Deliberately ignoring the human terrain

We have rarely seen such a work of profound analytic fallacy as the now much circulated study “Baghdad nights: evaluating the US military `surge' using nighttime light signatures”, which has been making the rounds throughout the blogsphere as of late. This paper purports to declare the Surge a failure based on the lack of increase of overnight artificial lighting, as measured by the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) sensors.

This sensor data has previously been used to illustrate the profound gaps between the quality of life in North Korea, when compared to the prosperity and wealth of the South. Electrical usage can generally be considered a proxy for economic activity, particularly in areas where public utilities must be augmented by private generation capacity.

The Environment and Planning paper provides night lights data only to December 2007. And while it briefly displays intensity mapping of sectarian deaths in Baghdad area neighborhoods, it largely ignores the decrease in such violence as the final outcome of “a vicious process of interethnic cleansing” rather than the result of the change in US counterinsurgency strategy and force commitments which was the surge. This is an assumption which cannot be supported merely through imagery analysis.

Needless to say, such an assumption ignores much of the literal reality on the ground – valuing remote sensing over the contemporaneous and local accounts of human sources, military commanders, and reconstruction agencies that have lived through the tumultuous progress of the latter stages of the Iraq intervention. It also conflates economic indicators with stability and security – a fatal assumption that invalidates any conclusions that might be drawn; an observation even an entry level intelligence professional would be expected to note. Further, one might very well question reliance on the relatively low resolution DMSP data for assessing complex urban terrain, particularly given that electrical availability has been a key topic of study for reconstruction planners. At the very least, a comparison of DMSP data against this ground truth baseline would seem to have been required.

Unfortunately, this is the very model of politicized intelligence; a study designed to create a single outcome through the selection of data it chose to present. It is also a profound argument against recent attempts to crowdsource analysis tasks to those who are not intelligence professionals by trade or training.

Against this approach we would cite a far more useful model for integrating the work of GEOINT professionals with that of ongoing counterinsurgency and civil reconstruction efforts, first offered by the National Defense Intelligence College. The paper, “Registering the Human Terrains: A Valuation of Cadastre” offers a far more productive means by which remote sensing data may be used to assess ongoing operational effects in a conflict theatre.

The night lights study is instructive, if only as a teaching case to illustrate the kind of error that self-reflective practitioners must identify and avoid in their own work.

h/t Creative Class

Intelligence and the 300 at 3 a.m.

Much has been made of the extended cadres of foreign policy advisors employed by the Obama campaign – purported to exceed some 300 subject matter experts and other assorted wonks, organized into a virtual think tank of sorts.

From a professional (and entirely apolitical) perspective of intelligence theory, the existence of the 300 is enough to give pause, especially since such innovations in political campaigns tend to be rapidly adopted in future election cycles. Shadow policy structures directly advising future candidates – perhaps even semi-permanently organized, as in the British model – may well become a recurring feature of the US party system. It is not our place to comment on the appropriateness of such a structure. However, these individuals are more or less entirely disconnected from the US intelligence system, and are relying on unknown information source of uncertain validity (presumably much if not all derived from the open source domain) to advise future leaders on matters in which there likely exists a substantial body of classified reporting. This classified view likely presents a far different picture than the open source would on a number of key issues. (One can look to the Mitrokin Archive’s revelations, for example, as but one hint of the re-evaluation that must necessarily occur in foreign policy relations when intelligence information is taken into account.)

This time around, it appears that the McCain campaign’s advisors are fewer in number, and being loosely organized likely play a lesser role in determining the candidate’s stance on any given issue. And the sitting Senator has long had access to classified intelligence (as does his opponent by virtue of the same office, albeit for a far shorter time period). This decision advantage is likely somewhat akin to that enjoyed by incumbent Presidents against outside challengers in previous elections. And while there are those who have been named as part of the 300 that were previously consumers of classified intelligence products, in most cases these individuals have been out of access for at least a decade. Again, from an apolitical intelligence theory perspective, this is quite sobering. To paraphrase CIA’s former Balkan Task Force - whose original comments came against the backdrop of the dispute between different factions arguing over the conflict in that troubled region - each campaign is entitled to its own policy, but not its own version of history.

The question of what intelligence support a campaign ought to receive, and how far that support should extend (beyond the traditional briefings provided to the candidate himself), are not easy to objectively address – particularly in a hyper-politicized election season. It is perhaps among the thorniest of aspects of intelligence – policy relations that have yet arisen in the new millennium. But it is nonetheless a critical consideration, and especially so in cases of crisis situations. For while intelligence theory recognizes that the community is not the only voice advising decisionmakers, most theoretical discussions assume that intelligence is part of the process – something that is not assured in the campaign stage. Among the questions which should be examined include how such intelligence support can be delivered, how to avoid politicization of that intelligence in the atmosphere of a hotly contested campaign, and how arrangements can be constructed to prevent leaks in a temporary and highly transient environment of moving facilities, rotating staff, and constant media attention.
The manner in which these questions are answered may well set the pattern for a subsequent administration’s use of intelligence, and shape key relationships between decisionmakers and the community. And more importantly, the international impact of any candidate’s actions during the early stages of a crisis event – such as the now infamous 3 a.m. call - is magnified by the instant global media environment moreso now than at any time in previous history.

Such 3 a.m. moments particularly highlight the need for (and the potential problems of) providing warning intelligence support. The first reaction of a surprised campaign has international impact, and may well be a significant factor in foreign responses during the early hours of a crisis depending on how those abroad view any particular candidate’s prospects for electoral success. (For a historical example of such an assessment by foreign decisionmakers, one need only recall the covert overtures made by the KGB’s Washington residentura to the Kennedy campaign at Kruschev’s request, which occurred against the crisis backdrop of negotiations over the fate of two RB-47 reconnaissance pilots downed in Soviet territory in July 1960). The Georgia / Russia incident provides a more contemporary example, and future analysis will by necessity have to consider the influence of both the official US reactions and the candidates’ responses on the Russian view of achievable conflict objectives in the first days of the fighting.

US Presidential candidates have not lacked for those former intelligence officials now willing to offer policy advice - and even their own visions of intelligence community reform. However, true professional intelligence support has been far less consistent. This merits greater attention.

Of lawyers and hammer fixation

We have condemned the too frequent intrusion of the lawyers into the realm of foreign intelligence on many previous occasions. From a perspective of policy and of practicality, it rarely results in good outcomes – especially when it comes hand in hand with the kind of toxic politicization that has so corrupted the contemporary environment. We can think of no better example than the continuing travesty which has been the leak plagued and talking point distorted scandal that is the attempt to apply unprecedented restrictions on foreign intelligence collection, brought about by a single un-reviewed FISA court decision and the political football that has resulted over corrective legislation. We need not revisit the matter here, as other commentators have spilled countless pixels on the topic, and we think the exceptionally candid statements by the community’s most senior leadership should have laid the matter to rest. That the debate continues is bitter testament to the folly of politicization too common in today’s national security decision-making abetted by ill starred over-lawyering.

