the frankly abhorrent treatment of a promising military historian, Mark Moyar, at the hands of an insular ivory tower. While there are many reasons for an individual not to find success within the academic job market, the string of coincidences that seem to have plagued this young man are entirely too damning in sum – particularly given the professional rigours he has already endured in the far more difficult publishing marketplace.

This is however not entirely surprising given his scholarly emphasis on revisiting the dead memories, and betrayed ghosts, of Vietnam. Historical research which vindicates (or at least argues for the re-evaluation of) contemporaneous assessment and prediction of Communist intentions, and the resulting eventual atrocities which consumed the region, is entirely verboten amongst the politically correct set – particularly if it might be construed to support differing views on the use of US military and diplomatic power in the pursuit of current and future interventions.

We tolerate few comparisons of the current conflict in Iraq (in any of its multiple evolving iterations since 2003) to the nation’s previous involvement in Vietnam. The environment - and the facts on the ground - are far different. However, it seems that the political playbooks which are twisting this conflict are simply re-hashed variants of older themes, which we find most unhelpful to the standards of objective and accurate analysis. But if we cannot even enjoy robust scholarly debate of the arguments of the past within the academy, in a manner which is free of politics, then how can we expect any escape from the politicization of academic intelligence studies in the current highly contentious environment?

Regrettably, we can also easily envision a similar fate to befall some poor scholar of tomorrow foolish enough to attempt to challenge the revisionist narratives that are arising today regarding OIF (and to no small extent the entirety of the Long War itself.) We have already seen some similar surprising coincidences in the hiring practices of a number of think tanks.

Absent change, we are quite concerned that those “thinking officers”, whose unique pre-doctoral work in the khaki tower of military academia should have earned them a place in any major institution of merit, will also face similar issues of discrimination even at their terminal degree. After all, how many Vietnam era veterans with in-theater service currently enjoy positions anywhere within the academy – especially in political science, international relations, history, or intelligence studies posts?

The ivory tower would do itself a great disservice to ignore the contributions of those who have served in the current GWOT, or any of those other individuals which would continue to attempt to bring the spirit of academic inquiry to hard issues of research and analysis in areas previously dominated by the narratives of a single interpretation. The ghosts of politics should not define the careers of those that would offer differing views.

But can we really expect much better, when there are still segments of the academy which refuse to accept the evidence of the VENONA intercepts regarding specific Communist agents such as Alger Hiss?

h/t Mediacrity

Imitation and the academy

Imitation is flattery, but also proof of a system which has lost its way.

We have noted an increasing proliferation of imitation items circulating within select smaller settings of the intelligence studies academia, which by some strange coincidence repeatedly also references the more rarefied material we have set forth or cited, usually within days of our initial postings. Such coincidences become increasingly suspect over time.

It is not that we are displeased that it appears that we are so profoundly influencing the evolution of the debate. We are however saddened that there appears to be so little original thought emerging out of institutions which should be thought leaders in this field, yet for some reason languish without insight or innovation to call their own, reduced to a genteel form of plagiarism that seeks to pass off others ongoing research efforts as their own.

We are also concerned that this dynamic ill equips students to meet respected academic and professional intelligence standards for collaboration and debate. In the online medium of the blogsphere, one of the more important elements which has evolved to enable a more dynamic and interesting collective conversation has been the “hat tip” reference to origins of material passed from one context to another. In a way, this modern practice very closely resembles the Islamic tradition of isnad utilized in oral repetition of narratives across generations of multiple speakers. It is, in our view, vital to the essence of the online scholarly debate – especially when in so many instances the entirety of discussions on particular issues may only be grasped by walking the chain of attribution back across time and individual contributions.

Not entirely without reason, the application of isnad type citation has been growing within the intelligence community – particularly as coordination processes and distributed collaboration becomes more and more common within many entities. This is partly a response to increased emphasis on the traceability of analytical judgments, and of data supporting those judgments, which has occurred given the public discussion surrounding the declassified version of the 2002 Iraq NIE and related Senate inquiries. Also, not coincidentally, as an aspect of rigor it is fundamentally similar to key basic analytic tradecraft in both HUMINT and COMINT fields, and therefore tends to be ingrained in professionals with experience in those disciplines to the point that it is transferred to more academic discussions almost without conscious volition. It is further in no small measure the direct result of influences from the blogsphere, in both its open and community iterations, as the availability of robust search capabilities coupled with small worlds social networks virtually ensures the visibility of any “me too” behaviors.

The intelligence community’s debate over new methods of citation may have changed with the technology, but frankly has not altered in its poles since the earliest days of analytic scholarship, as can be seen in earlier works on the subject.

Thankfully, our other more prominent blogging colleagues have always been kind in their attribution, for which we are grateful; and hope that we have also likewise been scrupulous in providing our source references for all to examine. We understand it may be entirely galling to many academics - steeped in a tradition which surrounds them with young minds with a tendency towards hero-worship - to acknowledge the anonymous mutterings of those they have never met at conferences, or recognized as published in the usual journals – particularly when the torch of authorship is passed so often between contributors, or temporarily suspended without any public explanation or acknowledgement for reasons entirely related to the unique factors of our collective profession. But it speaks to the heart of scholarly integrity, and to the disconnects between current professional practices and what passes for the same in a regrettable number of academic circles.

We are starkly reminded of the example of a particular British professor at one American institution who a number of years back attempted to pass himself off as a so-called expert in intelligence matters, but whose plagiarism and repeatedly demonstrated incompetence - before his frankly too quiet, and too long delayed dismissal - remains legendary in the field, and an enduring black mark for what was an otherwise fine organization. While the recently noted behaviors by other academics has not risen to anywhere near such an egregious level, the observed psychological factors bear striking and troubling similarity to early case indicators.

For those whose only recognition comes from the community of fellow thinkers, this behavior is particularly galling. The online blogsphere is an economy of attention, and while some may profit financially, this has never been our intention (or even something appropriate given our small skunkwork’s ever-changing collective roles and responsibilities.) This is rather an effort driven largely by personal interest, and what feedback we are given in other forums is the sole distinction between a semi-private “analysts’ coffee” between colleagues, and a worthwhile attempt to respond to Sherman Kent’s original call – albeit in a more informal manner than the gentleman could have conceived given the technology (and timelines) of his day. We certainly feel our humble effort falls well within the bounds of the latter category, and feedback from our more intellectually honest colleagues has validated time and again the return on our collective investment of time and energy in this effort. For whether their comments have been complimentary or critical, the debate advances based on common contributions and shared conversation for which we remain grateful.

Let us hope that our other colleagues will learn soon to display a higher standard of rigor, in order to set an unimpeachable example for the next generation of officers and analysts.