Correlation of academic performance to professional success in intelligence studies education

Courtesy of Trinity University’s Intelligence Center (a program which few may recall pre-dates the success brought by the more prominent IC CAE now hosted there) comes a piece which surfaces the fascinating history of the less distinguished of the graduates from one of the most elite institutions in the country, the US Naval Academy.

These are stories well worth the read, and we are grateful to the good doctor for recounting them. And while we remain strictly and professionally apolitical as to their import in the current election cycle, we however would ponder the perhaps unintended parallels one might draw regarding the students emerging from the intelligence studies academia itself. In this new enterprise, it has been all too easy to focus on the bright young things and rising stars. But is success in the cloistered ivory tower really a determinant of future excellence in a profession which has grown increasingly distant from the sterile models and dated theories too often propounded by those outside the walls of the vault?

This is a question which truly remains unanswered. There simply has not been a sufficient sample size across an adequate longitudinal depth given the emergent dynamics of the field. Further, the unsettled nature of the generally accepted unclassified curriculum has also worked against such observations. A number of institutions once focused tightly on producing graduates capable of answering the requirements of the working intelligence professional now seem to be increasingly at variance from the community’s needs, while a number of newer schools are simply untested. While we have great hope that from out of this current state the engine of creative destruction will drive new and better approaches, we have yet to see but faint indicators of regeneration.

However, while the plural of anecdote is not data, we do have a few observations that might be called out for future study against the fullness of time. For example, Trinity’s program itself has produced more than its share of intelligence scholars – including those recently minted undergraduates accepted directly into further academic studies at the National Defense Intelligence College, a singular and rare achievement which is clearly indicative of great potential. And the older program at Mercyhurst has produced a number of alumni who were brought into the community even in the leanest years of the hiring freeze by virtue of exemptions granted to those with exceptional academic records.

Yet the concept resonates with the experiences we have seen in others. There have been the equivalent of the anchormen and goats from those institutions (and others in the intelligence studies field) over the years, and many not by virtue of insufficient talent but rather the inevitable result of efforts focused more intently outward against real world objectives vice the acknowledged artificial standards of the classroom. The challenge, of course, lies in distinguishing between those individuals and their counterparts who truly lacked the preparation, initiative, and raw intellect to perform in this demanding field. At the same time, the task is not really easier for those who face the disappointment of having invested in a promising and high scoring young candidate only to find that the professors’ pet cannot perform under real world pressures where the right answer is not simply repeating a canned school solution.

We would daresay the best means of addressing this dilemma is to ensure that the intelligence studies academia always tests its candidates in conditions which mirror as closely as is possible stressors found in the professional intelligence environment. It is for this reason that we emphasize the need for an intelligence crucible when cultivating new professionals.

Regrettably, it appears that this is an idea which has not been popular as of late, especially as class sizes balloon and attrition rates shrink at many programs. While this may be profitable for the institutions concerned, it may prove to be a disservice not only to the agencies and firms which hire untested candidates but equally so to the candidates themselves. Failure in the classroom, even one which may cause an individual to re-assess the course of their future professional options, is far easier than dramatic self-destruction in the face of a burden the individual simply cannot carry. Unfortunately, this is a thing we have seen all too often – especially given the hiring surges of recent years.

While this is not a phenomenon unique to the intelligence profession, we think that it is indeed more pronounced. For this is a field of thinkers and of talkers, and therefore values these skills highly, as a result often seeing such competencies mirrored in the strong academic performers. Yet there is a greater gulf in this profession between the accomplishments of insight or communication, in contrast to the mimicry or sophistry which underlies some successful but otherwise hollow academics. The same can be said of some instructors in the field, as much as of the students. Indeed, one is often found at the root cause of the others.

Theory derived from lived experiences is all well and good, but validation is needed through more rigorous empirical research. That, we fear, will be a matter that must be left to the historians of the generation after next, for only then may the full measure of a cohort’s deeds be taken.

Evidence inferred

In the rush to focus on new analytical techniques and methodologies, particularly the more complex and arbitrarily numeric variants, we think that the fundamental aspects of inferential reasoning are too often overlooked. This is by no means the stuff of such modern vogue as complicated algorithms or cutting edge research into cognitive developments. Nor is it the drumbeat of “critical thinking” applied absent real problems or even properly constructed examples.

Rather, this is the meat of what separates the analytic mind from that of the mere reporter. The problem occurs not only when building new analysts, who are too frequently shorted on the fundamentals which are vital in cultivating this distinction, but also when developing analysts’ tradecraft at the journeyman level.

Part of the reason why inference is so often given such a short shrift is that there is rarely new material of interest in circulation on the topic, when one can easily find a few hundred other resources for just about any new “hot” topic. But then again, one supposes it is hard to muster funding for a proposal described as an attempt to revisit and extent the work of a lawyer from the late 19th century.

It is for this reason we were delighted that the folks at University College London have put together an excellent cadre of interdisciplinary researchers to tackle the problems of evidence and inference, including the esteemed Professor David Schum (who first brought the phrase into common usage within the intelligence profession). The Evidence Science group is clearly seeking to forge new ground from what others have long ignored as well trod paths. Their publication set is indeed well worth reviewing, as it covers a wide range of topics central to the profession of intelligence: the persistence of discredited evidence, exploration of belief formation, and the use of rhetoric and argumentation, among many others. While only a few of the pieces focus explicitly on the intelligence domain, these exist within a selection of interdisciplinary material which also can provide its own value to the judicious reader. (It is for this reason that we can recommend the site despite the number of lawyering and quantitative analysis publications).

We think this might be just the thing for some of those in the Beltway contemplating a long weekend away from it all and looking for some not-so light reading in the wider literature.

Revisiting analytic rigour

The research currently being done at Ohio State University into the problems of intelligence analysis – including information overload, cognitive processes, and other aspects of the methodology – has from time to time caught our interest. Among the more interesting of these items now in circulation is an excellent lecture that we most highly recommend to our readers, recorded last year during the too often overlooked Google Talks series. The discussion focuses on the evaluation of analytic rigor, and means by which analysis may be strengthened.

We particularly favour the philosophy that Dr. Woods presents, which seeks to avoid dictating a single best methodology or process. We are more than willing to listen to the methodologists, but too often we find a dictatorial approach significantly at odds with the realities of line analysis. We think that the observed case study technique used in the Ohio State team’s research – something too infrequently done by many academics – is key to the validity of their findings. One cannot discuss analytic ideals without involving those who are actually involved in applying tradecraft to real problems. It is also not enough to conduct such research in artificial environments within student populations – real line analysis is too different.

We certainly cannot agree with the apparent off-hand condemnation of “folk” psychology of intelligence analysis – clearly aimed at taking on Heuer’s “bible”. While we think that there is a clear role for the methodologists and their research into strengthen analytic tradecraft, there is also a very real need for interdisciplinary adaptation from other areas of social science, as well as the kind of internal discussions that make up a key part of the maintenance of those oft-criticized, but entirely vital, guilds that are the backbone of the community.

We do however find several key concepts of great interest that deserve wider attention, including the concept of the Supervisor’s Dilemma – the balance of customer outcomes requirements and analytic resource opportunity costs against the relative depth of analytic rigour. We also find the study techniques themselves of interest, especially the concept of elicitation through critique – something we feel will likely have a far greater applicability in capturing the kind of intergenerational knowledge that the community is in danger of losing. We see the technique as one means of making more formal – and scalable - some of the kinds of subtle interactions that characterized the experiences of apprentice and journeyman analysts under the mentorship of a master.