It is against this backdrop we find yet another attempt to introduce the unelected judicial branch into matters which have long been properly held to be strictly questions for the elected officials of the executive and legislative branches who are themselves accountable to voters in questions of policy. In this case, the intrusion comes in the form of a paper which presents a "modest" proposal to hold the war-making powers of the elected branches hostage to an adversarial court process, in which the case to be presented will be composed from intelligence take. We initially would have thought this a jest in very poor taste indeed, but we unfortunately see it was seriously argued.

Presumably such intelligence would be inevitably demanded in its most raw form. This is a sure prescription for even more damaging leaks than have already cost significant investments in blood and treasure through the loss of the unique capabilities that such investments had purchased. It is also a sure prescription for intelligence failure, not merely due to the loss of those capabilities to leaks, but also due to failures of analysis. Prior to World War II, a good many legal minds attempted to act as their own analysts – and failed in ways which demonstrated just about every form of cognitive bias and logical fallacy that has ever been documented in analytic tradecraft. The parsing of law and the insight required of intelligence analysis are entirely different creatures, and do not mix well – especially under the conditions of great uncertainty and implacable time constraints which are found in international crisis situations.

Given the dysfunction which has so characterized what is among the most vital and timely of national needs in this Long War, to great and unfortunately continuing loss. Not every problem in the arena of national security and international relations is amenable to the lawyer’s hammer (or more appropriately, the judge’s gavel.) There are other instruments of national power, and making these subservient to a courtroom process is a certain path towards rendering them entirely impotent in a complex, dynamic and continually evolving threat environment.



h/t Volokh Conspiracy

The intelligence community and technological surprise in the Cold War

It has long been a maxim in the intelligence community that despite other types of intelligence failures – created by both collection shortfalls and analytic errors – the one remarkable area of success was the “fact” that no Soviet weapons system was deployed during the latter period Cold War without the US being aware of it in advance. In this version of the telling, the initial period of uncertainty regarding Soviet capabilities was ended by new technical collection methods, and the analysis to derive insight from those collection systems. From that point forward – usually dated to around the time of the introduction of the U-2 platform – the US intelligence community allegedly never again faced strategic technological surprise.

This story has been repeated so often that it is no longer even questioned, particularly given the fact that multiple DCI’s and their deputies have also supported the statement. Despite this, a recent conversation regarding certain the post-Cold War discoveries regarding certain historical intelligence controversies gave us reason to revisit this old success story. The public history regarding the IC’s true knowledge of the main enemy’s scientific and technical intelligence advancements has become more clear as declassification continues to bring these topics back into the realm of academic discussion. One can also now make far more useful comparisons the increasingly public statements of former Soviet scientists, defense planners, and other professionals that are now recording their own services’ histories.

And from these comparisons, we find the old maxim gravely wanting in the revised judgment of history. Perhaps the most serious area of strategic surprise were the revelations first made public by Ken Alibek, the defector who formerly headed the Soviet Biopreparat program, of an unsuspected strategic biological warfare capability. This capability included weaponized anthrax and smallpox warheads deployed on R36 / SS-9 SCARP and R-36M / SS-18 SATAN ICBMs. This surprising revelation was however preceded by an earlier intelligence failure regarding Soviet BW programs, which missed the development and first operational deployment of T2 mycotoxins - yellow rain - in Laos and Cambodia. That alone should have provided warning that all was not well with the IC’s supposed scientific and technical intelligence superiority, as also should have the Sverdlovsk anthrax release accident. However, the rapidly and intensely politicized public debate over these latter two cases in particular serves to illustrate well the long term damage that can be done to the community by the failure to remain objective, independent, and apart from the media-led scrum.

US technical intelligence regarding Soviet chemical weapons programs also allegedly suffered from similar surprise, failing to initially detect the development of the entirely new class of Novichok nerve agents – again learning about the capability only from post-Cold War defector reporting. What might have been in this matter is far less clear, but as an exception it certainly disproves the rule.

It is important that when holding up a standard for new intelligence professionals to emulate that we choose one that has actually been met before. Absolutely avoiding all forms of strategic surprise in the scientific and technical area is a laudable goal. But that is not the bar that was set by the Cold War era – despite what others may claim - and measuring today’s efforts through that prism does a great disservice to those who are responsible for chasing an impossible mission under what are arguably the far harder circumstances of the contemporary operating environment.

This does not in any way detract from the excellent service given by those responsible for the assessment of Soviet weapons programs, and for the countless successes which initially gave rise to the myth. While the IC does not need aggrandizement, it does have ample legends that have more than earned bragging rights never exercised in a quiet profession. History owes those that never sought recognition in their own time an accurate accounting of the deeds of their day.

Wx-ing historical

We have addressed the recent fad towards addressing climate change as an intelligence issue several times over the course of this blog. We still remain convinced that while weather intelligence – Wx – will always remain a key factor in many accounts, climate change as a long term issue is simply beyond even the horizon that can be expected of the deepest of futures intelligence looks.

We are apparently in the minority in this view. We recently acquired a copy of an unclassified 1978 research paper from Central Intelligence Agency’s National Foreign Assessment Center (now republished by the University Press of the Pacific in 2005) which examined this very issue under the title “Relating Climate Change to its Effects”. For those younger analysts unfamiliar with the misty back history of old bureaucratic battles and therefore older acronyms, NFAC was the renamed Directorate of Intelligence (DI) under DCI Turner in 1977 – a designation which lasted only until reorganization under DCI Casey’s tenure in 1981.

We think perhaps this product might have best been buried with the old name. As a paper, it is almost entirely uninspiring – a mere 8 pages of substantive text, followed by hundreds of pages of tables and statistics that are the hard copy rendition of a contemporaneous data tape, mostly consisting of temperature and precipitation measurements assembled by a university contractor on behalf of USDA. These form the inputs to a simple climate model that was intended to provide for long term predictions of weather effects given specific outcomes, such as global cooling - a key concern of the day. (However, to their credit, the designers did examine the potential for global warming as well – which speaks well of the analytic rigour of the DI under any name, even if the paper is mute testament to just how badly scientific and technical experts can be at communicating with their readership through written intelligence products.) A speculative product such as this can be expected to offer no real conclusions – rather simply serving as a possible set of boundaries within the uncertainty space of future scenarios. However, it might well have made more explicit the effects it claimed to consider within the range of those scenarios.

But again, this serves to illustrate both the waste and the foolishness of attempting a futures intelligence estimate so far into the out years. We are not issued crystal balls when we are granted entry into the profession. It also serves to illustrate the perils of the arbitrary application of quantitative analysis as a fig leaf over unsustainable judgments. The model – no doubt painstakingly assembled and hard fought at the methodological level – is by its very nature the product of 1970’s era computer science. In the face of Moore’s Law, it is therefore over 20 generations obsolete.

Let us hope that this little musing upon the history of the account gives at least slight pause to modern practitioners seeking to enshrine climate change as a permanent account for long range intelligence analysis. At a point in time when supercomputational problems that take longer than a few months run time simply are not run at all until the next generation of architecture advances its inevitable order of magnitude or more, it is after all more than a bit presumptuous to assume that any community entity would be able to beat or even match the kind of big iron thrown at these problems in the civilian science world. It also very much begs the question of what better use such resources might be put to for other intelligence accounts – perhaps in the classic roles that the IC has always employed supercomputing resources: cryptanalysis, automated signal processing, or even exploring the new boundaries of potential offered by quantum intelligence.

If nothing else, this bit of history has also more firmly reinforced our opinion that climate change issues are a matter best left to the academics. Perhaps once the Long War has been won – and given the timescale we believe will be needed to accomplish this monumental, generational task – then the community’s attention can turn more to the matter once again. And if the current crop of speculative forecasts prove correct, at that point in time the issue may properly fall within the window of an actionable long rang estimate.

The students which endure in the cold

The expansion of the intelligence studies field as an academic discipline in a number of institutions around the country has not been an easy endeavor. Even in the post 9/11 world, facing the hard realities of the Long War, there remains the stubborn and reflexively anti-government radicalism of many entrenched faculty and their indoctrinated followers in the student Mobb.

We know the phenomena well, having faced first hand the protests against even the most scholarly of historical educational activities – often nominally driven by issues so far removed from the real activities of the intelligence community as to be the stuff of tinfoil hat madness (and we might uncharitably say, laudanum or analogous substances frequently consumed in the dorms of many schools). But we have recently been encouraged by the increasing mainstreaming of the profession – and the continued honorable and upstanding conduct of the students which seek to pursue its study. Thus we frankly had allowed ourselves to forget the open hostility which many students must continually endure in order to continue their chosen course of intellectual inquiry.

A recent editorial in the Mercyhurst College student newspaper has given cause to remember this unthinking rejection of an entire field, out of the dictates of a politicized worldview distinctly at odds with collegiate ideals of intellectual freedom. An otherwise entirely unremarkable student writer chose to give written voice to what is likely quite literally a sophomoric argument under the guise of examining whether an intelligence program “belongs” at the school – though unfortunately an argument also heard frequently from some faculty at the institution itself. To the College’s shame, a program which has brought record enrollment and outside funding into what otherwise would be a small, failing and scandal plagued liberal arts school in a decaying industrial town, remains both literally and figuratively out in the cold. It is unsurprising then – though still disheartening - that so many of the recent developments in the intelligence studies academia have bypassed the first civilian university to enter the field more than a decade ago.

But we also note the overwhelming response by a far more articulate – and accomplished – group of intelligence studies alumni and current students in correspondence with the Merciad. (UPDATE: We note regrettably that these some dozen letters or so at the previous link have now been removed from the paper's website.) Perhaps one might have reminded the original piece’s author that while the freedom of expression and the press are among fundamental right of the democratic society that these students have dedicated themselves to protecting, these are not a grant of immunity from criticism and response – especially when debating with individuals that also buy their pixels by the barrel. If nothing else, it is fascinating to see the numbers of successful students that can now speak from their experiences in the program. They as a group – engaged, outgoing, and openly able to cite their contributions to both the community and to society as a whole – are a far cry from the few quiet individuals, tucked away in unacknowledged intellectual labour at all hours of the day and night, that characterized the program in years past.

And if the institution cannot address the problems of its narrow-minded and anti-intellectual culture, perhaps it will find that student body, alumni contributions, and research funding departing for far more hospitable climes (in both the scholarly and meteorological sense) of the educational alternatives that are now developing elsewhere. Then one might well consider the question of what best “belongs” on that excellent piece of real estate up on the hill.

But it is still worth sparing a thought – and kind word - for the hard working young intelligence students which must constantly struggle in the face of this kind of sentiment – and in the face of very real consequences to their grades (and levels of personal stress), at a time when they are fighting to break into one of the most demanding and elite of professions. The program might not today have the same brutal attrition rate of years past, but it is by no means a cakewalk - and these kids deserve far better than to be made pawns in political games on campus.

The role of intelligence producers in national policy debates

A new chapter of intelligence – policy relations has been firmly cemented with the release of the latest UBL message (no matter to what degree it was staged and altered in AQ’s propaganda shops). The fact our of most hated enemy has taken to citing US authors and domestic political debate talking points in support of his (and his organization’s) cause has been a disturbing development dating back to at least 2004. However, when the enemy cites the work of a former intelligence analyst due to the level of unseemly publicity that individual has attracted, it is time to question the role of the “retired” community members that now speak so frequently in national media. (This is to say nothing of the entirely contemptible leaks by intelligence insiders that have so damaged the country’s capabilities across its most sensitive programs in favour of transient political advantage.)

Some speak from positions of substantive experience at pivotal moments in history, some attempt to leverage marginal roles from decades ago into a platform supported by their association with the entity rather than the value of their ideas. The number of these individuals, and the impact on public debate, is an unprecedented thing in the history of the US intelligence community, even given the typically difficult tensions between intelligence producers and their policy level consumers. The business of intelligence deals often with inherently political subjects and judgments, and it is a constant struggle for those serving on the line to defend against politicization (of their own bias, or of the temptations of external pressure). Yet those who no longer face the constraints of the line seem often to become very political creatures themselves.

In one sense, this may be legitimate, were they seeking policy positions as office holders or even appointees. However, the endless circuit of talking heads and pundits that have emerged, feeding from the trough of ratings created by scandal, is another matter entirely. There may even be legitimate roles for a former intelligence professional in the media – the help contextualize and inform regarding complex events and situations, for instance – the lack of which has been a defining feature of the failures of the media’s coverage of many recent cases. But there is a distinct difference between discussion and advocacy, which is as clear of a bright line as any found in between analytical judgments and policy proponency.

There is in journalism the old adage that a reporter of the news should not himself become the story. Perhaps there is also a corollary that should be penned as similar admonition to those that serve (or have served) in the intelligence field. Our honours come not from praise in the public forum, but from the quiet acknowledgment of our peers over a lifetime of silent service that yields good outcomes which only history shall chart - long after we have gone to our graves.

Consequences of the leak culture

We do not as a matter of discretion comment on individual cases involving alleged incidents of deliberate improper disclosure of classified information. However, we have long been on record as decrying the damnable culture which has driven the leak of so many programs in recent years. Hardly a month passes in which one of our colleagues does not report to the watering hole with a tale of woe, having had a program burned from under them and in the ensuing political maelstrom found themselves no longer able to function effectively. The operational costs are incalculable, and the human costs are very real – one reason the community cannot retain its best and brightest, or even continue to motivate those who stay when they know that all of their efforts can so quickly be rendered for naught with a single press item.

Our hatred of leaks, and leakers, has only grown as the scope and impact of unauthorized disclosures has worsened over recent years. We condemn not merely the media – though they ought to display a greater measure of reluctance when approached by those seeking to involve them (and their publication) in an illegal act; but most resoundingly of all those that would casually break their sacred oath and forsake their duty for some temporary and partisan objective. Programs costing billions of dollars and decades of efforts have been destroyed for the most transient of advantages in the political fight which is the Beltway, and if this continues apace, the intelligence community will slowly go blind without key new capabilities innovation, and in the face of adversary denial and deception efforts.