We also find great merit in the good professor’s comments regarding the overconfidence of new analysts, and the satisificing biases that result. We definitely have observed a level of arrogance in too many new hires – and especially those coming out of the intelligence studies programs. The first lesson that an analyst student should learn is the fear of God – and of their own error. Too many programs of instruction are not affording the student the chance to learn that fear from the visceral experiences of their own mistakes, and to take away from the experience a humility that will cause them to productively question their future work toward its improvement. Such experiences are far better gained when the consequences are not fatal, in line with the lessons taught by Red Flag.

There is much food for thought in this lecture, as well as the contributions to the literature that the Ohio State program has generated. We will no doubt have further commentary on the subject in the near future.

Antecedent to the Chief Intelligence Officer

Given the apparent interest in the historical examples of the roles played by the most senior intelligence professionals now carrying the title of Chief Intelligence Officer, we thought it appropriate to mention one of the designations which preceded the more common “modern” appellation.

Sir Francis Drake’s English fleet, constituted to resist the Spanish Armada in 1588, did not lack for its own intelligence. The fleet sailed with an intelligence department under an individual who carried the title “Master of the Discoveries”, which an 1898 reference (repeated by another source in 1902) likened to modern post of the Chief Intelligence Officer. This individual was given command as “Lieutenant-Colonel of the pinnaces”, these being a sort of light boat used for communications and scouting duties – a quite logical platform from which to build out an intelligence capability.

The title itself may have originated from the time of Prince Henry the Navigator, of Portugal, and passed into naval tradition by way of his school founded at Sagres in 1419. However, this is uncertain due to contemporary dispute as to the true nature of that gathering of cartographers and sailing masters. There is also some reference to the title in such use which may support this hypothesis, found a 1938 volume, but this may well be built upon the foundation of later local legends rather than true history.

The concepts underlying the idea of discovery were at the time a critical national security concern – offering grand strategic advantage to any government which could maintain such secret knowledge. The major fleets of the day were in fact nearly the entirety of a country’s military force projection, and thus the senior commanders the de facto heads of the defense establishment. The intelligence leadership of the day may have thus stood as one of the more influential figures in all of the profession’s history. One can also easily see how the post migrated from the fleet, to the Company, to the Admiralty (and in the US, the Office of Naval Intelligence - at least until 1911), and thence to the national intelligence establishment and its privatized counterparts.

While we do not think we shall see the more archaic form of address come back into fashion any time soon, it does extend the timeline for the formalized role back quite a bit. Throughout history, the position may have existed in informal practice for generations, but the dawn of the profession itself can be traced to the recognition of these functions in a manner distinct from other specialties.

The expanding intelligence studies web

We note today a few excellent resources for the intelligence professional newly brought to the online environment. The public internet presence of the community continues to expand apace as the value of Metcalf’s law is realized, and the protocols for an appropriate public discussion of the field slowly continue to evolve.

The National Defense Intelligence College (pronounced JMIC by those seeking to avoid confusion with the ill-starred Drug Intelligence Center by the same acronym) has dramatically expanded its public presence. Most importantly for the intelligence scholar, they are releasing in electronic form a whole selection of works from their press, with the promise of more to come. Many of the files are large, so the usual admonition regarding server courtesy is in order. However, we are exceptionally pleased to see these materials being made available more widely for use in other academic programs. This will do much to combat the problem of seeing the better recent unclassified intelligence literature circulating only as 5th generation samizdat photocopy from hand to hand, due to a limited print run. We hope to see at least a selection of their voluminous collection of theses likewise circulated. We also sincerely wish that the civilian academic programs around the country will take an example from the College and cease attempting to reinvent their own wheels, but rather pursue unique studies of lasting value to the field.

We also note, thanks to our friend Michael Tanji, the venerable and respected OSS Society has also expanded its online presence into something akin to a blog. We look forward to their contributions and stories, which have already gotten off to a good start with discussion regarding the potential rebirth of the Office of Strategic Services in the Long War. Regardless of the relative merits of the proposal itself, the idea does capture the imagination. We would love to see a modern version of the kind of stories told in the classic You're Stepping on My Cloak and Dagger for our new era.

The imperative of Sherman Kent’s original vision of an intelligence literature continues to call to professionals. We are grateful to see the benefits to the history and the appreciation of the field that have already resulted, and we look forward to future developments.

Revisiting primary sources – the Allen Dulles collection at Princeton

We have been recently quite frustrated by the continued reliance of those in the intelligence studies field on secondary and other derivative works for academic purposes – particularly when so much primary source material has been recently declassified and digitized. We feel there simply is no substitute in many of the great matters of controversy to a student actually reading the original documents themselves, with derivative works used to provide commentary and illumination. It does require one begin to acquire the skills of piecing together fragments of documents – never a bad thing for a prospective intelligence professional. But the technique also illustrates sharply the true nature of one’s limited knowledge when discussing these matters in an unclassified forum, even decades after the events – a lesson many students (and a good number of their less humble professors) would be well advised to internalize at an early date. There will always be pieces of the profession which any particular individual will not see, and the sooner a scholar learns to work within these constraints, the better off that student will be – and the less likely to make a fool of themselves through wild assumptions or arrogant airs.

It is thus with great interest we note that Princeton University has opened a digital archive of the private papers belonging to former DCI Allen Dulles. The variety and volume of materials is simply extraordinary, and although it is organized by librarians (rather than intelligence professionals or modern search engine experts) it is well worth the time to explore these virtual stacks. Given that the gentleman’s 1963 text The Craft of Intelligence, is still reprinted for use as a basic text at many university level programs, these further materials are both substantively illuminating and historically invaluable. Of particular interest are the French and German language items, which may never have been previously referenced in depth during intelligence studies research on the matter.

We of course would be remiss if we did not mention one of the more valuable secondary texts which would provide a framework to the scholar seeking to interpret these materials. James Srode’s text, Allen Dulles : Master of Spies, is a modern and accessible work that covers Dulles’ career and legacy, and can prove a valuable guide to the nearly undifferentiated mass of the digitized documents.

The entire collection is over 1.5 gigabytes of data. One day very soon we will no doubt laugh at this as a trivially small volume in the age of the exaflood – but for now, please do be kind to the university’s servers and stagger your requests over time if you choose to download sections for your perusal. They do run a pretty fast pipe, but we would not wish to see a tragedy of the commons deny this resource to other researchers.

We would love to see these kind of digitization efforts other libraries holding such vital collections of import to the intelligence studies field – and hopefully in conjunction with a good OCR and search capability such as Google Books or its counterparts now offer. We can think of few greater wartime contributions that the intellectuals of this country may offer than to assist in the rebuilding and expansion of its intelligence capabilities for the Long War.

We also hope to see a commensurate response from the intelligence studies academia itself. There is easily enough material for countless numbers of good journal articles and even a thesis or two, plus a large selection of case studies focusing on aspects operational and analytic tradecraft. Let us hope that the investment of the field’s thinkers will equal that of the library’s digitization program.

Questions of legality of intelligence in the commercial world

We frequently encounter those in the academic and business world which have little grasp of the applications of intelligence to the commercial world. These problems have not been helped by the distractions of discussion regarding economic espionage, directed by nation-states against particular industries. While the latter crimes do occur, and frankly have since the days of the first corporate entities of the East India Companies (Honorable or Dutch, take your pick), modern competitive intelligence is however a far different animal. And while any corporate entity may itself also commit a crime, there is quite a gulf between the examples that detractors might point to, and the standards which a profession establishes for itself in order to inculcate in its practitioners. Herein lies the heart of the frequent disconnect between intelligence professionals and their counterparts on the other side of the boardroom table.

This is not a new phenomenon, by any means. It has been our contention that the entire practice of commercial intelligence has a long and storied history that has been given short shrift, largely due to the influences of consultants and others seeking to brand their names onto this “new” thing that the re-discovered. While this may be a good way to sell books, and to organize conferences, we feel that it has greatly hurt the profession’s development and legitimization. Like national intelligence in the interwar years, it is too easy to wrap up a “new” experimental function like a business intelligence / competitive intelligence unit, particularly when budget cuts come rolling around. The taint of controversy has too often provided convenient ammunition as cover in such situations. Unfortunately, the very defense against these largely manufactured controversies is the same history that has been so deliberately discarded in favour of the branding of novelty.

Thus it seems we are doomed to watch that fight replayed over and again in the gulf of ignorance that has been the result. Yet the legitimacy of these units has long been settled law, among the oldest questions in the profession of intelligence to come before the bar. We cite a 1916 publication by the United States Bureau of Corporations, Trust Laws & Unfair Competition. (courtesy of the Government Printing Office), which references the matter (for American law) thusly:

Before entering the final decree in United States r. American Tobacco Co. et al the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York considered a request to enjoin the defendants "from espionage on the business of any competitor, from bribery of employees of such competitor, and from obtaining information from any United States revenue official." Lacombe, J., denied the request, saying: “Why any one Individual or corporation engaged in this business may not acquire such information as he or it can legitimately obtain from private or public sources as to the business of a competitor we fall to see. When illegitimate methods are proved, they may be dealt with.”

We would wish to see that opinion more widely promulgated and discussed, in order to defeat the pseudo-legalistic arguments that have lately come into fashion to justify short sighted decisions that managers are unwilling to take responsibility for themselves. We think that such a changed calculus may actually alter those decisions in a marked way – or perhaps at least prove the unsuitability of certain ill informed individuals for the roles given to them in the complex decision-making environment of the modern corporation.

The loss of the history of the intelligence profession has had terrible consequences to its practice and evolution. It is long past time serious scholars begin to address these failings, in a manner that advances the literature of the field in areas of direct relevance to the practitioner.

Further to the limited impact of university level intelligence scholarship

Our earlier comments decrying the essential irrelevance of much of the intelligence studies academy to the professional practitioner has provoked no small measure of reaction over the past month. Most comments have come from those still serving, with anecdotes – in truth, mostly horror stories – of the failure of numerous attempts to reach out to the scholars in the field. It seems there is a certain degree of stubbornness – one might even say a profound expression of anchoring bias – which ties the professoriat to lines of inquiry that contribute only marginally to the art and science, despite clear needs in other areas.

The esteemed Dr. Barton Whaley reflected upon this problem in a recent article, which in part examined the academic tendency to continually try to re-invent the wheel. (For those interested, it may be found in the Defense Intelligence Journal, Volume 15, Number 2, 2006.) His personal list of such wheels covered includes the “re-discovery” of the problems of strategic surprise. In this spirit, we might add our own list of those topics we think more than adequate attention has already been paid, given the other gaps in the literature. Among these are the continual attempt to revisit the foundational definition of intelligence, the endless rehashing of debates over words of estimative probability, and the needless attempts to impose a false and entirely arbitrary numeric precision in intelligence writing.

One of our colleagues put it best: the primary reason these sorts of academic wittering continue unabated has been the small number of professionals who have actually read such irrelevant stuff. And even fewer will have dwelt upon it long enough to respond, rather than laughing it off. Unfortunately, even those that have gone through the difficulties of finding time apart from the pressing business of current accounts, and fought through publication review in order to convey substantive examples from inside the vault, rarely make a dent in the external discussion, given how few pages emerge to compete with the growing corpus of distraction.

But we strongly suspect there are yet other intelligence studies academics that may indeed be well worth listening to, and we continue our discussions in the forlorn hope of surfacing their work more widely within the community. Thus we were most grateful for the insightful commentary regarding the same earlier post, provided by a learned individual whom we shall describe (with permission) only as a Western intelligence scholar, and full professor at a top tier university. The gentleman sought to enlighten your humble authors regarding the flipside of the equation of intelligence scholarship from the university’s perspective, and raised points well worth wider consideration. (Reproduced here with only minor editing to preserve the anonymity upon which all of our skunkworks relies). His response speaks to “two central factors which have inhibited not only the volume and quality of (ivory) tower scholarship on intelligence matters, but also the impact of scholarly work on the IC.”

“First—and this holds true for a variety of areas, and not just the IC—most scholars simply have no sense of how bureaucratic and government processes, let alone the military and IC, operate. It is not anything taught in graduate school, where the emphasis is very much on mastering the theoretical masters of the field. The majority of academics have fairly predictable career paths from undergraduate degree through to MA and PhD, with little outside-academia work experience (the exceptions being "professional" schools of diplomacy and foreign service, which place more emphasis on recruiting staff with professional experience, and also many scholars working in the aid and development field). I would register a disagreement with your observation that: "Lacking in-depth target knowledge, substantive understanding of applied analytical tradecraft, and relying on a too short tour (if even that) at a three letter organization or two, the result becomes a sort of punditry entirely divorced from the profession itself." More specifically, while I don't disagree with the broader point that you are making, I would argue that the quality of academic literature on intelligence, war, and diplomacy would be substantially improved by even relatively periods spent inside an agency, or foreign or defence ministry.”

Second, the professional reward system within academia neither rewards policy-relevant output, nor does it place much value on material published outside the regular scholarly channels. Indeed, even the latter are carefully weighted (formally or informally) by their academic prestige within a disciplinary field, with leading university presses and peer-reviewed journals coming first, lesser presses and journals second, and everything else a very scant third. In other words, the benefit that accrues to a scholar is almost in inverse proportion to the actual policy impact (or, in this case, impact on the intelligence community).

Although most scholars don't think directly in these terms, it is possible to put some numbers on this. Let us take the hypothetical example of an excellent scholar who forgoes publication in a top-ranked journal (say APSR or World Politics), and instead produces a online piece or occasional paper in easily disseminated and digestible form with direct IC implications. Come annual salary increment time, the former might well be worth $750 (or more) in annual pay increase… the latter perhaps $150 (or less). Lets also make them 34, with a thirty year career ahead of them. The lifetime loss from writing the latter is (ignoring inflationary effects, etc) a minimum of $18,000. If they did it every year--well, quite apart from the tenure and promotion consequences, you can see that the implicit disincentive is substantial. Equally important are the validation messages that fields send to themselves, and the prestige and value one is accorded within academic networks and other peer groups.

This is quite apart from other inhibiting factors.”

We confess that we had not properly considered the economic incentives in the equation – thinking primarily of the thing as an unambiguous good in its own right. Of course, this is also a product of our own cognitive biases – rarely in the IC do contributions to the literature translate directly into one’s pay packet in the same manner (perhaps one reason why the literature advances so slowly.) Neither should the currency of the reputation market be lightly discounted.

If the community is to encourage the kind of the scholarship in the intelligence studies field that will actually serve the profession’s interest, these factors need to be taken into account. The learned gentleman does offer a few potential solution pathways, which merit further discussion.