We greatly wonder, however, if the community will ever be able to impose specific consequences on the leakers (and their enablers within the media) to match the damage done by these illegal and utterly dishonorable acts. The framework within the law (and contractual instruments) is clear and strong, but it is a matter of seeing the investigations and enforcement through. However, with recent allegations surfacing of leaks not only for partisan politics, but involving disclosures to foreign officials, it seems that the potential penalties are insufficient deterrence given the scarcity of their actual application.

Such acts are not whistleblowing, they are not dissent, and they are certainly not “speaking truth to power” as some have suggested. There is no other word for this behavior but treason. It is not made noble by the “calling” of the journalist – indeed, if there were any other organizations engaged in the conspiracy to illegaly obtain classified information for profit on an ongoing basis it would be called racketeering at the very least.

There are additional higher order consequences to the leak culture which directly impacts the intelligence studies field. As the damage mounts, so too does an unwillingness by honorable professionals to discuss even unclassified and historical matters, lest an otherwise innocuous conversation be turned into a media spectacle – as has happened in a number of cases where journalists continue to seek the kinds of sensationalist headlines which they have come to rely on. This will inhibit learning within the profession in areas which might otherwise have been suitable for more public discussion. As proof of this, we have but to witness the explosive growth in categories of SBU designations, systems which are in no small part the reaction to poorly written hit pieces which do not even attempt to understand the difficult issues they seek to publicize to no end but their publications own ratings (and advertising profits).

The strength and success of the community will depend on being able to support the robust learning and growth of the next generation of intelligence professionals – many of which who are now learning their trade first in an unclassified and open source only environment. Just as the next generation of secrets will depend entirely on reversing the course of the leak culture, and preserving the commitment to the silent professionalism of service which may never be acknowledged.

Legal intrusions into foreign intelligence activities

There has been a recent and disturbing trend of domestic courts increasingly intruding into the realm foreign intelligence activities, an area throughout American history which has been the sole operational province of the Executive Branch, funded and overseen by the Legislative. Whether concerning detainee operations, communications intelligence programs, or even assessments of the threat posed by illegal combatants – the dangerous idea that foreign intelligence (as an activity) should be treated by legal regimes in the same manner as information gathering in the law enforcement context.

This is a damningly difficult concept to combat. Intelligence activities should and must always take place within the framework of a rule of law, and subject to the control and oversight of the elected branches of government. Reviewing intelligence activities on a case by case basis within a judicial framework is precisely the wrong approach when attempting to maintain situational awareness at the national level in a complex and dangerous world.

In recent weeks we have been particularly troubled to see a number of items which point towards the intellectual foundations of a potentially radical expansion in the scope of judicial overreach into foreign intelligence activities. The continued political furor over the recent leaks regarding the “Terrorist Surveillance Program” has shown just how damaging such intrusions can be, and how terribly frequent the improper discussion of sensitive programs by those who so callously break their most sacred oaths. When the DNI himself indicates that the political fights and legal wrangling has had operational impact, it is more than time to worry.

Worse yet, we detect a discernable strain of legal thinking which now seeks to impose restrictions not only on the collection of information, but on its use. The idea that a warrant might be required to search against previously accumulated foreign intelligence materials sounds absurd, but recent legal opinions appear to have laid the groundwork for such an argument in future cases. This would also be very nearly absolutely fatal in the context of fusion and collaboration for homeland security intelligence purposes (particularly if critical elements of the intelligence picture are obtained from foreign intelligence activities of DOD and other agencies, as if often the case.)

We have long maintained that the mindsets of the lawyer and the intelligence professional are diametrically opposed. The first seeks to present a structured picture through adversarial argumentation, and by training attacks to exclude evidence from the picture to support a particular viewpoint. The latter struggles to understand puzzles and mysteries, and to assemble a coherent narrative in the face of incomplete, conflicting, and deceptive information in order to support the decision-maker’s choices regarding courses of action. Allowing the lawyers to dictate further the key aspects of the world of intelligence – and allowing intelligence activities to be framed into an “investigative” basis rather than continuing inquiry into matters of standing interest – will be the death of the profession.

In part, we come so near to such a state of affairs due to the lack of formalization of intelligence activity as a profession in its own right. It is too easy for those without a long term stake in the process to formulate “reform”, and in the current hyper-politicized environment, see those measures implemented without regard to their effect within the community. What few efforts we have seen to move towards professionalization have been far too much in the character of rent-seeking, and too little towards establishing an articulable and defensible basis for the actions and requirements which allow for the successful understanding of the difficult accounts and hard targets with which we are faced.

We have but a little time for the intelligence studies academia to step up and meet this challenge, before too much is lost to those who pursue studies of the field from a perspective which is distinctly alien to the history and the effective practice of the art and science of intelligence.

Regional versus functional issue accounts

One of the longest standing debates in the organization of intelligence as an activity (and the inevitable growth into a bureaucracy) was first addressed by Sherman Kent in his 1949 Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy. Even then, the division between regional geographically specialized organization versus functional, issue focused groups created tension between analysts – frequently reflected in finished intelligence production.

Sherman Kent diagnosed the problem as having its origins in “the customs of American education”, calling out the tendency towards regional specialization in the studies of historians, geographers, and political scientists; and the functional specializations in education of economists, sociologists, psychologists, and other “theorists” without applied studies targets. In his words, “which of the two groups should have command of a project is by no means so plain, nor is there a clear answers to the larger question as to whether the whole organization should be laid down along regional or functional lines.” To have the house divided along both lines is “an invitation, and one readily accepted, for major civil war” within the analytical community.

Little has changed since then. Of course, in part this is why we have coordination processes – to ensure that different regional and issue desks even within a single agency are represented in the debate, and to do so across all relevant contributing agencies. The processes of coordination are so closely tied to those of analysis and production that even in agencies and offices which do not have a formal requirement for coordination will usually introduce a “lite” version internally amongst themselves. (Such positions are one of the most powerful places one can be in the community in terms of impact in the introduction of new viewpoints and judgments, actually, even though these are usually among the most peripheral of organizations, focused on niche and specialty problems with a definitely limited organizational lifespan.)

Coordination does not always address all issues, nor does it often settle in the minds of those who have brought their issues to the table and felt their viewpoint “lost” in the process (even though it almost always reflects at least as a dissent if there is any body of evidence in support, and often even in the face of good evidence to the contrary.) Thus, the “civil war” between analytical houses may often spill out long after an issue has been put to bed for the historians to address in the fullness of time.

We are seeing this age old process play out in the recent media reporting regarding the division between NESA and the counterterrorism specialists on the question of Ba’athist Iraq’s ties to Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Definitive evidence to answer the question most certainly exists, somewhere in the vast array of recovered documents, interrogation reports, and the physical evidence from the ground (in the form of the dead foreign fedayeen from the first fights of 2003 – as opposed to those foreign fighters that entered later as part of the evolving AQIZ structures). But it will take the judicious eye of an impartial scholar to judge the matter from a more comfortable distance of the future – say perhaps around the twenty five year declassification mark - and indeed, it is our personal opinion that the failings of both sides of the debate to appreciate the true nature and severity of the problem will be exposed.

But until then, it seems that the unseemly politicization of the debate in the public media – given impetus by figures such as Paul Pillar and George Tenet himself – will continue to attempt to re-write the first draft of that history (no doubt seeking to influence future hands as well as current reputations.) We fear it may unduly influence the intelligence studies academia – if it has not already – and would admonish our professional peers and new students alike to keep in mind the recurring nature of these debates as they look to examine past performance (in both successes and failures) in the popular case studies. Rarely in this world are we given issues to which a binary answer exists, and it is the grossest form of oversimplification to assume otherwise. Debates such as this also reinforce why it is more important than ever to seek alternative analysis through Red Cell and other methods, and to objectively consider those possibilities for which the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence – for evidence may be forthcoming, both for and against any given set of theories as the realities on the ground rapidly change, if one has but the eyes and the openness of mind to look.

As for our opinions on the great divide between the two kinds of houses, we find ourselves veterans of uniquely transnational issues, having been subject to every manner of surge and task force and working group and crisis cell, in the most unusual of niches. We prefer to see small, aggressive, ad-hoc structures comprised of both analysts and operators from a wide range of issues and regional desks with interests and equities in the same target which overlaps their accounts. Only then, by throwing everything against the wall in a structure short lived enough to avoid its own bureaucracy, and disconnected enough to be (at least partially) immune from the day to day politics within a given agency or office, have we found the kind of answers we sought regarding the great questions of process.

We strongly believe such radically unstable and short lived environments are most effective because they are the very manifestation of Schumpeter’s process of creative destruction. It is certainly no way to create a sinecure, nor even to build a long term career path – but it is the best way we have found to generate new and innovative approaches and answers to hard target problems, and to the problems others have not yet begun to identify let alone address.

h/t and further at Haft of the Spear

Politicization and the leak culture

We have recently had reason to revisit the old historical materials on Service I of the First Chief Directorate of the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, which was responsible for analysis of foreign political and military intelligence - such as it was within the confines of a culture focused nearly exclusively on collection operations, and in which decision-makers from Stalin onward nearly always chose to act as their own analysts.

In short, it was the epitome of a dysfunctional intelligence-policy relationship. In his second volume reviewing the incredible Mitrokin Archives – a secret collection of handwritten notes copied from the internal files of the FCD by a patient archivist, who spent 20 years accumulating the most sensitive files before fleeing the Soviet Union as one of the most amazing defectors ever to emerge from the Cold War – the noted intelligence historian Christopher Andrew put it best: “Though the politicization of intelligence sometimes degrades assessment even in democratic systems; it is actually built into the structure of all authoritarian regimes.”

We fear greatly that politicization is well on its way to becoming ingrained in the next generation of analysts entering the profession. Too many times recently we have seen instructors attempting to insist on degrees of political correctness that would make a commissar blush, and to outright excise materials that conflict with their favoured line of thinking from student work. There is an increasing emphasis on process, and the fig leaf numerics, to hide what otherwise might be transparent biases under the pretense of rigour. And unfortunately, the Millennial generation is exceptionally receptive to being shaped into this mold, having spent a lifetime growing up under increasingly indoctrination oriented education systems which fail to instill critical thinking skills yet insist on ever more dogmatic judgments.

We have said before that the wrong lessons have been drawn from the intelligence lead-in prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, and we are increasingly concerned by the number of academics that would rely on partially declassified materials (and damnable leaks) in an attempt to teach their own concept of intelligence “reform” to an eager audience which has nothing else against which to compare.

This is normalizing a degree of conformity in judgment, and excusing away the unacceptable behaviors of those who would break their sacred oaths. This is an institutionalization of a new culture, hitherto alien to the intelligence community, in which individuals claiming to “speak truth to power” place their own assessments, typically made in lockstep with the unexamined assumptions of an inherently political philosophy, above the requirements of professional tradecraft or even the needs of the mission. And when these individual perceive that their viewpoints do not carry the day – no matter what evidence may be assembled in favour of an alternative hypothesis (or against their preferred theory) – they choose to voice their displeasure to the press.

We view this with the gravest of concern, and heed well the related points made by Former Spook regarding the impact of such dysfunctional cultures in the origins of cascading failures. The warning signs are always apparent, and in hindsight may be castigated easily. It takes a far different effort, however, to change them before disaster befalls the unwary.

We see constantly in recent analytic debates the pressures to find false certainties, and a profound lack of respect for the “unknown unknowns” – at a time when the means of collection are ever more challenged, and the range of targets growing ever wider. Substantive expertise has become scarce, and is often a millstone in the face of a radically changed environment which offers no precedent upon which to rely – although few anointed experts are yet willing admit this when it occurs, and to face Smoking Mirror).

We wonder if somewhere in this increasingly damaging culture there is a patient Vasili borne of these failures, squirreling away the latest assembly of damaging leaks - not out of righteous conviction in the face of an evil system (as was the case for Mitrokin), but out of base ego and the desire political profit.

Without strong leadership, not merely at the highest levels but down to the line functions themselves, it is only a matter of time before these leaks destroy the community. We have insisted before that defeating politicization requires an individual commitment on the part of every intelligence professional – whether analyst or operator, administrator or briefer. But we fear that the current intel studies academia is not doing nearly enough to instill such a commitment, but rather reinforcing the damnable drivers which have brought us to such a dangerous point in the history of the community.

The politics of the (old) NDIC

We are surprised to see that our post regarding the old National Drug Intelligence Center has apparently struck such a deep nerve in at least one of our readers. We knew it was a popular item in the Department of Justice – having been visited hundreds of times by quite a range of individuals there (as well as our usual wide range of readership). We did not realize it would provoke such venom – nor somehow create an assumption that our writing was for the political purposes of the Republican administration. (We are strictly and professionally apolitical, and amongst the various elements of our skunkworks you will find no greater variance than in personal political opinions… while this is likely hard to believe in the age where the personal is nearly always political, there you have it.)

We are also fascinated to see the interpretation of our writing posed by the new “intelligencer”. Needless to say, we shall not quibble details of traffic, fight over the method of counting billets, nor discuss how and why our opinions of the place were formed. Our intent was not to add to the clamor of the budget fight over the earmarks that fund the place – as we note, this is very small beer indeed in the real intelligence community. (We have spent more in a fiscal quarter in some programs than their entire annual budget; and frankly even on the same sized programs elsewhere seen performance and quality to better effect - routinely exceeding their total annual production volume on a monthly basis on almost any account with a far smaller staffs. But editing hell does tends to kill a shop’s production…)

We do not wish to see the place closed entirely but rather reformed and revitalized to its as yet unfulfilled existing purpose and missions. Our primary motivation for critique is that we were, and remain, appalled at the suggestion that some of the most critical programs in the counterterrorism community might be shifted in the political winds, particularly to a shop with such a poor performance record when compared to the ground breaking work done at places such as National Counterterrorism Center.