“How can this be addressed? The recent proliferation of peer-reviewed academic journals on intelligence and security matters certainly helps, although it doesn't necessarily contribute to scholarly output with IC impacts. Sporadic efforts to get scholars inside government for a year or two, whether as scholars-in-residence or in an actual functioning capacity, ought to be expanded upon, and designed to have benefits (such as in-built research funds) that offset the apparent career liabilities of "wasting" (to quote a departmental colleague) one's sabbatical in this way. Finally, the intelligence community needs to reflect on whether its frequent aversion to providing "visiting" scholars with high-level security clearances needs to be rethought. There are certainly substantial security issues involved, given that scholars might well be lecturing on a country in class shortly after reading highly sensitive COMINT or HUMINT on the same. On the other hand, its not clear how they can understand what is going on--let alone contribute to the betterment of IC functions--if they are entirely kept out of the loop. At this point (and at the risk of paraphrasing Donald Rumsfeld), most don't know what they don't know.”

Money can be found, but its application towards productive ends has been problematic. Unfortunately, too often research funds have done little to redirect a faculty to more relevant pursuits, being simply contracts which were serviced using largely student labour. (Again, as in many cases of suboptimal contract performance, the fault may lie as much with the contracting agencies management of the project, but the history is what it is.) While cleared scholarship is an interesting concept, this is typically also done through a contracting vehicle – which tends to take the work product out of the academic realm and into the community itself, greatly limiting distribution elsewhere in the intelligence studies field. Many academics – with some justified reason – are also reluctant to accept the kind of future publication constraints that a term of cleared service will inevitably impose.

These are matters that deserve greater consideration, and we no doubt will return to in future discussions. We are grateful as always to our readership, and in particular to our commentator, for helping advance this discussion in ways we never could have anticipated when this small effort was begun.

Winter is the paper season

For those locked indoors in the cold (such as it may have been, or soon return, despite a brief and enjoyable moment of unseasonable warmth), winter is an excellent opportunity for research, reflection, and writing. It is especially appropriate at the start of a new year for all those professionals who have vowed that 2008 will be the year that they at last contribute the literature in their own right.

Thus, we note in passing a few of the more recent calls for papers that have been circulating in recent weeks. For further details beyond these brief summaries, please see the original announcement sources.

• 2008 International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War, to take place at the University of California at Santa Barbara on 4-5 April 2008. Submissions by graduate students working on any aspect of the Cold War, broadly defined. Of particular interest are papers that make use of newly available primary sources. A two-page proposal and a brief academic C.V. (in Word or PDF format), should be submitted to jchapman@history.ucsb.edu by 15 January 2008 to be considered. Notification of acceptance will be made by 5 February. Successful applicants will be expected to email their papers (no longer than 25 pages) by 21 March.

• Doreen and Jim McElvany 2008 Nonproliferation Challenge Essay Contest: In an effort to spur new scholarship and policy initiatives to address today's vexing proliferation problems, CNS and its journal, The Nonproliferation Review, are launching an essay contest. The contest is designed to find and publish the most outstanding new papers in the nonproliferation field. Although we will not exclude essays with a historical orientation (if they provide guidance for current or future policy), our priority is to generate new insights and recommendations for resolving contemporary nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons challenges, including those involving both state and non-state actors. Entries should not exceed 10,000 words (including endnotes), or approximately 40 double-spaced pages. All entries must be the original, unpublished work of the author(s) and must not be under consideration for publication elsewhere. Deadline for submission is 31 March 2008. Grand Prize: $10,000* and Outstanding Student Essay Prize: $1,000

• Computer Applications in Knowledge-Based Systems: A special issue of International Journal of Computer Applications in Technology: Knowledge-based systems provide intelligent assistance in solving any problem. They can be used not only as systems within engineering, but also within management, marketing, internet, communication, networking, psychology, education, etc. The research and development of these systems which exploit knowledge in the target domain is at the forefront of modern research. This special issue is intended to present applications of knowledge-based systems. Submitted papers are expected to postulate diverse problems, models and solutions for these applications. This special issue welcomes both academic and practical contributions in all aspects of knowledge-based systems. Relevant topics may include, but are not limited to, the following: Knowledge-based systems / Knowledge-based engineering / Knowledge discovery and data mining / Intelligent agents and multi-agent systems / Machine learning / Text mining and applications / Speech processing and synthesis / Signal processing / Business intelligence systems / Intelligence systems for e-business / Information agents on the internet / Genetic algorithms / Evolutionary computing / Hybrid intelligent systems / Knowledge acquisition / Communication assistance with knowledge / Natural language processing / Information retrieval / NLP application / Cross-language information retrieval. Important Dates: Submission of full paper before: 15 April 2008 / Notification of acceptance before: 15 June 2008 / Submission of final and revised manuscripts: 15 August 2008
  

• POLICING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, Criminal Justice Policy Review – Special Issue. Guest Editor: Willard M. Oliver, Ph.D., Sam Houston State University: Criminal Justice Policy Review is currently soliciting manuscripts for a special issue on policing for homeland security. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies in the United States have taken on new responsibilities, and the role of policing continues to evolve as a viable component of the overall national strategy for homeland security. Little research, however, identifies emerging policing strategies, their relationship and/or application to the national strategy for homeland security, and corresponding policy implications. Manuscripts considered for publication in this special issue could focus on a variety of topics, including (but not limited to): (1) adaptation of community policing and/or problem-oriented policing to homeland security; (2) law enforcement organizational transformation consistent with the overall national strategy for homeland security; (3) interagency cooperation for homeland security; (4) innovations in policing delivery of service models and policy consistent with the overall national strategy for homeland security; and, (5) policing for homeland security program evaluations. For style and submission guidelines for Criminal Justice Policy Review, please go to http://www.hhs.iup.edu/cr/CJPR. For additional information, contact Phil Stinson, Managing Editor, Criminal Justice Policy Review, at p.m.stinson@iup.edu or (724) 357-1247. Submission Deadline: May 1, 2008
  

And of course, interested parties are always welcome to submit papers or short pieces for publication in these pages, either for attribution or on anonymous / pseudonym basis. We remind our readers that we only accept unclassified material suitable for wide public distribution, which carries no potentially negative implications for operational security. For those individuals whose employment requires publication review, our policy remains the same as that of the Association for Intelligence Officers – it is entirely the responsibility of the prospective author to ensure compliance with all controlling policies and other security guidance; and we reserve the right to reject any material not meeting common community standards. Violations of law or policy will be reported to the appropriate agency authorities. However, with those limitations in mind, we have a broad range of eclectic interests in furtherance of our objective of advancing the literature and the profession, and contributions or notes are always welcome.

This is not to say our contemplated journal is yet dead, but much yet remains to be done in coordinating that project. There are also those who would be more comfortable seeing their work in the medium of the blog, which we would encourage – or simply have material which they do not feel would be appropriate for the peer reviewed journals, which we also understand. Students are particularly encouraged to contribute if they are not seeking publication elsewhere. Of course, there is also the wide range of other fine publications in the field, to which submissions may also be made to good effect.

We are greatly looking forward to what contributions to the literature that may be brewing on these long winter nights. After all, we do require a constant supply of good reading materials…

A hard look at prediction markets

Rarely does an analytical methodology garner attention in the manner that has marked the discussion of prediction markets. From controversial origins to increasingly widespread public adoption, we think more pixels have been spilled on this single approach than on perhaps any other methodology short of ACH.

We have written about such techniques before. Perhaps we might group them more generally under the moniker of arbitrary quantitative forecasting. Arbitrary, for the numbers themselves however derived have only relative meaning in the assessment of probabilities (including even financial data, which although it carries with it information about the state of a transaction series or commodity, responds as much to the complexities of interactions between financial entities as it does to those factors of relevance for intelligence forecasting.)