Our reactions to the old NDIC are not driven by envy, as our newfound critic might suggest (such envy as we might harbor is reserved for those with nice European or island postings assigned to small, out of the way accounts), but rather by disappointment in its failure to live up to its potential. There are few times when intelligence functions move outside the Beltway, and we have long encouraged the process in order to start the sea change required to make that happen as a realistic career option rather than the exile that it most certainly is now.

And for the record, we think this sort of debate is exactly what Sherman Kent had in mind when he first called for a literature of intelligence. A profession which cannot reflect upon itself and its activities in a robust and spirited debate - be they good or ill - is no profession at all.

For this reason, we welcome our new virtual colleague, and hope to see him/her contribute more to the literature beyond the narrow discussion of a transient politicized fight. Perhaps he/she can use this opportunity as a better chance to illuminate the discussion of new methodologies in counter-drug analysis, highlight new analytical software (but please, something other than the Microsoft driven abortion that is RAID or the utterly unused Orion packages), or debate DOCEX processes. If nothing else, we always appreciate new perspectives on future transformation of the community – and even if we might disagree on where NDIC currently stands, we might find common ground as to where it, and other decentralized components of the larger community, should be headed.

So, to our new counterpart, we offer the traditional benediction handed down to us from the days of SOE - merde alors.

The difference between intelligence, covert action, and policy

If true, this story illustrates why the machinery of intelligence and covert action should always be kept separate from the other instruments of policy and national power.

It is also one of those times when one looks back at the decision to involve DCI George Tenet directly in negotiations in the Middle East (in his titular capacity, no less) as the height of folly. After all, there are plenty of Arab conspiracies which attribute everything wrong in the world to that particular organization… and bringing them to the table by name did nothing but add fuel to that fire for generations to come.

In the same light, we look at the old Department of Justice efforts to train and equip PA police… we wonder how many of those individuals may have been executed in the streets in the past few days – or who are doing the killing themselves?

Nothing so blunts a nation’s capabilities than the use of those scarce resources for missions that other agencies and organizations should have done, but failed at. One can say the same risks lie in store for the “Department of Everything Else” long advocated by Tom Barnett.

Existential fights in other agencies

We have previously examined the issues of Beltway politics, pork, and the impact on major intelligence programs. While near and dear to our hearts, that issue was indeed small beer compared to the programmatic fight currently underway regarding a key space intelligence mission.

Former Spook has been on the case for some time, and updates with an insightful look at the players and partisans.

This is the real essence of the interagency fight, and a large part of the reasons why no transformation effort, and no restructuring – whether at the DNI level or anywhere else – will have any meaningful effect as long as the IC is viewed as just another jobs creation pork trough for someones’ home district.

Another broken oath

Our eternal enmity towards leakers and their enablers in the media is well known. Recent events, no matter what the truth (or lack thereof) behind any given set of allegations, have once again proven that the media can do immense harm to national security – whether or not they have been given real information or not.

We would second Tigerhawk’s statement: “Frankly, I just want our spies to keep our secrets and not subvert the policies of our elected officials.”

Being better versed in the distinctions within the world of espionage, we expect nothing from the spies – the recruited agents whose lives are written in treachery – but we expect the highest standards from the intelligence officers and analysts who are the professionals of our community. We have seen too often the terrible cost when those standards are not met.

This sort of politicization of intelligence, and the breaking of trust by those entrusted with the awesome responsibilities of the community, is beyond the pale. It is only when the culture within the community ostracizes the leakers, both through formal sanction and informal shunning, that these most insidious of betrayals will cease.

We also note an interesting perspective on the very real and immediate difficulties created by timed, politically motivated leaks at another very new, and likewise rather quiet blog (that happens to have a beautiful layout): The World is Grey, Jack.

The existential fight over the old NDIC

For those that have been around the intelligence community since the pre-9/11 era - and we are an increasingly small number it seems – there is another older NDIC, not the National Defense Intelligence College (once the Joint Military Intelligence College), but rather the National Drug Intelligence Center. It is rare that we at Kent’s Imperative comment on any specific institution or mission, but the news of recent events is so striking as to demand our notice.

We are deeply ambivalent about the old NDIC and its work. On the one hand, it could have been the perfect example of the kind of de-centralization and distributed analytical production that we have long advocated. Pushing the work of the intelligence community to places outside of the Beltway is a major need if we are going to have the kind of workforce, and the kind of sustainability, that the Long War requires. Indeed, we are personally acquainted with a number of good officers and analysts which left other fast track DC jobs to head to that entity based on family concerns. After all, their GS salaries go a lot further there – even if they will never see an -11, let alone a -13, billet.

However, the organization is deeply and fundamentally flawed. The location – on paper defined as “acceptable” due to the supposed 6 hour drive to DC (in reality much longer due to traffic, weather, and constant construction) – is a depressed and failing industrial area with no substantial local talent pool of any description. Its staffing has been long considered exile by most in the counterdrug specializations in the intelligence community. True, some may choose exile rather than continue to be consumed by the intrigues in the belly of the beast – but most cannot accept the career-ending move that the assignment has historically meant, unless they were very close to retirement or otherwise no longer interested in having a career. So the bench of substantive expertise available to that entity is very thin indeed…

Nor can most good analysts tolerate for long an excessively incestuous bureaucracy, driven by political factors held over from previous administrations, and beholden to a party line rigorously enforced through a coordination process that is legendary as the “seven levels of editing hell”. And all to produce finished intelligence which is largely regurgitated materials culled from HIDTA reporting, presented with a kind of analytic arrogance that only a fusion of DOJ and DEA cultures could create.

So it is with no surprise that we see the budgetary battles to continue to fund the pork-subsidized existence of NDIC are playing out once again, with the usual suspects front and foremost. The letter itself however gives us great pause: “The NDIC also anticipates undertaking a new and vitally important mission in partnership with the National Counter Terrorism Center, including: assuming responsibility for the terror no-fly list, the terror incident tracking program…”

Needless to say, we believe that such a move would be the height of folly. These are programs far too important to entrust to a backwater group of second-rates and has-beens – even if there are a few true professionals hidden among them. The NCTC Worldwide Incidents of Terrorism program alone has commanded the attention of some of the finest minds in the community, and stands as one of the un-paralleled examples of analytic tradecraft and rigour applied to a nearly impossible problem set – one that is accomplished in a form that its primary products can be publicly released. And let us not even discuss the implications of a major shift in responsibility for the no-fly list...

The funding line for NDIC is small beer by any real community standards. We are not opposed to its continued existence – in fact, we would support continued funding contingent on robust management oversight and the transformation of the entity into a hub for virtual distributed analysis and production. Such transformation should focus especially on an expansion of its training and education mission in order to support the new state & local fusion centers, and other less connected law enforcement agencies. (Perhaps such an expansion could even be modeled along the same lines as similar efforts at the National White Collar Crime Center.)

But let us be very clear that such experimentation should not come at the cost of vital missions stolen from key community players simply to justify a single politicians’ pet pork barrel.


h/t to Instapundit, with our thanks for his continuing interest in the earmarks process. We are interested only in the outcomes, but are grateful that someone keeps track of the details.

The continuing debate over climate intelligence

Weather intelligence (Wx) is one of the oldest continuously practiced forms of analytic prediction and forecasting. It has morphed over the years from something deeply and firmly entrenched “behind the green door” to an integral part of operations planning (an interesting evolution that may mirror future shifts coming in other forms of embedded intelligence support to the warfighter.) Wx forecasting is of course also a famously inexact blend of the art & the science, despite significant advances in sensor technology, modeling and simulation tools, and distributed real-time reporting sources.

Wx has also provided a fascinating comparative look into the evolution of analysis across cultural and organizational contexts, as US weather products (at least those available to the civilian world) are more timely and accurate than their European counterparts. The reference has escaped us, but we recall one research study that attributed this in part to the difference in meteorological publications processes between the peer-reviewed journal – preferred in the US - and the edited volume – preferred in Europe.

It is equally fascinating to see that the continuing debate over Wx in the form of the assessment of the potential for long term climate change has not yet abated. We have weighed in on this matter ourselves, but we continue to find new material surfacing throughout the community, mirroring a number of internal discussions. It seems that the prospect of institutionalizing this account has struck a nerve amongst practitioners. Additional references can be found at Politics & Soccer (the blog of a Georgetown University student) and at the Weekly Standard (where one can find a longer variant piece by the author usually featuring at Haft of the Spear.)

To this end, we note that there has been an apparent divide in the reactions between newly minted professionals (and their aspirant counterparts of equal age and similar experiences) versus the veterans and those that have been substantively engaged in the Long War for some time. Interesting enough, the younger generation is frequently eager to pursue such studies.

Whether our initial impression dismissing this difference as coming from a mindset imprinted by the media-generated cognitive biases (the results of decades of politically correct environmentalism targeted at the younger generation in the schools) will prove correct over time, we cannot say. There may also be more balanced and apolitical reasons for the interest of the younger set, perhaps even including the desire to find new accounts not yet dominated by the gray beards and talking heads of the community – and conveniently, one that does not require extended deployments but rather travel to the nicer places of the world for conferences, etc. (No one should ever think the new kids are stupid when it comes to angling for the right travel opportunities. One of our long ago bosses once noted that even the most inexperienced analysts could be divided into groups based on their native inclination towards cunning and self-interest in selecting assignments. The best and brightest would surge to the most difficult account of the day, and commit themselves utterly to it with no regard to personal sacrifice. The smarter, and usually quieter, ones would select the accounts most likely to bring them to the “chocolate” countries – nice European posts in places renowned for their confectionary and other cuisine.)

Once again, Wx provides a truly unique window into the practice of the craft, and the professionals' perspectives of the craft, cutting across the generations. It is however now become an entirely too political debate for our taste - and one that is being explicitly politicized by many of the participants.

When everything is intelligence, nothing is intelligence

The now famous essay from the Sherman Kent School comes to mind as one watches the debate over the intelligence community’s role in studying potential global warming issues play out in the media-legislative complex.

Both Haft of the Spear and In From the Cold have further insight and commentary into the role played by the political considerations in this equation, and are well worth reading.

One is also reminded that the intelligence implications of the issue has already been well covered by the National Intelligence Council’s Mapping the Global Future series, and to a lesser extent with the Proteus project’s scenarios.

However, a very wise (but very cynical) senior analyst once told us that the best account one could be assigned to is a futures study with a horizon long after your own retirement. That way, one could spend an entire career in intelligence and never be proven wrong…

Given the flux of other more frequently addressed geopolitical and transnational issues accounts, longer term futures are more and more being rendered irrelevant by the radical shifts of today. Thus, moving out to a geological timescale accomplishes the same objectives in a far more certain manner for those seeking a profitable retirement.

We ourselves feel that there are far more pressing and more immediate issues that demand the application of the talent and insight of trained intelligence professionals, and there are better target accounts in which the community can explore the integration of outside experts and academics with much more immediate, and much more reproducible, results.

As long as Americans are dying in the Long War, this kind of peacetime fantasy exercise is not just irrelevant but offensive. We are sure that there are many serving officers outside the wire that would love a chance to come back in, work in an air-conditioned office somewhere in the Beltway on a 9 to 5 schedule, see their families at night, and spend their time in the intellectual equivalent of wanking. But there is a real war to fight, and real intelligence to do first.

Revisionist politicization

We are most disturbed by some of the passages cited by advance reviewers of former DCI Tenent’s new book. The prospect of a senior official of that level authoring such a controversial piece so quickly after his tenure is a difficult enough thing to stomach, but it is frankly just another indicator of the unpleasant nature of senior level politics in this town these days – and an indicator of how far from the apolitical ideal the position itself has fallen.

Tenent is by no means the first former DCI to write an autobiography. Indeed, former DCI Gate’s older work has enjoyed re-issue after his appointment to SecDef. The existence of the book is not entirely the core of our objection, however much we might otherwise wish to see those who served in silence remain so upon their retirement, at least until the matters of controversy had been relegated to the status of history.

Our primary objection comes from the characterization of discussions of intelligence briefings and key judgments during Operation Iraqi Freedom pre-planning. There is much room for the interpretations of history, and the inevitable second guessing by the principals involved in those debates. This is also regrettably politics as usual in this town, for what is perceived a defeat (even in the narrow temporal sense of the media’s momentum) will always be an orphan.

The statements personally attacking specific DIA analysts, especially given the issues surrounding the factual accuracy of the criticism, is another matter entirely. While it is now a given in some circles that the creation of new functional and organizational structures for mission specific analytical efforts was somehow at the root of all problems with pre-war intelligence, this still remains in an unproven assertion whose core allegations of “cherry-picked” conclusions have never been validated – and which hopefully will be the subject of proper and rigorous academic study in coming years. No matter what the outcome of that study might be, it would be a far better treatment of a difficult historical discussion than the current media and political scrimmage that has so badly tainted the matter with controversy.

One can argue the motivations and effectiveness of specific units such as Undersecretary Feith’s shop (and many no doubt will for years to come), but the creation of dedicated mission centers, functional groups, or task forces is hardly a new phenomena driven by any specific agency management. In fact, one noted commentator (speaking under the Chatham House Rule in an unclassified public forum) recently focused attention on the issues surrounding the growing number of account-specific centers, not due to fears of politicization, but out of the very real concerns that the effective conduct of intelligence on a wide range of targets is now apparently best accomplished through exception (in the form of these small units) than through the normal but increasingly ineffective bureaucracies of the community - with damning implications for the larger entities.