It has been difficult, however, to evaluate the effectiveness of the technique amidst all of the hype. Certainly, we know of no significant influence on ordinary analytic tradecraft. The real business of intelligence continues much as it always has. This does not necessarily invalidate a methodological experiment, for there is certain room for more specialized vehicles to address unique problems or support new product lines. This is the usual fate of a new and uncertain methodology, and is not a bad thing in and of itself. (Although we do not that adoption of new methodologies has been recently accelerated, which we can attribute in part at least to the more widespread discussion within a growing literature. A new technique or approach might have lingered for decades before seeing significant use, but now may find a home – even if in a specialized shop – within months or years.)

Validation has always been the bane of methodologists. However elegant their theories, they are doomed to academic irrelevance unless adoption occurs across a sufficiently representative section of the community. And absent validation, adoption – especially in cases where significant implementation effort is required - will always chancy. In the face of production pressures and surge requirements, analysts will in almost every case fall back upon processes with which they are familiar – structured or otherwise. Prediction markets by their very nature tend to require a substantial up-front effort for highly uncertain results.

We are thus grateful to the folks at Google, along with coauthors from NBER and Dartmouth, for publishing some of the first real results of their internal prediction market. The study covers nearly three years of the operation of an exchange which handled over 70,000 transactions – each conveying a degree of belief on one of almost 300 particular questions, on behalf of 1500 active employees (although nearly 6500 held accounts that were not used.) Interesting, they identify unexpected influences due to physical proximity, as well as the impact of cognitive bias towards optimism based on employee fiscal considerations created by Google’s rising share price. Also quite interesting was their observation that new employees were more influenced by this bias, and that staff with longer tenure within the firm tended towards more calibrated judgment – a not inconsistent phenomenon within any analytic activity.

As warrant to the authors’ point regarding proximate location influences on information sharing, it was also revealed that Google employees moved offices approximately every 90 days. If ever there was a indicator of a complex and unstable system… but of course, we are aware of quite a few community elements that would meet or even exceed this frequency.

At least a third of all market questions were purely “fun” topics, while nearly half did not have direct impact to Google. This begs the question of how much of the activity was merely socialized gambling using virtual currency vice the exercise of deliberate judgment regarding the potential future environment – something that will plague almost any prediction market collaboration. While fun helps drive adoption, and play can lead to divergent insights, it is easy to envision such a mechanism as becoming a drain on the hard questions of the real topics.

All in all, the paper is well worth reading and carries with it quite a bit of food for thought to sustain those debating the utility and applications of prediction markets within the intelligence community. We admit to a growing skepticism regarding the value of the methodology that this study has only served to reinforce. Given the total time, resources, and intellectual energies required to support such an endeavor, these kinds of outcome do not in our view necessarily justify the effort. However, we remain open to the potential that such mechanisms capture effort which might otherwise be entirely undirected, and therefore may create insight where other techniques would not. These remain in our minds open questions, and worthy of further research.


h/t Marginal Revolution and Midas Oracle

Further to the forgotten history of commercial intelligence

Our previous remarks on the loss of the collective memory about commercial intelligence activities in the early decades of this century apparently struck a nerve with our readership. We received quite a good deal of private communication (as well as more public posts) in response, and are glad to see a vibrant discussion in the competitive and business side of the intelligence blogsphere.

We thought to offer a few more references, then, from the virtual archives. Unfortunately, many of the references cited have not yet been digitized, and indeed may not survive extant. However, should any happen upon them in the more physical types of archival research there are no doubt additional stories worth telling. Even what scant citation is available tantalizes the mind with the volumes of lost history that could be written by modern scholars of the intelligence studies field. Among the items we surfaced with a short afternoon's research are:

• A reference to “Sell’s Commercial Intelligence” in 1902, out of London.
• A 1906 reference to the unnamed works printed by Commercial (Manitoba), “Proprietors of Commercial Intelligence”
• Eurolaw Commercial Intelligence. 1930. A newsletter, apparently published twice per month and in comprehensive semi-annual editions.
• Hooper , Frank Wilfred. The Functions of a Bank in Relation to the Capital Market. 1936. A more general management text that nonetheless discusses the staffing and functions of an economic intelligence department.
• Goldstein, Herbert. Competitive Intelligence in the Chemical, Drug, and Process Industries. Scientific Documentation Associations, New York. First identified reference to the text was printed in 1937.
• Commercial Intelligence Journal, 1938. It is unknown how long publication continued, or in how many issues.
• Artis, Michael. Foundations of British Monetary Policy. Oxford University. 1945. Discusses the establishment of a “strong and highly qualified Economic Intelligence Department, whose head should be an executive director of the bank” for “intelligence and analysis”.
• Administration. Institute of Public Administration. 1953. A more general work that does however mention, in connection with marketing, “each area sales organization has its own commercial intelligence service and a comprehensive system of trader contact”.
• Business History Review. Harvard University. 1954. This volume references the practice of keeping “overseas sources of business intelligence”.
• Brech, Edward Franz Leopold. Organization, the Framework of Management. 1957. This text makes reference to the organization of an example Economic Intelligence Unit as supporting the Managing Directors of manufacturing concerns.
• Alden, Burton. Competitive Intelligence: Information, Espionage, and Decision-making. C.I. Associates. 1959. A similar title by the same name was first referenced in 1957 as a publication “from the students of Harvard University.”
• The Library Association Record. 1957. Discusses the role of librarians, claiming one “Miss Chevis dealt with commercial intelligence in a way which made it look exactly like special reference library work.”
• Rose, Harold. The Economic Background to Investment. Institute of Actuaries. 1960. The author identified himself as “head of the Economic Intelligence Department of a large assurance company between 1948 and 1950.”

Further, the older literature also contains reference to additional shops in various commercial enterprises, the history of which could no doubt fill an entire thesis. Among these are mention of commercial intelligence offices, including one Dun & Company, with branches in Mexico City, Havana, Rio de Janerio, and Buenos Aires as of 1914. A commercial intelligence system at Lloyd’s of London is identified yet earlier still, with a mention in 1876 citing “the labour of half a century”. Various references are made to the “Economic Research Unit, Business Intelligence Department, Bank of Ceylon, Colombo” in 1931, again in 1947, and lastly in 1960. The Economic Intelligence Unit of Prudential Insurance Company is also mentioned as active between 1948 to 1958.

A number of sources were found which identified specific Economic Intelligence Departments – predominately (but not exclusively) at major financial institutions, including:

• Barclay’s Bank, whose Department was identified as the author of a number of publications, the earliest of which dates from 1902
• Bank of France, first mentioned in 1934
• Bank of England, cited in 1952 and 1960
• The English Electric Company, identified as active between 1954 and 1960
• The Swiss Bank Corporation of London, mentioned as late as 1956
• Westminster Bank, cited in 1952

Interestingly, older volumes also support the increasingly persuasive argument that the term “business intelligence” has been so diluted in common usage as to become entirely meaningless as a useful label for an organization, activity, or product. In most references prior to World War II, the term referred nearly exclusively to the quality of mind that an individual executive possessed – similar to current delineation of emotional intelligence, or other measurements of aptitude. Between this history and its current bastardization for the sale of data warehousing software, we think it high time the term be retired in favour of an alternative of greater utility and value.

No doubt quite a number of other interesting nuggets still lurk in the backroom stacks, awaiting the enterprise of some young intelligence scholar to ferret them out. Rescuing this history is one of the true needs of the intelligence studies field – particularly as we struggle to understand the dynamics of the privatization of intelligence and the growth of non-state intelligence capabilities, which the literature shows to be a much older trend than most now account for.