Attacking individual analysts assigned to serve in any of these shops is beyond the pale. Analysts given the privilege and responsibility of briefing at the DCI’s level are not speaking from individual opinion but rather coordinated agency (if not community) assessments. One can question the accuracy of those assessments, or the analytic rigor of the process by which they were produced, but somehow alleging that the briefing lacked validity due to the (inaccurately alleged) reserve employment status of the individual analyst is the worst form of libel - and ill-befits a former senior. And at the end of the day, what a DCI chooses to convey to a sitting President is the responsibility of that DCI, who must judge his advisors and their statements from his own experience, analytical tradecraft, and substantive target knowledge. Once he has spoken, he must own his statements – for history will always attribute them first and foremost to him.

It is further appalling to note the attempted attribution of new statements, which failed to fully characterize the nature of the underlying information regarding Iraqi WMD programs upon which the assessments were based, to specific analysts but described in language which would be exceptionally unusual, to say the least. Any analyst’s tendency to caveat even to excess is well known within the community, especially given the widespread recognition of hard target challenges and the impact of adversary denial and deception efforts. Analysts are drilled in the precision of well-parsed language, and the calibration of judgment usually conveyed using some variant on words of estimative probability. One can argue whether specific caveats were well crafted, or given conclusions communicated effectively, but it is nearly unthinkable that statements claiming almost bravado levels of confidence would have propagated through multiple layers of analysis, coordination, and presentation. Nothing so offends the well-tuned ear of those in the analytical communities – and this would have certainly provoked reactions.

We are also frankly amazed that a former DCI should express outrage at being judged based on his own statements, or that such judgments might have career impact – even if they were simply others’ words repeated. Intelligence officers and analysts live and die based on the accuracy of their assessments, whether errors were based in their own mistakes or inherited from others in the community involved in the product’s lifecycle. They are even judged, rightly or wrongly, based on policymaker interpretation and use of that intelligence – as any warning analyst or watchstander knows all too well. This accountability, even if applied wrongly in specific cases – is a critical and needed weight upon every individual in the national security community to get it right above all other considerations. Because when intelligence is wrong, consequences follow far beyond individual careers.

The focus of estimative efforts has to be on the substance and the tradecraft, not on personal advancement or any other careerist interests – and that focus has to start and end with the very pinnacle of the organization, and the intelligence community as a whole.

h/t Captains Quarters, Haft of the Spear

The politicization of intelligence history

There are fewer accusations which carry more weight within the community than claims that the analysis and reporting of intelligence have been influenced by political considerations. The process and pressures by which political influence has been exerted in the great analytical debates of the past are well documented and well understood. These pressures have impacted assessments of adversary capabilities, such as during the debates over Soviet military capacity and the Bomber Gap and later Missile Gap. The dynamic has also affected the judgment of adversary intentions, such as during the earliest days of the post-World War II confrontation with the Soviets when the national estimates in both the US and the UK were constantly under competing pressures to reflect political positions favored by the powerful or the dissenting. (One excellent treatment examining the later can be found in Know Your Enemy: How the How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World, written by no less of an authority than the UK JIC’s former chairman Sir Percy Craddock.)

To say that politicization of intelligence is a cardinal sin is to understate the standards by which the community judges itself. The accepted norms of the profession drive analytical tradecraft and entire organizational structures, and have been subject to continual and justified debate since nearly the inception of what we now consider the literature of intelligence.

However, recent events have transpired which raise the spectre of an entirely different sort of collective sin: the politicization of intelligence history.

These are unprecedented times for those who practice and those who study the profession of intelligence. In an earlier era, one would never have expected the release of after action reports regarding major intelligence issues into the public domain while those issues and their kin remain current concerns. It was expected that a lifetime at least would pass before the lens of history could be turned to the deeds, thoughts, and words of those responsible for the most sensitive and secretive of decisions within the halls of the community.

This new transparency, in the form of committee reports, vetted dossiers, and even the release of raw, unevaluated documents has been simply stunning; even moreso the public acknowledgement of programs previously classified at the highest levels by a range of senior officials, including several statements of nearly world-changing import by the President himself. But this transparency is a matter of executive and policy-maker prerogative, the deliberate decision to muster support for current policy actions through the release of supporting information which was considered key to current judgments regarding the selected national course of action.

There has long been precedent for this prerogative, though never before has it been employed in such volume or kind. One has but to examine the use of overhead imagery during the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the disclosure of COMINT intercepts in the aftermath of the Soviet shoot-down of Korean Air Flight 007. These techniques would be reprised during the United Nations Security Council debates in early 2003, as the United States attempted to garner support for international action against Saddam Hussein’s regime with the support of selected imagery and intercepts.

Selected examples of the latest deliberate disclosure events, however, are emerging very different in nature than any previous use of publicly released intelligence information. These include releases of previously classified documents and key information by the 9/11 Commission examining the events leading up to the attacks of five years ago, and most recently the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s examination of pre- and post-war intelligence regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and terrorism related activities. To this one might add the recent release of the unclassified report regarding Iranian nuclear capabilities and intentions, which although derived from open sources can be considered as part of this overall phenomena as its authors emphasized that it’s structure and conclusions were “informed” by classified materials.

These processes began as inherently political exercises, and it is therefore unsurprising to see the end results subject to the classic Beltway political football as each competing side seeks to assert advantage. What once was a specialists game carried out in the narrow confines of academic journals and think tank sessions has now been opened out across the global interweb, enabled by the rapid lightweight digital publishing tools and constant connectivity that formed the blogsphere. In this Parallel World the sound of the melee now dwarfs by orders of magnitude what were once usually measured debates. And while the emergent effects of this openness are incredibly interesting from the immediate standpoint of understanding specific issues, especially as new forms of outside subject matter expertise are brought to bear on previously closely held problems, they pose a serious dilemma for the overall pursuit of what has been termed intelligence studies.

The weight of this secondary literature, some of which now includes unique and otherwise virtually unobtainable analysis of primary source documents originally written in hard target languages, will pose staggering challenges to the prospective historian seeking to understand major events in our collective experience as an intelligence community, and the student seeking to learn the trade and traditions of the profession. Moreover, the inherently political process has imbued much of these writings with such serious cognitive biases that it will require the exercise of strong analytical tradecraft simply to avoid immediate mindset formation which may irrevocably influence the reader to expect such politicization in the future. It has the potential to be a self-perpetuating cycle, to the great detriment of the intelligence studies field if not broken.

In the end, preserving an accurate and objective intelligence history matters. Future analysts will be shaped, possibly irretrievably, through their early exposure to that history. The explosive growth of the new literature discussing key matters of the art and science of intelligence has certainly been a major boon to the field, but it carries with it the potential for serious higher order effects that have not yet been anticipated or explored.

Fortunately, prescriptive remedies are available to counteract potentially negative higher order effects. Core analytical tradecraft can be applied just as readily to historical examples as current issues of concern, and the constant reinforcement of the tradecraft through study and research can only strengthen and professionalize key intelligence competencies. The pool of examples by which methodologists may demonstrate the application and efficacy of specific technique must be expanded, and must encompass scenarios in which the modern taint of politicization has not reared its ugly head.

Most of all, each practitioner in the field of intelligence studies, whether operator or academic, must personally decide to eschew politicization and seek objective understanding and insight from an apolitical standpoint, come what may.