Other intelligence histories

The history of intelligence, for as much attention as it receives within the comparative confines of the intelligence studies field (especially in comparison to the hard business of actually doing intelligence through analysis or operations), still is practically unexplored territory in so many respects. Likewise, what has been explored has been so poorly communicated back to the mainstream of academia. We recall a conversation, not too long ago, with a respected doctor-professor of diplomatic history at a major institution (name omitted to protect the guilty), in which this supposed subject matter expert admitted he had never once heard of the use of cryptanalysis in decoding intercepted diplomatic and personal letters throughout Europe from the 1500’s onward through the Peninsular War (the rough span of his supposed preferred period of study.)

Real intelligence history requires primary sources, and that requires work beyond the typical rehashing of tired tropes that characterizes so much of the cottage industry of intelligence reform. But if the intelligence studies discipline does not involve its counterparts in other departments, particularly amongst the historians, there is little hope of surfacing further source material from the deep archives and scattered collections of surviving material. This especially challenging given that the field has never been itself a primary subject of index, and that those unacquainted with the practice of the tradecraft are often hard pressed to recognize the materials which reference activity (versus organization or declared intent).

We, as a field and as scholars, must also give credit where it is due, and diligently reference the works of those historians which have pursued the hard work of uncovering and interpreting real primary sources. There is much that has been overlooked in the stacks, and the cross-pollination of these ideas from other areas would do much to enlighten our chosen paths of study.

For this reason we would like to bring particular attention to the often overlooked work of Dr. Karl De Leeuw of the University of Amsterdam, who has done much to shed light on unique aspects of intelligence history from a Dutch perspective. In particular, several of his more interesting pieces (from our humble vantage point, anyhow) have focused on cryptographic history to a quite surprising depth.

Among these publications are several articles in the journal Cryptologia (itself too frequently forgotten amongst the more qualitative practitioners of intelligence studies due to its high levels mathematical content), including “Johann Friedrich Euler (1741-1800): Mathematician and cryptologist at the court of the Dutch Stadholder William V” and “The Dutch invention of the rotor machine, 1915-1923”. Equally interesting is a piece in the Historical Journal, which examines “The Black Chamber in the Dutch Republic during the War of the Spanish Succession and its Aftermath, 1707–1715”.

Students and other self-reflective practitioners would be well advised to acquaint themselves further with the overlooked segments of research applicable to the field that circulates in areas outside of the well-trod paths of their contemporaries.

Arguments in intelligence history

We occasionally note the scrum which emerges as the topic of intelligence history is approached within the context of larger political science debates. In this case, Sic Semper Tyrannis has resurfaced the debate over the utility of social science derived approaches to intelligence analysis practice; centered around Sherman Kent himself and the original Ivy League influenced R&A, first raised back in 2005. The current piece expands the discussion into a wider examination of the use of intelligence within a supposed political school of thought allegedly shared by several recently prominent decision-makers. Though we find the formulation “neo-con” to be a particularly unhelpful analytical framework, both too heavily influenced by recent political rhetoric and prone to use as a shorthand masking too many anchored and unexamined assumptions; the piece does offer some value in summarizing a set of arguments of the contemporaneous back and forth of Soviet analysis that is rarely well captured in modern study. Also quite interestingly, whatever one’s take on the issues themselves, the discussion does illustrate the impact of the academic and privatized intelligence tradition on key community history, influenced which are too often overlooked and thus all too rarely taught.

We also note the very differing perspectives on the first exercise of alternative analysis, the famous Team B studies, to other views about the experiment referenced by Former Spook over at In From the Cold. It’s an old stalking horse of the intelligence academia, and in our opinion, too much of the subsequent debate over these cases has been influenced by contemporaneous political maneuvering intended to protect a government monopoly on intelligence in the face of a unique privatization challenge. We note that alternative analysis has now been enshrined into community practice – thus the lessons of the original competitive analysis exercise could not have been nearly so negative as many subsequent commentators would insist, whatever one might believe about the relative estimative accuracy of each team’s conclusions. Tradecraft may well be advanced by even imperfect experimentation, so long as methodologies are refined in subsequent iteration.

We also wish to thank Non Partisan Pundit for the kind words in the comment thread, and hope we may continue to strive to earn the appellation “not only well written and informative, but it's also refreshingly free of politics.” An intelligence practitioner is always intended to be professionally apolitical – a fact that we believe is not stressed nearly enough to the younger generation in an environment of highly politicized media, and the ongoing football between the Hill and the Administration (and back again). We see not only the ethical obligations inherent in this requirement, but also the practical benefits to the apolitical approach, as exemplified in Tetlock’s research into expert judgment, best approached through his recent work cast in Berlin’s metaphor of the fox and the hedgehog. We also look forward to the Pundit’s further examination of intelligence studies issues, such as the discussion of the effect of “yes men” within closed regimes.

Intelligence in the (proto) UN system

Much as we previously remarked upon the true but too oft forgotten origins of commercial intelligence, we have also recently had occasion to be reminded of the obscure history of another overlooked facet of comparative intelligence traditions.

Throughout the confusion of the 1990’s in the emergence of the new world disorder, the requirements of intelligence in the international system were fiercely debated. Along the way, the naive ideals of too many abstract theorists came to dominate, insisting that organizations such as the United Nations did not need, and should not employ, the activities of intelligence – even when forward deployed in support of contingency and peacekeeping operations. This overly idealistic thinking met bruising reality in the conflicts of the Balkans, and the legacies such as Srebrenica live with us still to this day. The Netherlands Institute of War Documentation’s landmark study was only completed in 2002 – including an examination of intelligence operations and liaison relationships notable for its astounding access to primary Dutch sources (if not perhaps its accuracy in other more speculative areas involving the services and activities of other nations.)

But despite the protests of the modern theorists who would fashion the international community in a softer image, there is indeed nothing alien regarding the idea of intelligence in transnational bodies. The use of intelligence for negotiations between alliances of like-minded states, dealing with countries outside of the normalized system, dates back at least to the diplomacy of the Elizabethan age. The collection and analysis of information in support of a variety of intergovernmental purposes continued unabated, even to inclusion under its overt nomenclature in one of the first transnational deliberative bodies.

Once again, via the newly liberated electronic ghosts of tomes from the deep archives, we note a small but overlooked piece of that historical puzzle. It takes the form of a 1934 volume published by the Economic Intelligence Service of the League of Nations. It is the surviving (and now digitally enduring) member of a publication series begun in 1931, providing basic intelligence on international banking systems worldwide dating back 1913. As typical of economic intelligence reporting of the day, the volume is largely a dry compilation of reference level materials, though its analytical framing is rather sophisticated for its day. Unsurprisingly, source material from the Economist is cited frequently – which will no doubt please those at the Economist Intelligence Service who can now lay claim with stronger evidence to a far older intelligence tradition than is commonly recorded.

A subsequent volume was published in 1935, but the next digitally available volume dates from 1942, for which the Economic Intelligence Service’s Financial Section then director, a monsieur A. Loveday, again penned the introduction - noting the publication changes wrought in post-War volumes. From this we might surmise an interruption in publication – or at the very least, distribution - during the turmoil of the intervening years.

This history casts the debates over the role of intelligence in the UN system during 1990’s in a most unfavorable light. If intelligence was suitable for the rather more mundane applications of economic and commercial consumers during the earliest days of what was arguably an even more idealistic international organization, then the application of the same tradecraft to the preservation of effective peacekeeping options – and the lives of those allegedly under the protection of a UN deployment – should have been far more readily acceptable.

Selective memory and forgotten history can have terrible consequences. We doubt there was ever a more compelling case demonstrating the need for rigorous intelligence scholarship, supported by a robust literature.

This incident also reminds us that it is not enough for academics to claim the distinctions of scholarship – they must also write, in a manner that does not merely rehash old arguments and recycle the same primary source set. New research and the rediscovery of older sources are needed, and the writings which result from these studies must have relevance and reach to influence the world of the practitioner. The field cannot afford disconnected abstractions of no applied merit, nor can it endure to see its history and lessons learned to be lost in the dusty stacks for another generation.

The changing of the intelligence studies (public) blogsphere

It is against the backdrop of our continuing discussions of intelligence studies and the impact of blogging that we note the passing of two blogs which we have had occasion to enjoy over the past while. The World is Grey and Fast Squirrel have recently chosen to close up shop. We respect their decisions, and understand entirely – as much as we will miss their contributions to the public literature. They join the now defunct JMJ Blog, Intelligence Analysis & OSINT, and Robot Economist among those recent intel, and intel related blogs which have gone dark.

Blogging – especially the personal, hobbyist kind – has always been a dynamic enterprise, with a constantly shifting menagerie of new faces. Even among our own humble skunkworks here at KI, we have seen contributors come and go. The public side of intelligence studies blogging is perhaps more prone to this than other aspects of the distributed conversation, if only due to certain unique features of the constrained information environment. After all, some may find it difficult to accept that the interests which drive the majority of their day and professional energies must be totally ignored in public discourse, and that the focus of online writing must remain academic, historical, and high level. Doing so in a manner that maintains both relevance to the reader, and the satisfies the intellectual interests of the authors, can certainly be a challenge for some bloggers. (We are fortunate here at KI that our interests span such a diverse range that we find no difficulty exploring areas of the field in which there can be no conflict of interest.)

At the same time as our old (virtual) companions have closed up shop, a few other blogs have come to our attention that appear to be fellow travelers in the revolution in intelligence affairs. These include the Intel Fusion blog, and the AFCEA’s MAZZ-INT commentaries. It is not surprising that several others hail from overseas (allies), or the private sector’s competitive intelligence / business intelligence spaces, such as the Singaporean National Security Intelligence, the Italian Intelligence & Security Analysis, the Competitive Intelligence Marketplace, or Jens Theime’s weblog. This does not make these potential contributions any less valid, of course – but such material does perhaps fall into the nebulous category of comparative intelligence studies.

Given the difficulties of public blogging for many intelligence professionals, we do expect to see the expansion of the activity on other networks rather than public pieces by a number of those authors seeking to enter the conversation. But that is a discussion for another time and place entirely, we should think. Our only hope is that many of those choosing to blog in more rarefied atmospheres recall the original admonition in Sherman Kent’s call for the literature, in which he urges those with an inclination to write not merely on their target or issue, but on the nature of their shared profession and its tradecraft. It is all too tempting in an environment where the details of one’s accounts may be shared more fully to explore those details and their implications, rather than the higher level abstractions of process, patterns, and transformation. However, it is the latter concerns that will truly respond to the Imperative laid upon us all, and help to chart the unknowns of the profession’s continuing evolution.

Blogs and (intelligence) scholarship

Via the TaxProf Blog, we note the proceedings of a conference designed to examine the impact of blogging on the study of law. The parallels of many of the key arguments for the intelligence academy are quite striking indeed.

Recent years have seen not only the dramatic expansion of the intelligence studies field, but also attempts by a number of parties to impose their own control on the manner in which the field is evolving. These efforts have varied from proposed standards bodies to commissar style denunciation of new programs as mere “training” for vocational skills. Some are motivated by the best intentions of furthering professionalization, and some are regrettably little more than rent-seeking.

We have been greatly surprised that the expansion of the actual work of teaching intelligence has not led to nearly the flowering of the literature of intelligence that one might otherwise expect. For those most part, intelligence faculty simply do not publish – in the community’s own organs, or in the public journals that have arisen in the space. Now this may be in part explained by the moribund state of the field’s traditional publishing opportunities – but we doubt such an explanation complete, especially in this age of lightweight digital dissemination such as SSRN. Nor are we content to ascribe the lack of new material simply to the effects of tenure – though many a sleeping backwater might offer tempting distractions to those who enjoy lifetime employment, too few intelligence studies educators actually have their tenure in hand (not least due to the relative newness of many intelligence studies programs.) Likewise we find it difficult to assign blame to the consulting pathways that many intelligence professors also pursue, given the importance of networking and thought leadership in building intellectual capital for consulting assignments. (Indeed, we find that many of the scholar/bloggers of our acquaintance cite their blog as a more productive source of engagement opportunities than the institutions which supposedly provide them a place to stand respectably in the public square.)

There are many arguments both for and against blogging in pursuit of furthering the intelligence literature. In our opinion, not everyone is cut out to blog – and many, for reasons of classification and operational security, cannot (at least in public form) for entirely valid and understandable reasons. Yet this is no excuse for far too many intelligence educators – from those who work primarily if not exclusively in the unclassified, open source realm to those many now that focus on the pre-induction student pipeline at the university level.

We would strongly second the warning first given to the legal scholars as also quite fitting for those in the intelligence studies field: evolve or die.

The form into which intelligence studies evolves does not have to be a blog, but it has to be a mechanism which will advance the literature and the scholarship - and in a manner which has relevance to the native 21st century intelligence community, not merely the quaintly archaic exchange of dead trees that marked the industrial age era. Evolution does not come without risk – of professional differences and disputes, of public errors and their required corrections, or of the revision of one’s thoughts and writings in light of debate and further discourse. But in this it is no different than other forms of scholarship – merely conducted on a shorter timeline, with a self-selecting audience that is in many ways far broader in expertise, and often far more deeply studied, than the author might expect. Yet this is how the profession grows, and it is the imperative that was laid upon those who would make claim to its examination to pursue that growth.

Virtual talking heads

The circulation of the survey instrument for Mercyhurst’s new research study on video format delivery of finished intelligence has occasioned no small measure of debate among participating professionals within the community. While we are glad to see the research being conducted to advance the understanding of the field, we have some serious questions about the wider implications of the use of video for product delivery. Its historical applications have occasionally resulted in unique value – particularly for certain high level consumers, such as its famous use as part of President Reagan’s daily briefing. However, for routine production it imposes burdens on development, editing and coordination, archival processes, and technology / connectivity requirements that create issues far beyond the initial considerations of communications efficacy.

The entire discussion also reminds us of the earlier attempts to re-create intelligence briefings into virtual formats through automated processes. First popularized in response to Web 1.0 start-ups such as the virtual news readers such as Anna Nova, the concept never moved beyond research and development phases precisely for some of the same reasons. The removal of the human briefing element also created a disconnect between attention and pacing, which alienated many consumers whose areas of interest diverged from the set piece delivery – but who may have been more productively engaged by a dynamic briefer. There is also the subtle but very real impact of the uncanny valley – the noticeable aspects of the artificial in “too human” like virtual entities. (We wish to note one of our close colleagues’ wise but whimsical suggestion to replace a human virtual briefer with an object of classic children’s theatre. If nothing else, we would love to have such a product on hand to inject a bit of levity into meetings in which the participants take themselves too seriously.)

Set piece delivery tends to work best in environments where the consumer can devote only partial attention to the product – such as audio delivery of briefing or lecture materials, designed for those who are looking for cognitive engagement during other routine tasks such as driving, physical exercise, or the like. We have not yet seen an environment in which video delivery could meet this same niche – particularly for products which demand a higher degree of attention than watching CNN with the sound turned down in the typical watch center fashion. Virtual talking heads suffered the same problem.

There also remains the serious question of the longer term impacts of removing one of the few opportunities for direct interaction between consumers and intelligence professionals, where the intangibles of human relationships are nowhere as easily quantified. Perhaps there are some aspects of intelligence that simply ought not be automated, to the ultimate benefit of consumer outcomes.

Nonetheless, we will be interested to see the results of the study, and happy to see the literature of intelligence advanced in this area. We can only hope other academic studies will continue to build understanding of the nature of intelligence communication.

Critiquing Myers Briggs for the (new) intelligence workforce

Not so very long ago, it seemed that the Myers Briggs Type Indicator was all the rage within a certain segment of the intelligence community. It was imagined that one’s personality could be pinned neatly to cardboard, and used as a proxy for judging individual reactions by managers essentially uncomfortable with the messy realities of actual humans. What started as an interesting thought exercise, intended for new analysts to learn about themselves in the spirit of reflective practice (much like Johari’s Window and similar concepts) soon was extended far beyond its initial use into a whole range of areas that it should never have been attempted in.

Sometime over the course of the past few years we saw a brief respite in the recycling of the MBTI “discovery”, and thought the fad over. After all, there is a war on, and there were quite a few other new attempts at understanding the intelligence community’s workforce in a more sophisticated manner that had been discussed since. We had hoped never again to see other individuals wearing their type code as badge around the vault…

Clearly, we relaxed too soon. There is rumour of an as yet unpublished work now circulating within academic circles, which examined the MBTI of a cohort of intelligence studies students. It claims to draw some sort of generational lessons in how the Millennial will differ from their older counterparts in the community.

Now, we are among the first to point to the radical impact of the oil and water mixture of the newest members of the community with practitioners of a certain age and kind of experience. This is not in our opinion a bad thing by any means, and in fact we have seen it result in some fascinating and innovative outcomes that no one could have predicted in advance, least of all the participants involved. We also hold the greatest hope for the students yet to enter the profession, for they will be the true drivers of a kind of transformation never before seen in the community as the Long War comes to full term.

But in addition to our critique of the uses to which the MBTI has been bent, we would strongly question the utility of using a student population at a civilian institution as the benchmark for the cohort. After all, most of those students will never have spent a day within the IC (or even in a full time private contracting shop.) The behaviors and activities of a millennial college student are a far cry from their employed professional counterpart of the same age – particularly given variables such as military service. Having shepherded more than our fair share of new cohorts into the community, we are acutely aware of the changes that are quickly wrought in individuals as the weight of their new responsibilities settles full upon their shoulders.

We are also greatly aware of the changes in behavior and expressed personality characteristics created by the unique pressures of the Long War, which can vary greatly depending on the roles these individuals are assigned. Such changes demonstrate the highly situational nature of the indicator, as an individual assigned to highly collaborative collection tasks will express as far more outgoing and concrete on a particular day than he or she might when tasked to intensely cerebral, isolated research on another.

The student population also likely contains a high percentage of candidates that will never actually enter the intelligence community, whether because they are seduced by the higher salaries of the business / competitive intelligence sector, or when they find they fall into that percentage that cannot obtain a security clearance. The distortion caused by the inclusion of these individuals within the benchmark study renders any conclusions highly suspect.

It is long past time to return the MBTI to its place as a teaching tool to cultivate introspection, rather than the clumsy lever of management others have sought to make of it. We also hope that the intelligence studies academia will perhaps focus on those newer tools of workforce assessment and evaluation – such as the competencies model, or performance assessments based on the universal joint task list – which could yield viable results using a model student population.

We would also hope to see this research published in the community’s literature, or through the academy’s own press, in order that a more substantive debate might occur as to its merits, design and outcomes than speculation upon rumour would allow.

The forgotten art of descriptive analysis

Descriptive intelligence analysis is not typically considered real analysis by many academics, who usually represent the work as the bottom rung of a pyramid in which their attention remains focused on the supposed “higher echelon” tasks. These same academics tend to ignore current intelligence of all sorts, and all too often also intelligence activities conducted at the tactical level – their interest being limited largely by their lack of understanding of any products other than the most famous national and strategic FINTEL such as the PDB or NIEs.

But stop and think for a moment about how many times one encounters in the practice of the profession complex, multifaceted situations with literally decades worth of reporting that must be summarized – and in a few pages or a few minutes' briefing, convey the essence of the thing in order to even begin to understand events that transpire in the world. This is by no means an easy task, and typically may be as difficult as the kind of push for predictive intel that we see for the larger and better understood issues. That descriptive analysis seems mundane in much of recent literature is very much a product of those who work from unconscious bias and stereotypes of situations, without real depth on an account. One could even say that most of the real intelligence challenges in Iraq, since the start of OIF to the current Awakening, have been in first understanding and describing complex dynamics and personalities in order to more positively leverage the multinational capabilities to good effect. (There is a reason efforts like the Human Terrain System have been created in order to aid in better description of complex targets within the cultural environment.)

The lack of respect accorded to some of the most common and critical tasks within the community has also led to the dismissal of a whole range of environments and tradecraft which have grown more common even as they are less discussed. The proliferation of new watch centers and the growth of the fusion center concept has created new demands for real time, 24/7 intelligence support – often relying on new sources of information not previously considered by the intelligence community. After all, the needs of homeland security are far different than foreign intelligence in many cases, particularly when one examines all hazard issues and matters of greater state / local / tribal concern than the traditional CT focus. There has been simply no real effort within the intelligence studies academia to understand these environments, and to examine the changes in tradecraft wrought by new collaborative technologies, organizational structures, and functional processes that have come to be considered best practice in that world. Despite the dozens of centers, and the thousands of analysts, operators, and watchstanders employed in this segment of the community, it remains virtually unknown in the literature of the profession – not least of which because it would involve examining issues perceived to rank at the low end of some notional representation culled from decades past. And it is not just a homeland security thing - there has been an equally important growth in joint intelligence operations centers and fusion task forces within the national intelligence side of the house.

We sincerely hope that some bright young thing in one of the new academic programs will soon take an interest, and focus some much needed attention on this area.

The sun rises on Japanese intelligence

Further to the study of comparative intelligence traditions, we note the recent increased discussion of the role and activities of the intelligence profession in Japan.

The country’s WWII legacy has long made discussion of such matters extremely controversial within the context of the domestic political scene. Recent publications have however shed new light on otherwise neglected aspects of the country’s own intelligence community.

The National Bureau of Asian Research has recently reviewed two Japanese language books on the subject. The first, Nihon No Intelligence Kikan, was written by the former Chief of the Cabinet Secretariat Information Research Bureau – a position which seems very roughly analogous to a US counterpart of the NIC or even the old Office of National Estimates. The book describes the organization of the agency, its activities, and the role of OSINT in Japanese intelligence.

The second volume, Strategy on Intelligence Activity by the State, was authored as a dialogue between a former intelligence officer in the Japanese Foreign Ministry and a former intelligence officer from the South Korean Navy.

For those wishing to peruse more official sources as background before diving into such works, there is also a short briefing paper available from the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies, which provides a concise overview of the country’s intelligence structure.

We are pleased to see the internationalization of intelligence studies amongst our allies, and hope to see additional similar works in the near future (as well as English language printings…)


(With our humble thanks to the reader who kindly brought this to our attention).